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STELLINGEN 
De politiek ten aanzien van coöperaties in Indonesië beperkt de ontwikkeling 
van coöperaties op het platteland tot zelfstandige ondernemingen, 
(dit proefschrift) 
2 
Het verstrekken van kredieten door instellingen die niet de duidelijke bedoeling 
hebben leensom en rente te vorderen van de leners moet beschouwd worden 
als een gecompliceerde vorm van geld uitdelen, 
(dit proefschrift) 
3 
Het participeren van boeren in lokale organisaties verkrijgt, zeer terecht, 
uitgebreid aandacht in de literatuur betreffende coöperaties. Het deelnemen 
van onderzoekers in ontwikkelingsaktiviteiten krijgt echter vrijwel geen aan-
dacht, terwijl juist deze participatie de gelegenheid geeft inzicht te krijgen in 
het gehele complex van faktoren die succes of mislukking bepalen. 
4 
De specialisatie in akkerbouw, tuinbouw, veeteelt en bosbouw is het gevolg 
van de toegenomen kennis van de landbouw, met name in de ontwikkelde landen. 
In de landbouw van ontwikkelingslanden zijn specialisten op deze gebieden 
eveneens noodzakelijk, maar de behoefte aan generalisten die inzicht hebben 
in al deze vormen van landgebruik en in de economische en sociale aspecten 
van de landbouw wordt onderschat. In de ontwikkelingssamenwerking zou daarom 
meer aandacht gegeven moeten worden aan de opleiding van dergelijke landbouw-
kundigen, dit ten koste van de aandacht voor de opleiding van specialisten. 
5 
Het geven van geschenken en het afsluiten van financiële transacties hebben 
gemeen dat ze een langdurige relatie tussen twee partijen vestigen of bevestigen. 
Hierin verschillen beide handelingen van de goederen transactie van koop en 
verkoop. 
Baal, J. van, 1972. De boodschap der drie illusies, overdenkingen over religie, 
kunst en spel. van Gorkum & Comp. N.V., Assen. 
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6 
De koloniale erfenis dient te worden afgeschreven. Over de snelheid van af-
schrijving kan men van mening verschillen, maar het gebruik van "de koloniale 
erfenis" als reden voor het voortbestaan van als onjuist beschouwde toestanden 
is steeds minder op zijn plaats. Bovendien belemmert een dergelijke duiding de 
analyse van de huidige situatie en daarmee eventuele oplossingen voor de 
ongewenste toestanden. 
7 
Het gebruik van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen in de tuinbouw in Indonesië is 
zeer hoog. Meer onderzoek en betere voorlichting betreffende het juiste gebruik 
van deze middelen zal gunstige effekten hebben op het inkomen van de groente-
producenten en het milieu. 
8 
Uitdrukkingen als "hij heeft zijn krediet verspeeld" en "Jan heeft bij zijn 
leraar krediet" zijn gebaseerd op hetzelfde begrip krediet dat gehanteerd wordt 
door Baker en Bhargava in hun theorie betreffende liquiditeitsmanagement. 
Baker, C.B. and V.K. Bhargava, 1974. Financing small-farm development in 
India. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 18 (2): 101-118. 
9 
Het begrip afschrijving is gebaseerd op het onderscheid tussen kapitaal en 
inkomen en het verband tussen beide. Onderscheid en verband worden in 
ontwikkelingslanden veelal niet onderkend met als gevolg dat van tijd tot tijd 
rehabüitatieprogramma's nodig zijn, b.v. bij irrigatiesystemen, omdat regel-
matig onderhoud, dat kapitealsvermindering compenseert, ontbreekt. 
10 
De snelle vooruitgang in computertechnologie staat in schrille tegenstelling tot 
de stagnerende ontwikkeling van bedrijfszekere fietsverlichting. Het gevolg is 
dat we uitgebreide en recente informatie kunnen verkrijgen betreffende ongeluk-
ken met fietsers, die bij grotere aandacht voor fietsverlichting deels voorkomen 
hadden kunnen worden. 
HAJ. Moll, Farmers and finance: experience with institutional savings and 
credit in West Java. Wageningen, 21 maart 1989. 
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ABSTRACT 
This study deals with an experimental savings and credit scheme developed 
for vegetable farmers in West Java, Indonesia, by a technical cooperation project 
between the governments of Indonesia and The Netherlands. Key elements were: 
a) An organizational structure with three levels: the project as financial 
institution, village cooperatives, and groups of approximately 50 farmers. 
b) Emphasis on financial viability through an interest rate of 5.4 percent per 
month on the short-term loans provided and through the combination of savings 
and credit services. 
c) Location of the savings and credit services in the groups. 
The review and analysis of the scheme after seven years of operation shows 
that all costs of the scheme can be covered by the interest receipts and that 
the savings of the group members resulted in a considerable build-up of own 
capital in the groups; the scheme is thus financially viable. Further was 
demonstrated that it is possible to reach farming communities with diverse 
financial potential all over the vegetable production areas in West Java. These 
achievements are largely the result of the incorporation of groups in the orga-
nizational structure, which results in easy access, members' preparedness to 
save, and a reasonable cost level through the use of management capacity 
available in the local communities. 
The discussion of the experiences of the scheme in the context of the pro-
vision of financial services to farmers in developing countries in general, results 
in the formulation of seven essential factors regarding the environment in 
which financial institutions operate and regarding the operation of financial 
institutions providing services to farmers. 
Agricultural credit / Savings and credit / Cooperatives / Cost-covering interest 
rate / Indonesia / Financial relationships / Farm households 
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SUMMARY 
The provision of credit at low interest rates by formal institutions to farmers 
is in many developing countries a major component of the agricultural policy. 
The performance of these institutions and their credit programmes has fallen 
short of expectations and in many cases the programmes are terminated for 
this reason and the institutions wound up. Professionals from various disciplines 
have criticized credit policies and programmes. This criticism has provided 
insight into the political environment in which policies are formulated, the 
operation of the institutions itselves, the role of credit in agricultural develop-
ment, and the great variety of formal and informal financial relationships in 
rural areas. 
This study deals with an experimental savings and credit scheme developed 
for vegetable farmers in West Java, Indonesia. The scheme was developed in 
the context of a technical cooperation project between the governments of 
Indonesia and The Netherlands. In the experiment an attempt is being made to 
transform the experiences with institutional credit and the increased insight 
into the financial relationships in rural areas into operational guidelines. The 
scheme is reviewed and analysed with the purpose of identifing organizational, 
financial and operational factors that are decisive for its performance; to review 
the role of institutional financial services in the context of all financial rela-
tionships of the vegetable farmers; and to identify the external and internal 
conditions that are essential for the functioning of financial institutions in 
rural financial markets in developing countries. 
The experimental savings and credit scheme was formulated in consultation 
with farmers and with the staff of village cooperatives (Koperasi Unit Desa, 
KUD) in West Java. Key elements were: 
a) An organizational structure with three levels: the project, in charge of 
overall guidance and supervision; the KUDs, representing groups of farmers; 
and groups, with a membership of approximately 50 farmers, who operated 
under the legal authority of the KUD in their respective areas. 
b) Emphasis on financial viability through a nominal interest rate of 5.4 percent 
per month on the short-term loans provided and through the combination of 
savings and credit services. 
c) Location of the savings and credit services in the groups. The groups elected 
a chairman and treasurer who were in charge of the provision of loans to, 
and the collection of savings from the members. Weekly cash days were held 
for all transactions, usually in the chairman's house. 
The project provided the groups with a loan for the starting capital required 
for the provision of loans to members. The experimental savings and credit 
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scheme deviated strongly in various aspects from existing practices in Indonesia: 
the consultation with farmers and local authorities during the formulation 
process, the use of groups of farmers with a considerable measure of indepen-
dence, and the interest rate of 5.4 percent per month for the short-term loans. 
The experimental scheme started in 1979 with four groups in the area of 
one KUD. The evaluation after 8 months showed encouraging results and it 
was decided to expand the scheme. At the end of 1985, 94 groups in 11 KUDs 
were in operation in all major vegetable production areas of West Java. The 
expansion went together with an adaptation of regulations with regard to the 
financial management in the groups, and with a formalization of the relations 
between groups, KUDs and project. As a result, the project developed into a 
financial institution, with relations with KUDs and groups formalized. The 
groups showed their ability to operate as legal bodies on their own, but 
Indonesian cooperative policy forbad the establishment of groups outside the 
KUDs, and therefore the KUDs remained involved as the legal representatives 
of the groups. 
The review and analysis of the scheme after seven years of operation shows 
that all costs of the scheme can be covered by the interest receipts and that 
the savings of the group members resulted in a considerable build-up of own 
capital in the groups; the scheme is thus financially viable. The efforts of the 
scheme to reach all farmers and to build up relations with members based on 
confidence were partly successful. Experience has shown that the efforts of 
the scheme in these directions must be complemented by the interest of farmers 
in a permanent financial relationship, and that fanners must show this interest 
by maintaining a correct repayment discipline. In most of the groups the great 
majority of the farmers have shown this interest, and the experimental scheme 
has demonstrated that it is possible to reach farming communities with diverse 
financial potential all over the vegetable production areas in West Java. These 
achievements are largely the result of the incorporation of groups in the or-
ganizational structure of the scheme, which results in easy access, members' 
preparedness to save, and a reasonable cost level through the use of management 
capacity available in the local communities. 
The situation of vegetable farmers in West Java is specific, and operational 
aspects of the scheme, such as the type of services provided, the interest 
rate, and the frequency of cash days were formulated to deal with this situation. 
In other situations these operational aspects need to be modified. When form-
ulating these aspects in other situations, the approach used by the scheme 
could be followed. 
The discussion of the experiences of the scheme in the context of the pro-
vision of financial services to farmers in developing countries in general, results 
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in the formulation of seven essential factors regarding the environment in 
which financial institutions operate and regarding the operation of financial 
institutions. The factors regarding the environment are: 
1. The government must refrain from interfering in interest rates and operational 
aspects such as lending policy. 
2. Farm households must have a capacity to save, to enable them to comply 
voluntarily with the terms and conditions of a relationship with financial inst-
itutions. 
3. The existing formal and informal financial relations in rural financial markets 
form elements of competition that limit the freedom of an institution to set 
interest rates and further terms and conditions of its services. 
The factors regarding the operations of institutions are: 
4. Operational costs must be covered by interest receipts, and the operational 
costs must be sufficiently low so that credit can be offered at an attractive 
rate to borrowers, and capital can be attracted at a rate that satisfies lenders. 
5. The services provided must be adjusted to the farmers' requirements. 
6. The physical distance between institution and farmers must be limited, to 
keep the costs of access at a low level. 
7. Services must be provided in the knowledge that permanent relationships 
with farmers are essential, because these services are useful to farmers now 
and in future. 
These essential factors form a comprehensive framework for the analysis of 
the functioning of financial institutions in rural financial markets in developing 
countries. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
LI Credit and agricultural development 
Increasing agricultural production is a widely accepted major objective in 
the national development policies of low-income countries. This emphasis results 
from the importance of the agricultural sector in the national economy and 
the fact that a large proportion of the population depends directly or indirectly 
on agriculture for its livelihood. To reach this objective, millions of farmers 
must be motivated to adopt modern production technologies to intensify pro-
duction or to increase the area tilled. Such motivation is considerably influenced 
by decisions taken at national level regarding prices of agricultural products 
and inputs, land use rights, access to markets and by the availability of sup-
porting services and infrastructure. For farmers, the modern production tech-
nologies generally mean new investments and/or increased purchases of inputs, 
and thus higher capital requirements. Policy makers have often voiced the 
opinion that this financial aspect formed a major obstacle to modernization. 
The limited financial capacity of farmers was stressed, they were often simply 
considered to be 'poor', and existing sources of finance were considered to 
be inadequate to deal with the increased financial requirements. Donor countries 
and agencies accepted the diagnosis 'lack of capital' as the principal cause of 
an ailing agriculture, and supported the obvious remedy, the transfer of capital 
in cash or in kind. In many countries these converging viewpoints resulted in 
the provision of cheap credit by formal institutions as an important incentive 
to motivate fanners to adopt modern production methods. 
However, the performance of many credit programmes has fallen short of 
expectations and the costs have proved to be much higher than anticipated. 
Moreover, any positive effects were temporary, because permanent relations 
were not established between financial institutions and fanners. A great number 
of credit programmes were therefore terminated after several years of operation, 
with only the vague conclusion that the programme had most probably somehow 
contributed to the desired increase of agricultural production. 
Criticism of credit policies and programmes has been building up from various 
directions, especially since the 1972/73 'Spring Review" on small farmer credit 
programmes by the U.S. Agency for International Development revealed the 
almost universal nature of the problems. The traditional assumptions of many 
policy makers regarding the capability of farm households to save and invest 
and the performance of informal financial intermediaries have been questioned 
and generally found weak or false. The political interference in financial insti-
tutions and the cheap credit policies of government-supported projects have 
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been criticized by Adams, Graham, Von Pischke and many others, who concluded 
that these policies were based on faulty assumptions and resulted in seriously 
disturbed financial markets. The role of institutional credit in the context of 
agricultural development has been questioned and it has often been found that 
adverse price policies, infrastructural shortcomings or lack of suitable tech-
nologies formed the major constraints to development. The criticism of insti-
tutional credit programmes resulted in the conclusion that the provision of 
cheap, institutional credit is not the universal remedy for an ailing agriculture. 
Professionals from various disciplines have not only focused their attention 
on the functioning of institutional credit, but also on the great variety of 
formal and informal financial relationships in rural areas. These studies have 
resulted in a more comprehensive understanding of the financial environment 
of farmers, and rural households in general. The concept of rural financial 
markets was developed and within this context it became clear that financial 
institutions are just one of the operators providing financial services to rural 
households. 
Despite criticism on credit programmes and a more balanced view of the 
position of institutional credit in rural financial markets, one basic assumption 
of all credit programmes has not been questioned: financial institutions are in 
principle in a position to provide valuable services to farmers who become 
more extensively engaged in modern agriculture. If this assumption is accepted, 
the original statement from the 1960s: 'farmers must be supplied with institu-
tional credit' must be replaced by two main questions: 'what types of financial 
services are required by farmers?' and 'what type of institution is able to 
provide these services?' These two questions can only be addressed through 
experiments with new types of financial institutions that have new methods of 
operation; such experiments must be built on experience with the costly failure 
of many credit programmes in the past and on a better understanding of the 
financial environment in rural areas. 
12 Approach and objectives of the study 
This study deals with an experimental savings and credit scheme for vegetable 
farmers in West Java, Indonesia. In the experiment, an attempt is being made 
to transform the experiences with institutional credit and the better under-
standing of rural financial markets into operational guidelines for the de-
velopment of a financial institution in a specific situation. The experiment was 
formulated on the basis of: a review of world-wide experience with institutional 
credit and other financial relations in rural financial markets; a study of the 
institutional and financial environment in Indonesia; a study of existing credit 
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services for vegetable fanners in West Java; and an assessment of the financial 
position of the vegetable farmers. The key elements of the scheme are: 
- An organizational structure with three levels: financial institution, village 
cooperative, and groups of approximately 50 farmers living in the same neigh-
bourhood. Tasks and responsibilities are divided to make efficient use of know-
ledge and management capacity at all levels. 
- Emphasis on financial viability through cost-covering interest rates on loans 
and through the combination of savings and credit services. 
- Location of the savings and credit activities in the groups, the level closest 
to the the farmers. 
The scheme was developed in the context of a technical cooperation project 
between the governments of Indonesia and The Netherlands. The project was 
placed under the direct responsibility of the Directorate General of Cooperatives 
in the Ministry of Trade and Cooperatives in Indonesia. 
In this study the experimental savings and credit scheme is described and 
analysed from its start in 1979 until the end of 1985, with the aim of: 
- Identifying the organizational, financial and operational factors that are 
decisive for the performance of the scheme. 
- Reviewing the role of the institutional financial services provided by the 
scheme in the context of all internal and external financial relations of farm 
households. 
- Identifying the external and internal conditions that are essential for the 
functioning of financial institutions providing services to farmers in general. 
13 Background 
From 1977 until 1982 the author was stationed in Bandung, the capital of 
West Java province, as advisor in the cooperatives and credit section of the 
project 'Marketing vegetables and fruits in West Java'. He was directly involved 
in the formulation and implementation of the experimental savings and credit 
scheme until his departure in 1982. Thereafter, regular contact with the project 
was maintained, and in 1986 he returned to Indonesia for two months to review 
the development and performance of the scheme. 
1.4C»utIme 
The study follows the approach outlined in Section 1.2. In Chapter 2 the 
literature regarding farmers and finance is reviewed, with the emphasis on the 
institutional and informal financial relations in rural financial markets and the 
financial relationships of farm households. The chapter ends by summarizing 
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the conclusions that were of particular relevance for the formulation of the 
experimental scheme. Chapter 3 deals with the environment of the scheme. 
The institutional infrastructure in the agricultural sector in Indonesia is desc-
ribed in two sections focused on institutional finance and cooperatives, respec-
tively. The existing institutional and informal credit arrangements in West 
Java are reviewed in the next section. The chapter ends with the analysis of 
the financial position of the vegetable farmers. The sections of this chapter 
end with the findings and conclusions that further determined the framework 
for the formulation of the scheme. Chapter 4 gives a review of the savings 
and credit scheme from its formulation in 1978/1979 up until 1985. Main atten-
tion is focused on organizational structure, financial viability, access to financial 
services, and the financial relations of the farm households. In the second 
section of this chapter the reader is introduced to the operation of the scheme 
in the field through an account of the proceedings in two groups. In Chapter 
5 the results of, and the experience with, the experimental scheme are discussed. 
First, the performance of the scheme is discussed; in the next section the 
focus is on the environment in which the scheme operates; and in the third 
section the specific aspects of the project as implementing agency are discussed. 
The chapter ends with a discussion of the relevance of the experience for the 
provision of institutional financial services to farmers in general. 
5 
2 FARMERS AND FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Fanners and finance in developing countries covers a wide spectrum of topics 
ranging from national financial policies to the use of credit by peasant farmers. 
In this chapter the literature is reviewed under two headings: the government 
- dealing with issues at national level; and rural financial markets - the envi-
ronment in which financial services are offered by a variety of operators and 
demanded by farm households. The purposes of this review are to provide a 
descriptive view of the environment of financial relations in rural areas and 
to discuss the central issues in the provision of institutional financial services. 
2.1 The government 
The government's economic and financial policies have a profound influence 
on rural financial markets and farm households. This influence stretches from 
the economic and financial environment in rural areas to specific aspects of 
the provision of financial services to farmers. Basic policy decisions determine 
the role of the agricultural sector vis-a-vis other sectors in the national eco-
nomy. These policies are reflected in the institutional organization of the 
government apparatus and in a hierarchy of priorities and measures which 
have widespread repercussions, for example on the rural infrastructure and 
agricultural incomes. The institutionalization of the basic policies results in a 
high degree of inflexibility in the short run. This inflexibility is further en-
hanced by the choices and priorities made and set in the private sector, which 
are related to those of the government. The result is a trend in the incomes 
of agricultural and rural households that has consequences for the propensity 
and ability to invest, save, obtain and repay loans and thus the functioning of 
rural financial markets. 
The government's monetary policy with regard to the stability of the domestic 
currency and the exchange rate is of great importance for the general con-
fidence in money, an essential condition for the well-functioning of the financial 
sector. Disturbances, such as unexpected large depreciations, monetary reforms 
or periods with high inflation have negative effects on savers, borrowers and 
intermediaries alike. Persons or firms with excess money are deterred from 
saving and the disturbances, or the possibility thereof, form an additional risk 
for financial intermediaries, a risk which results in higher risk premiums and 
thus higher costs for the borrowers. 
The government determines the institutional structure of the financial system. 
The role of the central bank in financial and monetary policies, and the exis-
tence and roles of private banks, government banks, development banks and 
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other financial institutions directly reflect national priorities and policies. 
Further, the government provides the legal framework for the operations of 
these formal financial institutions. This legislation is in the first place aimed 
at protecting the interests of borrowers and lenders and the common interest 
in a sound financial and monetary system. Regulations regarding solvability 
and liquidity, measures to enforce repayments and the role of the central 
bank vis-a-vis the financial institutions are part of the legal framework in all 
countries. 
In many countries the role of the government goes beyond the general mea-
sures mentioned. Development policies often result in interventions such as 
the determination of interest rates, the allocation of credit to specific sectors, 
regions or groups, and interference in loan recovery procedures. These inter-
ventions basically affect the financial operations of the institutions and they 
result in an artificial competitive position of institutions vis-a-vis informal 
intermediaries in rural financial markets. One step further than intervention 
is direct government participation in the provision of financial services through 
specialized farm credit institutions or cooperatives. Measures taken to curb 
the operations of informal financial intermediaries are often parallel to inter-
vention and participation, because such intermediaries are considered to be 
exploiters not serving the common interest. Intervention in financial institutions 
and direct government participation will be dealt with in more detail in Section 
2.2.1 dealing with formal institutions. 
Government interventions in prices of agricultural products or inputs form a 
special risk factor for farmers and financial intermediaries. Prices and subsidies 
can be changed overnight and these changes directly affect agricultural incomes. 
In the case of lower incomes, existing financial transactions may be disrupted 
if default becomes unavoidable. The risk of changes in price policies is especially 
important for the producers of crops for the national or international market. 
Attempts to stimulate the production of basic food crops at prices that are 
kept low for the urban population often result in an intricate network of 
input subsidies, price regulations and trade restrictions. For the producers of 
export crops the risks resulting from possible changes in government interven-
tions and exchange rate policies are added to the vagaries of the world market. 
Additional government intervention, such as the provision of long term credit 
on easy terms for producers of perennial export crops, may be required to 
reduce the risk for farmers to acceptable levels. The lender, in most cases 
the government, then becomes directly involved and bears part of the risk of 
policy changes and price fluctuations on the world market. 
Besides the influence of national economic and financial policies on domestic 
affairs, these policies also influence the access of governments and their subjects 
7 
to international capital markets. Foreign private financial institutions and 
investors will only be prepared to provide capital if they see profitable oppor-
tunities. These largely depend on policies regarding imports and exports, the 
convertibility of the national currency, and other regulations. Donor countries 
and international agencies provide loans on commercial or concessionary terms 
under conditions that might restrict the use of the funds or that might affect 
national policies. Thus, the degree to which a government wishes to participate 
in international financial markets restricts its freedom to determine national 
financial and economic policies. 
22 Rural financial markets 
A rural financial market (RFM) consists of relationships between buyers and 
sellers of financial assets who are active in rural economies. The relationships 
are based on transactions that include borrowing, lending, and transfer of 
ownership of financial assets: debt claims, verbal or written promises to pay, 
and ownership claims, giving the holder the right of access, use or control 
(Von Pischke et al., 1983). The concept of RFM covers formal institutions, 
informal intermediaries, the enterprises and households demanding financial 
services and the financial relationships based on reciprocity. It forms the context 
for the discussion of central issues in financial services and for the review of 
participants and relationships. 
The distinction made in the definition of RFMs between relationships and 
transactions points to a fundamental feature of financial markets, namely the 
exchange of resources for commitments to pay specified resources in the future. 
A basic condition for these transactions is confidence in the ability and intention 
of the party making the commitment to fulfil the transaction in the future. 
Confidence can be supported by the possibility of legal action, by the lender 
having personal knowledge of the borrower, or by collateral, but confidence 
remains an essential element in financial transactions. This confidence is not 
simply an element that is present or absent; it is gradually built up in relation-
ships between individuals, within groups, or between individuals and institutions. 
In this study the ability to develop and maintain financial relationships is one 
of the central issues in the review and analysis of the experimental scheme. 
The mobilization of savings and the provision of credit are the basic functions 
in RFMs. Both functions should preferably be performed through an array of 
institutional and informal arrangements to suit the requirements a) of depositors 
with varying capacity to save, liquidity preference and propensity to bear 
risk, and b) of borrowers with their specific needs with regard to amount, 
duration and repayment conditions. Intermediaries play an important role in 
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the adjustment of financial streams between savers and borrowers. They pool 
the savings of many persons, generally deposited in short-term accounts, and 
transform these into a smaller number of larger amounts lent for specific 
periods. The linking of RFMs with financial markets at national level is a 
third function of RFMs, which is especially performed by formal institutions. 
Such a linkage is of importance to reduce seasonal, sectoral and regional fluc-
tuations in the demand for and supply of finance in RFMs, and in later stages 
it opens the possibility for the rural population to participate in investments 
outside the rural sector. 
When reviewing the performance of RFMs and their individual operators it 
is very important to consider the cost of financial intermediation. High lending 
and borrowing costs result in low interest rates being offered to savers, high 
costs for the borrowers and thus in a low volume of resources transferred to 
optimal uses. The effects of borrowing and lending costs are shown in Figure 
2.1 below. S represents the supply of capital by depositors; D represents the 
interest 
rate 
L S 
Figure 2.1. The effects of costs on financial intermediation. 
demand for capital by borrowers. The line dx represents the demand of borrowers 
for capital obtained from intermediaries; it is derived from D by subtracting 
the additional borrowing costs borrowers incur. The line dz represents the 
demand for capital by intermediaries; it is derived from di by subtracting the 
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admiriistration and default costs of intermediaries. In a situation where there 
are no borrowing costs and costs for the intermediary, the lines di and dz 
coincide with D; a quantity of capital q„ would be deposited and loaned at 
interest rate u. The existence of borrowing and lending costs leads to the 
situation indicated by line L. The volume of capital that is collected by inter-
mediaries and distributed to borrowers is reduced from q a to qt, while the 
costs for the borrowers increase from i* to i* and the returns to depositors 
diminish from L to it>. The differences between i* and u and between ii and 
it, represent the borrowing cost and lending cost respectively. Low cost of 
lending and low borrowing costs, i.e. efficient intermediation, thus facilitate 
the optimal use of funds in an RFM. 
The interest rate on loans is determined by the cost of lending and the 
lender's margin. The cost of lending is composed of three elements: the cost 
of capital, the administrative costs, and the cost resulting from default. The 
cost of capital is either the cost incurred to obtain funds or the opportunity 
cost, depending on the situation of the lender. It is assumed that inflation is 
included in the cost of capital. The capital available for lending is seldom 
lent in total, because of the fluctuating demand for loans. This limited use of 
capital proportionally raises the cost of capital on loans provided (if the lender 
has access to short-term deposit facilities, the cost increase that result from 
the limited use of the available capital is reduced). The various administrative 
costs, for staff, buildings, transport, information gathering and office supplies, 
are incurred mainly during the supply of loans and the receipt of repayments, 
and administrative costs are fairly independent of the duration and size of 
the loan. The risk involved in the supply of loans can be expressed either ex 
ante in the risk premium, estimated by the lender prior to the supply of a 
loan, or ex post in the default rate calculated on loans supplied and repayments 
received. Default as actual cost element is used to express the risk in this 
section. Default results in the loss of capital, a loss which must be compensated 
if the intermediary wishes to remain in business, and it leads to an overall 
cost increase to offset the effects of the partial non-payment of costs by 
defaulters. The cost of lending (i) can be calculated with the formula: 
i = (-§ + a + d) 1 
with: c cost of capital in percentage for the period of the loan, 
use of capital in percentage, 
administrative costs in percentage of loans supplied, 
default rate in percentage of loans supplied. 
u 
a 
d 
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The cost elements should all refer to the same period. This is normally not 
the actual case, because loans are provided with different durations and as at 
any moment there will be loans outstanding that are not yet due. However, 
the formula is useful to calculate the cost of lending under various anticipated 
conditions (Table 2.1). It is reasonable to assume that administrative costs, 
Table 2.1. Cost of lending. 
Duration Cost of Capital Admin. Default Cost of lending 
capital use cost H > * e 
1) total per month 
(months) (%) (%) (%) <*) (%) (%) 
(i) 6 6.0 70.0 10.0 10.0 31.7 53 
(ii) 6 6.0 70.0 2.0 10.0 22.9 3.8 
(iii) 3 3.0 70.0 10.0 10.0 27.0 9.0 
(iv) 12 12.0 70.0 10.0 10.0 41.3 3.4 
(v) 8 2.0 95.0 2.0 35 7.9 1.0 
1. One percent per month for cases i-hr, three percent per year for case v. 
expressed as a percentage of the loan amount, is higher for small loans than 
for larger loans, and this is represented in cases i and ii, respectively. This leads 
to the difference in the cost of lending between these two cases. The preference 
of formal institutions, with their considerable administrative costs, for the larger 
customers is clearly understandable. Cases iii and iv demonstrate the effect of 
the duration of the loan on the cost. Cost of capital is 1 percent per month 
in both cases, but administrative costs and cost of default must be recovered 
after three months in case iii and after twelve months in case iv. This results 
in the higher cost per month in case iii. Finally, case v gives the values for 
the cost elements that are required to arrive at a lending cost of 1 percent 
per month, a rate which is not unusual for loans provided by institutions. 
Extremely low capital cost, 3 percent per annum, an almost complete use of 
funds, low administrative costs and an exceptionally low default rate are required 
to break even at this interest rate per month. Cases i to iv show that interest 
rates of 40-50 percent per annum charged by informal intermediaries (Section 
2.2.2.1) by no means point to a situation in which high monopoly profits are 
made. Rather they indicate that the cost of lending small amounts for short 
periods is high, even if capital costs are low and if defaults are not exceptional-
ly high. 
Borrowers pay for the cost of lending and for the margin of intermediaries 
through the" interest on loans, but they also incur additional costs. These addi-
tional borrowing costs, such as travel expenses, time spent, charges for permits 
or registration and, possibly, bribes, can be considerable, depending on which 
procedures the intermediary follows. These borrowing costs, together with the 
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borrower's perception of the chance of his application for credit being turned 
down, form the effective borrowing costs as seen by the prospective borrower. 
2.2.1 Formal institutions 
The formal institutions in RFMs operate within the framework of regulations 
(and possibly interventions) laid down by the government. This framework sup-
ports the institutions through links with the central bank and through regula-
tions, which both add to the status of reliability, an important intangible asset 
of an institution dealing with finance. The legal framework may also hamper 
the activities of an institution, if it interferes with the banking principles 
and the operation of the institution as a business. The question of whether 
formal institutions are supported or hampered by the government's regulations 
and interventions is of central importance in the following review of the per-
formance of commercial banks, specialized farm credit institutions and coope-
ratives in RFMs. Other institutions providing financial services, such as insurance 
companies, finance corporations and, possibly, postal services, are not included 
in the review, because they have a minor role at most. 
2.2.1.1 Commercial banks 
The role of commercial banks in RFMs in developing countries is small, in 
the first place because they are often absent in rural areas, in the second place 
because, if present, they confine their activities to a small proportion of the 
clients in RFMs. Commercial banks are urban-based institutions specialized in 
providing services to enterprises (usually large ones) in trade and industry. These 
enterprises are financially well organized, and this, plus the availability of 
assets, forms a secure basis for credit transactions. Branch offices in rural 
areas deal with the same type of clients: traders and large-scale entrepreneurs 
who are able to offer stores of goods or buildings as security. Besides the 
provision of short-term credit, the banks generally offer deposit and transfer 
facilities which are valuable services in isolated rural areas. The direct connec-
tion with the regional or national office of the bank further offers access to 
all financial services available in urban centres. 
Small farmers are generally outside the scope of commercial banks: they are 
unable to offer securities because they do not own land or cannot prove own-
ership; the scale of transactions is small, which results in relatively high 
administrative costs; the risk originating from uncertainty about yields and 
marketable surpluses, prices, previous debts and family circumstances is con-
sidered too high The provision of credit, generally short-term credit, to traders, 
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large entrepreneurs and possibly cooperatives is, however, important for small 
farmers too. It enables direct payment for produce delivered, and the redistri-
bution of loans by large entrepreneurs to small farmers is a well-known phenom-
enon. In southern India this role of traders is actively supported by the state 
government by providing fertilizer dealers with loans for inputs and agricultural 
production (Harris, 1980), but this is an exceptional case. 
Governments, for various reasons, have sought ways and means to induce 
commercial banks to provide increased amounts of finance to the agricultural 
sector, particularly to small farmers. The establishment of portfolio-ceilings to 
specific lending services of commercial banks is one of the instruments used by 
the government to enforce allocation of finance to the agricultural sector. 
Measures like this invariably lead to evasive practices, which means inefficiency, 
possibly corruption, and political manipulation, and the effect on agricultural 
development or on the well-being of small farmers is doubtful 
The provision of rediscount facilities for agricultural loans is a second instru-
ment that is, in principle, more attractive to banks because of the access to 
capital at subsidized interest rates. It means an increased flow of government 
funds to the agricultural sector. However, it may enable the banks to use their 
own funds solely for other purposes, and thus, the total effect of rediscounting 
on the allocation of funds is difficult to measure. In Mexico the system of redis-
counting has been in operation since 1955. Romero Chavez (in Von Pischke et 
al., 1983) concludes in his review 'It (agricultural credit) has grown considerably 
and is in good standing thanks to the protection the government grants to both 
the central (rediscounting) institution and the commercial banks. One main disad-
vantage, however, comes from the political situation that surrounds the system 
and makes lenders quite selective'. Further he concludes that: 'the weakest link 
in the chain - the one between rural borrower and local credit institution - must 
be strengthened'. This comment, after 25 years of special government effort, 
points at the difficulties banks have in providing services to the rural population 
and the limited effect of government policies to induce the banks to do so. 
2.2.1.2 Specialized farm credit institutions 
Many governments in developing countries have tried to improve the access 
of farmers to financial institutions by establishing special institutions. Von 
Pischke (1981) defined these institutions as specialized farm credit institutions 
(SFCI), being government institutions or programmes that offer farmers loans 
but no other significant services. The performance of SFCI in many countries 
is below expectations, and the discussion of policies, operational aspects and 
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the total concept of SFCI by Von Pischke, Adams (in various publications), 
Donald (1976) and others forms the core of the debate on agriculture and 
credit. The main points and themes of the discussion are reviewed below. 
The establishment of SFCI is based on a number of almost universal assump-
tions regarding farmers, agriculture and finance: farmers are poor, hence do not 
save and thus are unable to help themselves; the supply of institutional credit 
is an essential requirement for agricultural development or, in other terms, to 
increase the standard of living of farmers; this credit should be cheap because 
farmers are poor; the government should promote rural welfare, and the supply 
of credit is an instrument to do this; existing institutions or intermediaries 
are unable, or unacceptable, to perform the role of supplier of additional credit. 
Two of these assumptions require a review in a broader context: the question 
of whether farmers are poor or not, or more precisely whether farmers are 
able to invest or not, is discussed in Section 2.2.3; the focus of governments 
on SFCI as the sole vehicle for credit is dealt with at the end of the review 
of all participants in RFMs. The discussion below is focused on three topics, 
which together determine the performance of SFCI: cheap credit policy, lending 
policy, and operations. 
The functioning of SFCI is largely determined by the main objective to 
provide credit at 'reasonable' interest rates. 'Reasonable' generally means that 
credit is supplied at negative real interest rates, or in any case, at rates below 
the market rates. In the first place, these rates exclude the attraction of savings 
at acceptable interest rates, and thus exclude the provision of a service for 
which an institution with links to national financial markets and possibilities 
for safekeeping is, in principle, well suited. For the institution itself this means 
that chances to obtain valuable information about the local market and to 
establish regular relations with clients are neglected. A second consequence is 
that SFCI, with their high costs of lending, can never cover costs by interest 
receipts; they unavoidably operate at a loss. In this situation, profit and loss 
account and balance sheet cease to be indicators of operations, and the SFCI 
is left without a steering mechanism. Instead, the number and amount of loans 
disbursed are often taken as indicators for the functioning of the SFCI, but 
disbursement is only part of the business and as such an unsuitable measure 
of success or failure. The unavoidable losses and the inability to attract own 
funds result in a continuous dependency on funds from the initiator of the 
SFCI and this precludes a policy change towards banking principles. In the 
third place, the supply of cheap credit will be met by an excessive demand 
for credit for a variety of purposes, some of which are not worth public support. 
Credit rationing is the consequence, and the application of the cost-minimizing 
criterion is an obvious way to do this. The inevitable consequence is that 
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larger farmers, or larger clients in general, will benefit most. However, such 
a criterion is contradictory to the official objectives of SFCI and the prefe-
rential treatment of larger clients takes place without clear directives or control. 
In this situation, where officials hold power to make decisions on vague criteria 
and where positive decisions result in clear benefits, corruption and political 
manipulation may flourish. 
The lending policy followed by SFCI is to provide loans in specific amounts 
for specific purposes to those who have the potential to use the loan for the 
specified purpose. This is based on the idea that the provision of a specific loan 
amount results in the use of the correct amount of inputs, which leads to the 
planned output that is sufficient to improve the farmer's income and to repay 
the loan. Such a reasoning disregards the intentions of the individual farmers, 
their financial requirements, and the vagaries of agricultural production. The 
application of ownership of land, or in general the potential to use the loan for 
the specified purpose, as the main criterion for the allocation of loans leads to 
misallocation. Some of those eligible might have no intention of using the loan 
for the purpose specified, or for other productive purposes, and others might 
have no intention of repaying. By fixing loan amounts the SFCI disregard the 
farmer's experience in the use of inputs as well as his own financial means. The 
relations between inputs, physical output and income in agriculture are variable 
and partly unpredictable, especially when new technology is involved. The 
average output may be as estimated, but regional differences and fluctuations 
from year to year might result in lower than average returns for a large 
proportion of the borrowers. Misallocation of credit funds because of faulty 
loan evaluation criteria, inappropriate loan amounts and variations in returns 
result in repayment rates that are disastrous for SFCI. Repayment rates of 
less than 50 percent are normal, and rates of 85-95 percent, usual rates in 
the private sector, are exceptional, especially after a few years of operation. 
The operations of SFCI are based on two considerations that are partly 
contradictory. The aim of SFCI is to reach large numbers of small farmers, and 
only simple procedures will enable large numbers of applications to be processed. 
The specific purpose for which credit is supplied, however, requires control, 
administrative as well as in the field, which means elaborate procedures. These 
two considerations must be balanced within the limits of the budget and the 
available manpower. In practice, the procedures are generally elaborate and strict 
control cannot be achieved because of the fungibility of credit. The procedures 
may form an important obstacle for small farmers, because the borrowing costs 
can be considerable when compared with the small amount that the farmers are 
eligible for. Procedures as such may also limit the access of specific groups of 
borrowers to credit. The use of complicated forms, official language, and in 
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general the approach of the staff may form an effective barrier which only 
the more urban-oriented, educated clients can surmount. 
This brief review of the main aspects of the performance of SFCI leads to 
the conclusion that SFCI do not function satisfactorily: funds are continuously 
required to cover losses; the target group is hardly reached; and signs of mis-
allocation and misuse of funds by fanners and bank staff become increasingly 
apparent after a few years of operation. Eventually, politicians and officials will 
conclude that the performance of SFCI is not satisfactory; the usual lifetime 
of SFCI is 5-10 years. 
The debate on SFCI has revealed the peculiar mixture of political and 
financial assumptions that first lead to the establishment of SFCI, and that 
secondly result in their poor performance. It has also pointed to essential 
conditions for improving the performance of financial institutions: cost-covering 
interest rates; the provision of more services than credit alone; and flexibility 
in lending policy. However, the debate leaves us with two important questions: 
1. Is it possible to utilize the increased insight gained, and establish financial 
institutions that are able to deal with services in the small amounts farmers 
require, and still operate at a cost level which makes cost-covering interest 
rates acceptable? 
2. Why do SFCI continue to be established and re-established, with new names 
and with new packages? 
The first question can only be answered by experiments, and this study deals 
with such an experiment. The answer to the second question must be sought 
outside the domain of financial intermediation. Within a national agricultural 
policy, the disbursement of credit may act as incentive for the adoption of 
innovations. Losses incurred by SFCI are then considered inputs in the total 
programme, and may be acceptable from this viewpoint. Another motive for 
establishing or re-establishing SFCI is direct political gain by a group, political 
party or the government. From these viewpoints SFCI may or may not be 
justified; this question is outside the scope of this study, but it must be clear 
that the negative effect of SFCI on RFMs is a heavy price to be paid. The 
operation of SFCI leads to the undermining of the repayment discipline of 
farmers, it is disastrous for the operating standards of staff of financial inst-
itutions involved and, in general, it spoils the possibility of sound financial 
relations between individuals and institutions. 
2.2.1.3 Cooperatives 
A cooperative is a voluntary, democratically controlled association of people 
with the specific purpose of conducting some kind of business. Cooperatives 
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operate under a cooperative law or act, and after registration a cooperative 
becomes a body corporate liable to conduct business in its own right. Coope-
ratives generally operate in the field of input supply, marketing and financial 
services. Governments of developing countries and international development 
agencies often primarily look upon cooperatives as instruments for agricultural 
or rural development. These two approaches: cooperatives as business and co-
operatives as instruments for public policy are at the core of the discussion 
of the performance of cooperatives in the field of finance. 
Single-purpose cooperatives providing credit only, thus not combined with 
the collection of savings, are to a large extent government instruments to 
channel funds to farmers or the rural population. Membership is required in 
order to obtain a loan, but the consequences may be no more than an additional 
signature and the deduction of the entrance fee from the loan amount. This 
type of cooperative resembles the SFCI. Indeed, in his review of cooperatives, 
Youngjohns (in Howell, 1980), discusses problems similar to those presented in 
Section 2.2.1.2. His conclusion is that single-purpose cooperatives have no 
basis for commercial operation, because of government interference and the 
too narrowly defined activity, and this is in line with the conclusions regarding 
SFCI. 
The combination of credit services with input supply and marketing services 
in one cooperative results in several countries in viable enterprises. The coffee 
cooperatives in Kenya and dairy and sugar cooperatives in India are examples 
of this type of multipurpose cooperative. Credit (short-term as well as medium-
term) is provided, together with the inputs required. Repayments are deducted 
from the proceeds of the products marketed through the cooperative. This 
combination of services works especially well if the cooperative is the only 
marketing channel; this is often the case with export products, such as coffee 
and cocoa, or products requiring processing such as cotton or milk. The good 
performance of these cooperatives in terms of turnover and profitability partly 
results from the monopoly position created or maintained by the government, 
and the actual costs of the services provided may be high. Multipurpose co-
operatives have advantages, because the continuity of activities and the larger 
scale of operations enable qualified staff to be employed, and overheads can 
be spread over the various activities. A disadvantage is the complexity of the 
enterprise, which may be beyond the management and control capacity of the 
members. Inefficiency and political interference are the obvious dangers in 
such a situation. The credit services cannot be evaluated separately, because 
the viability of the total package of services (which may depend on price 
setting or a monopoly position) determines the success or failure of all the 
services together. 
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The inclusion of savings facilities in the services provided by cooperatives 
has met with a remarkable response of members in a number of countries. Von 
Pischke (Von Pischke et al., 1983) gives details about Kenya's Cooperative 
Savings Scheme, which started in 1970 in coffee cooperatives. The scheme 
offered new and relatively attractive saving opportunities. Balances accumulated 
rapidly and surpassed the volume of outstanding loans. The identification of 
profitable and appropriate uses for the funds became a main problem. The 
performance of cooperatives in the field of saving in Korea and Taiwan is 
well documented (Lee et al., 1979; Adams, 1979; Cole and Park, 1983) and in 
these countries a large saving potential has been tapped and channelled into 
profitable uses. According to Wai (1972) the mobilization of savings requires 
three key elements: people must have sufficient resources or income to be 
able to save; they must have secure and dependable opportunities to save; and 
they must have an incentive to save. Cooperatives are in the position to comply 
with the second and third elements, provided interest rates are set, or allowed 
to be set, at realistic rates. 
Credit Unions are cooperatives specialized in the collection of savings and 
the provision of credit. The operations are generally entirely based on the 
members' own capital contributed through their regular savings. This self suffi-
ciency in resources leads to a great measure of self control and a minimum 
of government influence. Credit unions typically flourish in urban areas where 
wage-earners, able to make regular contributions, constitute the main part of 
the membership. The role in rural areas is limited, and it could be that informal 
institutions perform similar services satisfactorily, thus diminishing the need 
for formalization. 
Stricktly speaking, group lending does not fall under the activities of co-
operatives, because groups do not have the formal status of cooperatives. The 
groups are, however, generally all supported by institutions that either avoid 
the term cooperative because of earlier unfortunate experiences, or who consider 
the groups as pre-cooperatives. Group lending, therefore, can be considered as 
a form of cooperative lending without many of the formalities and without the 
usually high expectations bestowed on formal cooperatives. Group lending has 
three potential advantages above lending to individuals: the reduction of transfer 
costs for lenders as well as borrowers; the reduction of the risk of loan default 
through group pressure and joint responsibility; and a more economic access by 
farmers to extension services. The performance of group lending in 10 countries 
is evaluated by Desai (Von Pischke et al., 1983). His overall conclusions are that 
lenders' administrative costs are moderately reduced, repayment rates show little 
or no improvement over individual loans, and borrowers' costs are considerably 
reduced. The access of the poorer members of the communities to groups, and 
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thus loans, is not evaluated. He points out that joint hability does not seem to 
result in improved repayment rates, with the exception of two cases where 
enforced savings gave the members a wider interest in group activities. Group 
loans are a new experiment in most of the countries Desai studied, but because 
the economic rationale as well as the implementation do not differ basically 
from the provision of credit through single-purpose cooperatives or through 
SFCI, one can hardly expect a consistendy better performance. 
The review of financial services provided by cooperatives shows that the 
provision of credit alone is generally not successful, because of external inter-
ference resulting from the use of public funds and the weak commercial basis, 
especially in areas where demand for credit is highly seasonal. The combination 
of credit and savings services is more successful. The greater financial inde-
pendence enables members to participate in the institution, and having a stake 
in the cooperative stimulates member discipline - both essential factors for the 
operation of a cooperative as business enterprise. The stronger financial position 
of a cooperative vis-a-vis individual members further means that funds that 
are temporarily not required can be deposited in banks. Furthermore, savings 
facilities are widely appreciated and the provision of suitable, reliable oppor-
tunities can be a decisive reason for joining a cooperative. The success of 
several cooperative savings programmes points to a hitherto unfulfilled demand. 
2.2.2 Informal sector 
2.2.2.1 Professional operators 
Informal professional operators are private persons providing financial services 
on commercial terms, either as their main occupation, or as part of their busi-
ness enterprise, or as a part-time occupation. Moneylenders, traders, indigenous 
bankers, landlords, pawnbrokers and larger farmers are representatives of this 
group. The term 'informal' refers to the provision of services which is generally 
not, or only partly, regulated. Moneylenders and pawnbrokers may be required 
to register, and in that case they operate to some extent under formal legisla-
tion. Informal operators in RFMs are a worldwide phenomenon; this demon-
strates the universal need of the rural population for financial services and 
the ability of the professional operators to provide some of these services 
under very different circumstances, as a financially viable occupation. The 
variety of financial transactions reflects the variety of circumstances, and 
additional conditions, such as the delivery of products, the provision of labour, 
or the exchange of pledges such as gold or jewelry, may be part of the trans-
action. Despite the variety of operators and transactions, the informal profes-
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sional operators have various main features in common which justifies then-
classification in one group, and which makes a general review possible. The 
main service provided by informal professional operators is the supply of 
short-term credit. This credit is provided in kind (e.g. the provision of consumer 
goods or farm inputs) or in cash. The restriction to short-term credit and the 
provision of credit for other than productive purposes are often main points 
of criticism on the functioning of informal professional operators. The observa-
tions may be correct, but such criticism is not. Lack of long-term credit or 
credit for other than productive purposes must be considered a shortcoming in 
the overall functioning of RFMs. Moreover, criticism on the provision of credit 
for consumption results from too rigid ideas about the use of funds in a 
household. Reliable access to consumption credit may, for example, lead to 
investment, because it enables a farmer to transform part of his non-productive 
assets otherwise kept for emergencies. 
The role of informal professional operators in the collection of savings, 
especially savings in small sums, is believed to be small. However, recent re-
search has brought forward several cases. Hoist (1984) gives a description of 
indigenous bankers and concludes that they are remarkably responsive to the 
needs of small savers. Thingalaya (1979) gives an interesting example of the 
collecting of small savings: he describes the Pigmy deposit scheme of the Syn-
dicate Bank in India. This bank operates through full-time agents, working on 
commission basis, who go from customer to customer collecting small sums of 
money daily or weekly. The number of accounts handled per bank employee is 
287, but per employee there are several agents, which brings the number of 
clients per agent to around 100. This description suggests that the collection 
of small savings is a specialization that cannot easily be undertaken by those 
professional operators who are also engaged in trade, agriculture or other 
enterprises. 
Informal professional operators usually operate in a restricted geographic 
area, or in a specific section of the market. Close proximity of operator and 
client is an essential feature of the business, because it facilitates the adjust-
ment of terms and conditions to specific requirements and because it results 
in a continuous stream of information about borrowers and their occupations. 
However, it also limits the amount of clients an operator can serve. Average 
numbers of 500-1000 clients for a pawnbroker in Sri Lanka mentioned by Bouman 
and Houtman (1984) are exceptional, and such a large clientele is only possible 
because in this case the loans provided bear comparatively little risk and it is 
not necessary to collect information. Other evidence suggests that clients 
normally number between 2 and 50. The limited area in which most informal 
professional operators operate is a restriction for the optimal use of funds. 
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Available investment opportunities may be relatively unattractive, and this 
limits the return on own capital and on savings, insofar that these are accepted. 
Links between informal professional operators and external financial markets 
through formal institutions, if existent, generally result in an inflow of resources 
in RFMs. There is a great deal of evidence that credit obtained by traders, 
landlords, larger farmers or pawnbrokers from formal sources is reloaned to 
small farmers, traders etc. who are not eligible for direct loans from these 
formal institutions. 
The interest rates charged by informal professional operators have often 
been criticized by civil servants and policy makers as being exorbitant or 
exploitative. Donald (1976) quotes data from two comprehensive surveys: the 
IMF survey by Wai published in 1957 and the World Bank survey in 1974. He 
concludes that median rates are probably around 40 to 50 percent per annum. 
These rates are indeed higher than the rates usually charged by formal insti-
tutions, but such a direct comparison is not justified, for several reasons. 
Informal professional operators and formal institutions generally serve different 
clients with different services, even if they operate in the same location; in 
cases where formal institutions have tried to reach the same clients they have 
often incurred heavy losses, which means that their interest rates did not 
reflect the costs made. The direct comparison is further complicated by the 
fact that most of the informal credit is supplied by shopkeepers and traders 
as part of their total business. A review of the components of the interest 
rate charged sheds more light upon the question regarding supposed exploitation, 
or, in more general terms, the efficiency of informal professional operators. 
The administrative costs are low, because accommodation, equipment, supplies, 
and staff are kept to the bare minimum. The costs of default are more impor-
tant, but information about borrowers available prior to the decision to provide 
a loan and various possibilities to enforce repayment, some of which could be 
illegal, enable the lender to reduce the risk of default. The third cost component 
is the cost of capital These costs vary widely, depending on the source and 
the alternative uses of capital. Singh presents (Von Pischke et at, 1983) cost 
data from village moneylenders in North India and estimates the return to 
capital in local agriculture as being 77 percent. This is probably an extreme 
case, but it illustrates the need to take into account the situation in which 
certain rates are asked and paid. In general we may expect the cost of capital 
to be at least positive in real terms, which means a rate above the rate of 
inflation. The fourth component of the interest rate is the margin, Le. the 
difference between the interest charged and the costs mentioned. Estimates for 
the cost components reviewed result in ranges of 2 to 4 percent for administra-
tive costs, 5 to 10 percent for default and 10 to 25 percent for capital cost, 
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which means total costs around 32 percent, if 90 percent of the available 
capital is used. A comparison of these costs with the interest rates of 40 to 
50 percent given by Donald (1976) refutes the contention that high profits 
resulting from monopoly positions are widespread. 
Another cost aspect must be taken into account when reviewing the efficiency 
of informal professional operators: the costs incurred by a borrower to obtain 
a loan. Because of proximity and simple and swift procedures these costs are 
generally low, in sharp contrast with the costs involved in obtaining a loan 
from formal institutions. The difference in additional borrowing costs may 
eliminate the difference between the often unrealistically low interest charged 
by formal institutions and the interest charged by informal professional ope-
rators, especially when loans are small. 
To sum up: informal professional operators provide a limited range of 
financial services in RFMs to customers who are generally not reached by 
formal institutions. The provision of credit requires accurate information about 
customers and their activities and this limits the number of clients an 
intermediary can serve. The interest rates charged for credit cannot be 
considered excessive in general. The flexibility in the provision of credit 
together with the simple and quick procedures are an advantage for the services 
of informal professional operators, compared with those of formal institutions. 
2.2.2.2 Financial relations based on reciprocity 
Financial relations based on reciprocity may exist between two individuals 
or within a group, and transactions take place without intermediation by pro-
fessionals. In rural communities this type of financing is generally embedded in 
more or less traditional relationships. The transactions between two individuals 
may range from rather unspecified, such as the provision of labour to a neigh-
bour in case of illness on the mutual understanding that the neighbour will 
reciprocate in future if required, to written agreements in which the amount 
loaned and repayment date are stipulated. Financial transactions involving 
groups show a wide variety of forms and purposes, and some group members 
may play a more or less official role. In a study of rural communities on 
Lombok, Indonesia, Billah (1984) found more than 20 types of associations 
involved in the collection of savings to be spend on specific purposes, such 
as: the provision of loans in case of emergencies; the provision of loans in 
cash or kind for agricultural production; the payment of expenses related to 
birth, marriage or death; and the payment of the costs of religious festivals. 
Savings were collected in cash as well as in kind. Besides the wide range of 
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purposes for which funds were formed it is interesting to note the variety of 
arrangements, even among organizations with the same purpose. 
Bouman (1977) described the rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs), a form of informal saving and lending which is found in many parts 
of Africa, East and South Asia, both Americas, the Caribbean, and the Middle 
East. The basic principle of a ROSCA is that the participants of a group make 
regular contributions to a fund which is given to each member in turn. The 
first col-lector receives an interest-free loan from the others; the last in the 
line is saving by extending credit to all others; the others in between alternate 
between debtor and creditor positions. This basic principle is adapted to serve 
the requirements of farmers, traders, wage-earners and other groups in a range 
of circumstances. The amount received in turn can be varied by the number of 
participants allowed per association, the amounts paid in and the duration of 
the cycle. The order of rotation may be decided by lot, consensus, auction, 
negotiation or by decision of the chairman. Further, the ROSCA may serve 
additional purposes such as insurance, fostering community solidarity, or it 
may have festive aspects. After completion of the cycle the association may 
be dissolved or start with the next round with similar or new conditions. Com-
pulsory saving, the opportunity to use a considerable amount for investment 
or other purposes, the adaptability of the system to the particular requirements, 
and the simple procedures are the basic features of this system. Individuals 
may participate in more than one association, thereby covering particular, 
personal requirements. 
The informal lending and borrowing relations based on mutual assistance are 
of great importance to rural individuals and households, because they spread the 
individual risk, and improve the use of resources in a community by offering 
opportunities for saving and investment. These functions are performed at low 
costs, because no intermediaries are involved and the relations are supported 
by local knowledge, social control and collective support - factors that reduce 
the risk of default. The main restrictions of this type of relations are the 
limited ability to lend large sums or sums for a long period. The limited pos-
sibilities for safekeeping cash, the most liquid form of funds collected, form an 
additional problem in local communities which can be resolved only by trans-
forming cash into less liquid assets or by establishing relations with other 
operators in the RFM. 
2.2.3 The farm household 
The discussion about the utilization of institutional credit by farmers in low 
income countries or, in broader terms, the impact of credit programmes on 
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production, deals with the basis of the subject farmers and finance. The simplest 
viewpoint: 'farmers are poor and require credit to raise production' formed, 
and still forms, the justification of many credit programmes. Comment on this 
viewpoint was given as early as in 1965 by the Group of Experts on Agricultural 
Credit, Banking and Cooperation established by the International Cooperative 
Alliance (ICA) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO). The report of this group (FAO, 1965) states: 'the expansion of agri-
cultural credit alone does not always bring about an adequate increase in agri-
cultural production'. The group points at various factors inherent in subsistence 
farming and concludes that 'as long as agriculture is not a business but a way 
of life, cost price is a sheer fiction, and household and farm expenses an 
inextricable knot, and it will be impossible to draw a clear border line between 
credit for consumptive and credit for productive purposes'. The phrases 'credit 
for productive purposes' and 'credit for consumptive purposes' have been often 
interpreted as two different types of credit, between which the designers of 
credit programmes could choose. Thus, programmes were aimed at providing 
'productive credit', and the provision of this credit in kind was often seen as 
a sufficient condition to ensure its productive use. Von Pischke and Adams 
(1980) have pointed at the fungibility of credit in a discussion about the design 
and evaluation of credit programmes, and concluded that a distinction between 
productive and consumptive credit has no practical value. They state: 'for all 
practical purposes, loans in cash or in kind can be used to buy any good or 
service available to the borrower in the market'. The authors argue that the 
provision of additional resources enables the recipients to reallocate an equiv-
alent proportion of their own resources according to their own priorities. Thus, 
a direct relationship between the provision of credit for a specific activity 
and the output of that activity cannot be established and the authors come to 
the conclusion that it is virtually impossible to evaluate the impact of credit 
use at the farm level. 
David and Meyer (1979) studied the problems involved in measuring the farm-
level impact of agricultural loans by reviewing selected studies of the impact 
of agricultural credit programmes. They concluded that most of the studies 
were largely descriptive and more useful in generating hypotheses than in 
rigorously assessing loan impact. The few analytical economic and mathematical 
programmingstudies available hadmethodological problems. Three methodological 
issues were identified: a) most of the studies use the farm as basic unit of 
analysis, little attention is given to the interdependence of production and 
consumption; b) few studies recognize the fungibility of money, c) most studies 
have not adequately resolved the attribution problem, that is, have separated 
the effects of loans from other factors. The magnitude of efforts required to 
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deal with these issues, in data collection at farm household and at agricultural 
sector level, and in mathematical analysis, further supports the opinion of 
Von Pischke and Adams that it is virtually impossible to measure the farm-
level impact of loans . Although the studies mentioned do not provide answers 
in quantitative terms about the use of institutional credit by farmers, they do 
provide insight into the financial decisions to be made by farm households. 
This insight forms the starting point for the following discussion about the 
financial structure of a farm household and its external financial relations. 
In a farm household, decisions are made daily regarding the allocation of 
resources for production and consumption purposes. The decisions are made under 
conditions that are characterized by seasonality and uncertainty. Seasonality 
is a largely predictable condition connected with the agricultural calendar. 
The requirements for working capital vary with the seasons and this might 
result in a short-term saving capacity or in a short-term credit requirement. 
Production and consumption are surrounded by uncertainty: the climate and 
the market situation for products affect the volume and value of production 
and thus income; the consumption requirements of the household are partly 
predictable, but events such as illness and death, which are unpredictable but 
nevertheless part of life, may result in unexpected and comparatively large 
demands on available resources. The balance between the outcome of the pro-
duction and consumption decisions results in changes in the resource basis of 
the household, and this resource basis determines the continuity of production 
and consumption in the future. Given the seasonality of agriculture, the uncer-
tainty regarding income and consumption requirements and the importance of 
continuity for the farm household we must assume that production, consumption 
and the resource basis are taken into account when decisions are made about 
the allocation of resources. The decisions about the resource basis are reflected 
internally, within the household, in the size and composition of the assets, 
and externally in the relations with others who are prepared to receive or 
provide resources in exchange for the commitment to repay or receive similar 
resources in future. The farm household can thus be defined as a complex 
economic unit frequently making decisions about the allocation of resources for 
production and consumption and about the size and composition of the resource 
basis. 
The model of a farm household with its internal and external financial rela-
tions, according to the above definition, is shown in Figure 2.2. The components 
of the resource basis can be measured in terms of production value and Hquidity 
value, according to the theory of hquidity management put forward by Baker 
and Bhargava (1974). Assets such as land, labour, livestock and implements, 
generally stated as productive assets, have a production value for the household 
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which equals the sales value (otherwise these assets would have been sold or 
used elsewhere). These assets are essential for production, and the Uquidity 
resource basis production and consumption rural financial market 
productive assets 
for agricultural 
production and 
non-farm activities: 
land, labour, 
capital assets 
non productive 
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Figure 2.2. The financial relations of the farm household. 
value is low. Non-productive assets such as gold, jewelry and consumer durables 
have no production value (though possibly a certain consumption value) but 
have a liquidity value which is dependent on exchange or marketing possibilities 
within the reach of the farm household and the transaction costs involved in 
transforming these items into cash or kind. The third type of asset, cash, can 
be used for production or consumption directly and without transaction costs, 
and thus has a high Uquidity value. The debts and claims, the fourth item of 
the resource basis, result from the external relations. These external relations 
can be divided into three categories: the relations based on mutual exchange; 
the relations with informal intermediaries such as landlords, traders or money-
lenders; and the relations with institutions providing loans and/or accepting 
savings under specific conditions. These external relations, insofar as the 
households are borrowers, are based on the borrowing capacity of the farm 
household, which is derived from the production capacity as perceived by lenders. 
This borrowing capacity, stated as 'credit' by Baker and Bhargava, can be 
used to secure loans without actually disposing of productive or non-productive 
assets. The costs of converting part of the borrowing capacity into a loan 
must be regarded as transfer costs in the same sense as the transfer costs 
involved in exchanging, for example, jewelry into cash. The availability of a 
reliable source of loans against costs that are favourable compared with the 
conversion costs of non-productive assets enables the farm household to use 
its own cash for production or consumption and to rely on its borrowing 
capacity as a contingency source of cash. The extent to which the farm house-
hold has used its borrowing capacity is shown by the amount of debts; the 
remaining borrowing capacity as such is a non-visible asset but is reflected in 
the composition of the other assets. To sum up: in making decisions about the 
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resource basis the farm household takes into account the productivity and 
liquidity aspects of the assets as well as the actual and potential external 
financial relations. 
This basic model of a farm household can be recognized in the various types 
of farms found in developing countries. The composition and size of the resource 
basis reflect the individual wealth and preferences of a household within the 
context of the availability of production factors and consumption goods in a 
village or region. The type of external relations for the exchange of resources 
against commitments is related to social factors and to the stage of development. 
Von Stockhausen (1984) discusses the relation between the development stage 
and institutional financial services. He distinguishes three stages: subsistence, 
agricultural investment, and non-agricultural investment. In the review below 
the informal relations are added to the institutional financial services, to give 
a more comprehensive picture of the external relations of the farm household. 
In the subsistence stage the farm household resources of land, labour and 
capital (in the form of livestock and home-made implements), are used to pro-
duce for own consumption only. Savings are made in kind, such as stores of crop 
products or livestock. External relations are restricted to the exchange of labour, 
implements or livestock, on a reciprocal basis. The transition towards the 
agricultural investment stage starts with the exchange in kind of small quantities 
of excess products; later this attains a more regular form and money is used 
in the transactions. Production for own consumption remains of dominant 
importance, but the reliance on consumer goods from outside increases. The 
possibility to exchange excess production and the introduction of money opens 
new ways for production, savings and financial services. The luring of labour, 
sharecropping arrangements and credit from traders can lead to a more full 
use of production factors, and the increased production can be used to satisfy 
increasing consumption demands. Savings can be accumulated in the form of 
gold, jewelry or cash and this leads to financial services such as those offered 
by pawnbrokers, moneylenders, rotating saving and credit associations and, 
possibly, simple forms of institutional savings such as accounts at post offices. 
The agricultural investment stage is characterized by the rapidly increasing 
importance of cash crops, a decreasing share of self-produced goods in the con-
sumption requirements, and the monetization of transactions. The increasingly 
intensive use of production factors sooner or later leads to diminishing returns, 
and new production methods become attractive or even necessary. These methods 
lead to the purchase of inputs such as fertilizers, seed and pesticides and result 
in investments in machinery or land improvement entering the farm. Farming 
becomes more dynamic and the external relations with financial markets for 
depositing savings and for obtaining credit become of greater importance to cope 
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with production requirements, consumption needs and the wish to safeguard the 
resource basis of the household. The savings potential of households in this stage 
is considerable, as is shown by various studies: Ong et al. on Taiwan, Howse 
on Southern Africa and DeLancey on Cameroon (all in Von Pischke et al., 
1983), and Bouman (1977) on indigenous savings and credit societies in third 
world countries. Institutional credit becomes a complementary source of finance 
for new production methods, augmenting self-financing and finance supplied 
by informal sources. 
The transition to the non-agricultural investment phase is the consequence 
of increasing investment possibilities outside the agricultural primary production 
enterprises, and the availability of savings in Equid forms. The marketing and 
processing of agricultural products offer investment opportunities to individual 
farmers or cooperatives of farmers in their direct neighbourhood. Rural financial 
markets play an important role in this stage by mobilizing savings and trans-
ferring these in appropriate forms to the industrial and services sectors in 
the national economy. 
The majority of the farm households in developing countries fall into the 
agricultural investment stage or in the adjacent transitional stages. This means 
that the consumption requirements of the household are only partly met by own 
production; there is dependency on local, national or world markets to sell 
products and to obtain consumption and investment goods; cash is used as 
main form of exchange; and the households rely on a variety of external finan-
cial relations. 
23 Conclusions 
The government has a decisive role in shaping the environment in which 
financial institutions operate. Sound monetary policies resulting in a general 
confidence in money and legislation to protect the interests of borrowers and 
lenders are both prerequisites for the well-functioning of the financial system. 
Economic policies influence incomes, investment and savings in agriculture and 
thereby determine the volume and type of financial services required. Direct 
government intervention in financial institutions has met with little, if any, 
success; thus, such intervention is an inappropriate way to stimulate agriculture. 
Financial institutions should be allowed to perform their tasks of intermediation 
guided by business criteria. If agriculture requires stimulation through subsidies, 
the government should not use financial institutions for this purpose, but should 
explore more direct ways of subsidizing. 
Contrary to the widespread belief of policy-makers, farm households do have 
a capacity to finance from own resources the seasonal expenses for production, 
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unexpected expenses and investments. However, this capacity of self-financing 
is limited and the establishment of external financial relations widens the 
scope of the farm household to deal with temporary imbalances between income 
and expenses. For farm households engaged in commercial agriculture, the 
relations with financial institutions are important in order to be able to satisfy 
present and future production and consumption requirements. 
RFMs consist of a wide variety of relationships between buyers and sellers 
of financial assets. The three groups of relationships or operators (formal 
institutions, informal professional operators, and financial relations based on 
reciprocity) all have advantages and restrictions and no single operator or 
type of relationship is able to cover all the services required. The result is 
that intermediaries specialize in certain services and groups of clients, and 
RFMs become segmented. This may lead to monopoly positions of operators, or 
to situations in which certain financial services are not available to groups of 
rural households. 
In principle, their links with national financial markets and their possibilities 
for safekeeping put formal institutions in a position to be able to provide part 
of the financial services farmers require. However, the review of the various 
types of formal institutions shows the dilemma that arises in the provision of 
financial services to farmers by institutions. Commercial banks are urban-based 
institutions with a modus operandi that is not suitable for dealing efficiently 
with the large numbers of transactions of small volume that form the core of 
the farmers' requirements. SFCI aim at providing services adjusted to the 
requirements of farmers, but political considerations overshadow operational 
principles, which results in low effectiveness and non-viable institutions with 
a restricted lifetime. The performance of cooperatives in the provision of 
financial services varies widely. Political interference may result in a poor 
performance comparable with those of SFCI, or to a reasonably successful 
operation in artificial monopoly positions. If the government allows cooperatives 
to operate as financial institutions they may perform well, as shown by co-
operatives in the rural areas of Taiwan and Korea and credit unions operating 
in urban areas in several other countries. 
Despite their generally poor performance, the presence of formal institutions 
in RFMs with services tailored to the requirements of farmers means that RFMs 
are improved by the availability of a wider range of financial services and 
increased competition. In order to realize their potential role in RFMs, formal 
institutions providing services to farmers must comply with three basic condi-
tions. In the first place, the institutions must be financially viable, to allow 
them to function independently and continuously. In the second place, the 
institutions must be able to reach all fanners who need their services. They 
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must therefore provide services that are adjusted to the needs of the farm 
households, and must use simple and quick procedures. In the third place, 
the institutions must develop and maintain relationships with farmers based on 
confidence. These three basic conditions formed the starting point for the 
formulation of the experimental savings and credit scheme for vegetable farmers 
in West Java described and analysed in this study. 
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3 THE SETTING OF THE EXPERIMENTAL SAVINGS AND CREDIT 
SCHEME 
3.1 Introduction 
Indonesia is the most populous state of South-East Asia, with 162 million 
inhabitants in 1985. The gross national product per person was USD 530 in 
that year, which places Indonesia in the group of lower middle-income coun-
tries. The average annual growth of the gross domestic product, fuelled by 
petroleum and gas revenues, was 7.9 percent in the period from 1965 to 1980, 
and slowed down to 3.5 percent thereafter. The average annual inflation was 
15 percent in the period of 1970 to 1985. The Rupiah devaluated in several 
steps from Rp 415 in 1977 to Rp 1645 per USD in 1987 (Table 3.1). Agriculture 
Table 3.1. Currency equivalents and price indices, 1970-1985. 
Exchange rate Consumer price index 
(Rp per USD) (1980 = 100) 
1970 363 20 
1971 392 21 
1972 415 22 
1973 415 29 
1974 415 40 
1975 415 48 
1976 415 58 
1977 415 64 
1978 442 69 
1979 623 84 
1980 627 100 
1981 632 112 
1982 661 123 
1983 909 137 
1984 1026 152 
1985 1111 159 
1986 1283 168 
Source: IMF (1987) 
is one of the main sectors in the economy, contributing 26 percent to the 
gross domestic product and employing 55 percent of the working population. 
Six branches are distinguished in agriculture: food crops; non-food crops (both 
produced on farms); estate crops; livestock and livestock products; forestry; 
and fishery. The food crops and non-food crops, produced by 18.4 million farm 
households on farms with an average size of less than one hectare, constitute 
the major part of the agricultural product: 66 percent and 8 percent, respective-
ly. The other four branches each account for 6-8 percent. 
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this chapter. The first two sections deal with the institutional infrastructure 
in the agricultural sector in Indonesia; the last two sections deal with the 
financial environment in the vegetable production areas in West Java. 
Figure 3.1. West Java, main highland vegetable production areas. 
Table 3.2. Highland vegetables in West Java, production areas (ha) and main crops. 
Sub-district 
typel 
Area 
type2 total 2) 
Main crops 1) 
Cikajang 1200 350 1550 potato, cabbage, tomato, Chinese 
cabbage, carrot 
Cipanas/Pacet 1800 800 2600 carrot, onion, celery, cabbage, 
lettuce, beans, chayote. 
Ciwidey 300 200 500 beans, cabbage, chilis, onions, 
potato. 
Lembang/Cisarua 4500 400 4900 cabbage, cauliflower, tomato, 
Chinese cabbage, potato. 
Pangalengan 3400 1700 5100 cabbage, potato. 
total 11200 3450 14650 
1. Roughly in order of importance. 
2. Area type 1 is terraced land with or without irrigation; area type 2 is 
land on slopes. 
Source: Moll (1978) 
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32. Finance and agriculture 
The financial system in Indonesia consists of three broad categories: the 
banking system, the non-bank financial institutions, and the informal financial 
system. The monetary authorities, i.e. the central bank (Bank Indonesia) and 
the Department of Finance, control the first two categories; the informal sector 
operates without direct control. The following institutions were in operation 
in the financial system (1983): 
a. The banking system b. Non-bank financial institutions 
-Bank Indonesia 1 -development finance banks 3 
-deposit money banks: -investment banks 9 
state commercial banks 5 -insurance companies 65 
private national commercial banks 70 -pension funds 33 
foreign commercial banks 11 -other (see text and Table 3.4) 
-development banks: 
state-owned development bank 1 
regional development banks 27 
-cooperative bank 1 
-saving banks 3 
-secondary banks (see text and Table 3.4) 
The banking system is dominated by the government-owned financial institutions: 
Bank Indonesia, the five state commercial banks and the state-owned develop-
ment bank, which together supplied 79 percent of all credit in 1983 (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3. Bank credits by groups of banks, 1978-1983 (billion Rp). 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Bank Indonesia (direct credits) 1935 2163 2454 2649 2771 2356 
state commercial banks 1) 2832 3270 4301 5881 8031 9787 
private national commercial banks 299 406 566 834 1197 1883 
regional development banks 66 87 145 247 357 411 
foreign commercial banks 262 342 414 548 666 862 
totals 5394 6268 7880 10159 13022 15299 
1. Including State Development Bank. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1985) 
Bank Indonesia issues currency, controls the official foreign exchange reserves, 
and supervises and regulates all major financial institutions, except insurance 
companies. It implements the official monetary policy through the regulation 
of credit and other controls. The bank extends two kinds of credit: liquidity 
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credits to banks, mainly through refinancing loans to priority sectors, and 
direct credits to official entities and state enterprises. 
Specific fields of operation are allocated to the five state banks, although 
in practice this specialization in not maintained rigidly. The Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI) is concerned with agriculture, fisheries, cooperatives and other 
aspects of rural development and is the primary source of institutional credit 
in the rural areas; the Bank Bumi Daya (BBD) concentrates its operations on 
estate agriculture and forestry, the Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesia (BEIT) special-
izes in loans for the production, processing and marketing of export commodities; 
the Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) concentrates on the industrial sector; the 
Bank Dagang Negara (BDN) is concerned with the mining sector. The five 
state banks are the major instruments for implementing the public credit policy 
by lending to the priority sectors determined by the government. Bank Indonesia 
provides various rediscount facilities for various categories of loans in these 
priority sectors. The rediscount facilities, of which the state banks are the 
major recipients, are an important source of funds. This was especially the 
case in the period before mid-1983 when the savings deposit rates of state 
banks were determined by the Bank Indonesia at such unattractive levels that 
the banks' ability to attract savings was severely limited. Since mid-1983 the 
state banks have been allowed to determine interest rates on deposits and on 
loans themselves. The annual interest rate on savings deposits increased to 
18-20 percent and this resulted in a greatly increased flow of savings to the 
state banks; the interest rates on loans reached levels of 25-30 percent per 
year. Despite the greater possibilities of providing loans from the increased 
assets, the special credit programmes executed by the state banks and supported 
by rediscount facilities of the Bank Indonesia remain of major importance in 
the priority sectors, such as agriculture and small industry and trade. 
The other institutions in the financial system are important for specific 
customers. The national private banks and the foreign banks provide services 
to large Indonesian firms and foreign companies respectively. These banks 
have been free to set their own deposit and lending rates but credit ceilings 
set annually and other regulations limit their operations and thus the competition 
with state banks. The regional development banks are owned by the provincial 
governments and they perform cashier functions and provide commercial banking 
services. The operations of the regional development banks differ from province 
to province. The role of the cooperative bank is currently under discussion 
and plans are being made to transform this bank into the main source of credit 
for the cooperatives in Indonesia. At present, the volume of loans supplied is 
insignificant, a mere 0.1 percent of the loans provided by the state banks 
(1984). The secondary banks and the other non-bank financial institutions 
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comprise a wide spectrum of institutions mainly operating in specific areas or 
providing specific services such as the Bank Pasar (market bank) or the village 
cooperatives (KUDs) which provide small credits for traders (Table 3.4). The 
Table 3.4. Recognized secondary banks and other non-bank financial institutions, 
number and credit outstanding per December 1981 (billion Rp). 
Number of Credit 
institutions outstanding 
banks 
Badan Kredit Desa 3295 7.8 
Lumbung desa 2090 
Bank Pasar 164 
Bank Karya Produksi Desa 217 30.2 
Bank Pegawai and others 26 
non-bank financial institutions 
Badan Kredit Kecamatan (Central Java) 1) 486 1.3 
KUD 3050 59.8 
Lembaga Perkreditan Kecamatan (West Java) 2) 104 1.3 
Lumbung Pitik Negara (West Sumatra) 472 0.6 
total 9904 101.0 
1. As of December 1977. 
2. As of December 1980. 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (unpublished records); Department of Cooperatives (1983) 
scope of these institutions is small in terms of resources, but their impact on 
the communities in which they operate is important. 
In 1968 the BRI was designated the financial institution for the agricultural 
and rural sector, with the following responsibilities. 
a) To provide credit to farmers, fishermen and cooperatives. 
b) To provide credit to small enterprises in rural areas. 
c) To assist the government in implementing agrarian policies. 
d) To assist the government in rural community development efforts. 
e) To provide guidance and supervision to village banks and other secondary 
banks in accordance with the directives of the Bank Indonesia. 
The BRI handles three basic types of credit programmes. 
a) Government programmes financed from the central government budget. The 
bank follows instructions from technical agencies about the channelling of the 
funds, while the government bears all or most of the risk. BIMAS credit fell 
under these programmes. 
b) Special Bank Indonesia programmes based on access to rediscounting or 
Uquidity credits. The Kredit Investasi Kecil (KIK, small investment credit) and 
Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen (KMKP, permanent working capital credit) pro-
grammes fall in this category. 
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c) Loans from the BRI's own resources. 
In addition to this the BRI channels funds for government development pro-
grammes to provincial governments, village cooperatives and others and par-
ticipates in multilateral financing of government projects containing credit 
components. To perform these tasks the BRI has a network of 15 regional 
offices, 284 branches, 57 sub-offices and mobile units and approximately 3600 
Village Units (1981). 
BIMAS credit has been the most widespread credit programme aimed at in-
dividual farmers. The programme started in the 1960s as one of the components 
of the BIMAS rice production intensification scheme. Landowners and tenant 
farmers could receive a fixed package of inputs and cash upon recommendation 
by the village headman (lurah). The loans were given for 7 months or until 
one month after the harvest. The loans were processed mainly by the Village 
Units of the BRI. Bank of Indonesia provided rediscount facilities for 100 
percent of the loans provided at 3 percent interest per annum; BRI charged 1 
percent per month to the farmers. The risk of delinquent payment was borne 
by the Government (50 percent), Bank Indonesia (25 percent) and BRI itself 
(25 percent). At first, credit was supplied for rice production only, but from 
1972 onwards packages were available for secondary crops such as maize, ground-
nuts, sweet potato, cassava and soybeans (BIMAS palawija). The participation 
of farmers in the BIMAS programme rose rapidly in the first half of the 1970s, 
and in 1975 4.1 million or approximately 25 percent of all farmers received 
credit for rice or secondary crops (Table 3.5). From 1976 onwards the annual 
flow of BIMAS loans declined with the increasing ineligibility of farmers who 
had defaulted on previous loans. Delinquency increased in the course of the 
programme when borrowers became aware of the readiness of the government 
to reschedule repayments or write off loans completely. In 1984 the numbers 
of farmers receiving BIMAS loans for rice fell below the half million and in 
1985 the BIMAS programme was terminated. Farmers had to a large extent 
adopted modern production methods and the guaranteed floor prices enabled 
them to finance the inputs themselves. Moreover, loan delinquency and reports 
about widespread misuse of funds by bank employees and others involved in 
the provision of loans raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of the 
programme. After termination of the BIMAS programme the 3600 Village Units 
staffed with 12 000 employees were left virtually without business. It can 
therefore be concluded that the credit component of BIMAS has contributed 
to the acceptance of modern production methods but, despite great efforts by 
BRI in establishing Village Units in the rural areas, and the large amounts of 
public funds spent, the programme has not contributed to the establishment of 
regular financial services for farmers. 
37 
An array of credit programmes directed at the agricultural sector is still in 
operation. In 1981 the BRI handled approximately 250 different types of credit, 
Table 35. The BIMAS credit programme for rice and secondary crops, 1971-1985. 
Participation Credit supplied Credit outstanding Default 
(million (billion Rp) (billion Rp) rate 
recipients) 
rice second, 
crops 
rice second, total 
crops 
rice second, total 
crops (%) 
1971 1.7 11.0 0.0 11.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 4 
1972 1.5 9.9 0.0 9.9 0.4 0.0 0.4 4 
1973 2.3 0.0 17.7 0.1 17.8 0.9 0.0 0.9 5 
1974 35 0.3 44.1 3.3 47.4 3.8 0.3 4.1 9 
1975 3.7 0.4 57.8 7.9 65.7 5.8 1.8 7.6 12 
1976 3.4 0.4 775 8.9 86.4 85 15 10.0 12 
1977 2.7 0.3 66.4 7.7 74.1 115 1.9 13.4 18 
1978 2.4 0.2 623 6.8 69.1 9.6 1.4 11.0 16 
1979 1.9 0.2 55.2 5.2 60.4 8.4 1.1 95 16 
1980 1.6 0.2 505 5.6 56.1 7.6 1.3 8.9 16 
1981 1.6 0.1 54.8 65 613 11.3 2.7 14.0 23 
1982 1.6 0.3 57.4 9.7 67.1 20.1 4.6 24.7 37 
1983 1.2 0.2 55.0 10.2 65.2 21.6 4.3 25.9 40 
1984 0.4 0.1 15.7 25 18.2 4.7 0.9 5.6 31 
1985 0.1 - 3.9 0.6 45 1.1 0.4 15 33 
1. Crop seasons 1970/71 and 1971 are stated under 1971 etc. 
Source: BRI (1986) 
each with different funding, a different purpose and different procedures to 
be followed! Two credit programmes that quickly gained national importance 
for small-scale enterprises in agriculture as well as in trade, industry and 
transport are the KIK and KMKP programmes. The maximum loan permitted 
per borrower is Rp 15 million in both programmes, the interest rate is 12 
percent per year, and the maximum duration is 10 years for KIK loans and 4 
years for KMKP loans. The loans are provided by all state commercial banks, 
the regional and national development banks and certain selected national 
private commercial banks. The BRI provides the lion's share of these loans 
(approximately 50 percent). The Bank Indonesia rediscounts the KIK and KMKP 
loans for 80 percent and 75 percent respectively, at interest rates of 3 percent 
and 4 percent per year. To guarantee repayment of these loans to the banks 
the government established P.T. ASKRENDO (The Indonesian Loan Insurance 
Company). Loans to cooperatives are insured by the Lembaga Jaminan Kredit 
Koperasi (LJKK, Cooperative Credit Insurance Institution). The KIK and KMKP 
programmes developed into the largest small-scale cheap credit programmes, 
with a total amount outstanding of Rp 1196 billion in 1982 (1.8 billion USD), 
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which is 10 percent of the total bank credit in Indonesia (Table 3.6). The 
share of loans to the agricultural sector was around 20 percent in 1975, rose 
Table 3.6. KIK and KMPK credit programmes, loans approved and total 
amounts outstanding, 1975-1982. 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
KIK 
loans approved 
number 7100 11200 11900 15230 17130 42420 52000 33000 
amount (mill Rp) 12800 21500 24600 31600 57300 151000 214000 157000 
average loan 
(mill Rp) 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 3.3 3.6 4.1 4.8 
total amount 
outstanding 
(millRp) 22000 36000 50000 65000 99000 210000 353000 405000 
KMKP 
loans approved 
number 9600 142000 156200 98100 23500 24580 352000 181000 
amount (millRp) 13200 38400 47900 65500 127300 264700 493000 392000 
average loan 
(mill Rp) 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.4 2.2 
total amount 
outstanding 
(mill Rp) 19000 41000 62000 84000 154000 321000 635000 791000 
Source: Bouman (1983) 
gradually to 46 percent in 1979 and then declined to 9 percent in 1982. The 
initial increase is partly attributable to the development of special loan packages 
(Mass KUC & KMKP). The annual report of the BRI (1979) lists 21 special KIK 
and KMKP programmes for pumps, beef cattle, smallholders' pepper production 
and for storage and drying faculties for KUDs. The decline after 1979 is the 
result of the discontinuation of these package loans which had low repayment 
rates, especially in the agricultural sector. Exact data on non-repayment of 
KUC and KMKP loans are not available but estimates by P.T. ASKRINDO speak 
of 20 percent of all loans. 
The increasing rate of default in the mass credit programmes for the agri-
cultural sector, BIMAS and Mass KIK and KMKP, resulted in 1981 in the Presi-
dential Instruction to establish a 'Special Team', consisting of staff of technical 
institutions and departments concerned, Bank Indonesia and BRI, to settle the 
credits overdue. The chairman of this team told the press in January 1982: 
'We targeted to settle 50 percent of the total of Rp 115.3 billion (174 million 
USD) overdue, in fact we have reached only 24.9 percent'. He further revealed 
that 90 percent of the delinquents were farmers with overdues of Rp 26 000 
to Rp 35 000 (40 to 53 USD), while the remaining 10 percent were teachers, 
members of the armed forces, officers of the BRI and some village heads with 
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debts of Rp 444 000 to Rp 577 000 (670 to 873 USD). The establishment of 
the 'Special Team', the target of recovering 50 percent only, the lack of re-
payment discipline of farmers and the apparent corruption of those involved 
in the processing of loans, all show the failure of the credit programmes to 
establish permanent financial relations between institutions and clients. 
In summary, the financial system in Indonesia is used by the government to 
channel funds to priority sectors to promote growth, equity and stability -all 
objectives of national policy. The state commercial banks are thereby largely 
reduced to disbursement agencies: the formulation of credit requirements of 
prospective clients is taken over by technical departments and institutions; 
there is no need to assess the risk in the provision of loans, because the risk 
is borne by the government; the need to attract savings is limited because 
funds are supplied at attractive interest rates from the state budget. The state 
commercial banks are thus deprived of signals regarding the price and quantity 
preferences of savers and borrowers as well as the yardstick to measure then-
own functioning: profitability. 
The government policy regarding the agricultural sector results in a great 
number of subsidized credit programmes available to farmers. The package 
approach generally followed facilitates the disbursement of loans and thus 
meets the targets in terms of amounts disbursed or farmers reached. However, 
it limits the effective use of resources, because input requirements differ from 
place to place and because the capability of farmers to finance part of the 
inputs themselves is not taken into account. The effect of the programmes on 
production or farmers' incomes is impossible to measure, but it is safe to assume 
that, for example, the BIMAS credit programme has contributed to increased 
rice production. Whether this contribution is in line with the resources used, 
or whether the same contribution could have been realized with instruments 
other than credit remains unclear. The effect of the programmes on the re-
payment discipline of the farmers and the ability of bank staff and others 
involved to operate efficiently and honestly is clearly negative. The delinquency, 
inefficiency and corruption result in high costs and low effectiveness, and 
sooner or later credit programmes are stopped, thereby reinforcing the idea 
that these programmes are temporary hand-outs. 
To conclude: the credit programmes in the agricultural sector have not resulted 
in the establishment of a permanent relationship based on mutual trust between 
the rural population and financial institutions, and such a relationship is a 
basic requirement for effective financial intermediation. On the contrary, the 
programmes resulted in a situation in which bank staff with a murky record 
regarding the provision of loans face potential clients who have a seriously 
undermined propensity to repay institutional loans. 
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33 Cooperatives 
The history of formal cooperative organizations in Indonesia started in 1896 
when Raden Aria Wiria Atmaja established the 'Hulp en Spaarbank' (Relief and 
Savings Bank) in Purwokerto, Central Java. The activities of this bank were 
soon extended to the rural population thanks to the efforts of the Resident, 
W.P.D. de Wolff van Westerrode, along the lines set out by the Raiffaisen 
cooperatives, and the bank was renamed 'Poerwokertosche Hulp-, Spaar en 
Landbouwcrediet Bank' (Purwokerto Relief, Savings and Agricultural Credit 
Bank). The bank established rice barns in the villages for saving and credit in 
kind, the 'Lumbung Desa'. The number of these local organizations rose quickly, 
from 250 in 1898 in Purwokerto to 12 800 in 1912 in Indonesia. In 1915 the 
first law on cooperatives, a copy of the law in The Netherlands, came into 
force. This led to official assistance from the colonial government, and the 
credit system was further developed and expanded. Various emerging Indonesian 
nationalist movements also established cooperatives according to their own 
interpretation of the cooperative principles. These cooperatives remained largely 
outside the official structure, although some form of cooperation between the 
colonial government and the nationalist groups was established in 1929. Such 
cooperation was facilitated by the introduction of a new law on cooperatives 
in 1927, which was more adapted to Indonesian concepts of law (Damanik, 
1981). However, the basic difference of opinion between colonial government 
and nationalist groups remained. The former emphasized the development of 
thrift and credit cooperatives to improve the individual situation of its members; 
the latter saw in cooperatives a possibility to open up new economic activities 
in trade, industry and agriculture for the indigenous population. Sukotjo (1978) 
states that in 1932 there were 1540 'wild' cooperatives against 172 cooperatives 
which were registered under the cooperative law. The development of various 
types of registered cooperatives until 1940 shows the emphasis on credit co-
operatives (Table 3.7). During the Japanese occupation, 1942-1945, the coope-
Table 3.7. Number and type of cooperatives, 1930-1940. 
consumers credit central 
credit 
agricul-
tural 
indus-
trial 
sales other total 
1930 2 81 0 6 0 0 0 89 
1934 25 215 8 5 2 2 0 257 
1938 15 462 13 11 4 4 8 535 
1940 23 478 15 19 53 43 8 639 
Source: Damanik (1980) 
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ratives were transformed into tools for the war economy and lost their meaning 
as cooperatives. 
The nationalist movement's basic idea about the role of cooperatives in the 
Indonesian society is clearly expressed in article 33 of the chapter on Social 
Well-being of the 1945 Constitution: 'The economy is organized as a joint 
effort, based upon ways of working that accord with the family principle'. 
The explanation of the constitution further states: 'The production is carried 
out by all people for all people under one leadership or controlled by members 
of the society, the prosperity of the society is given priority and not individual 
prosperity. For that reason the economy is arranged as a joint effort based 
upon the family principle and brotherhood. The economic institution suitable 
for this is the cooperative'. These ideas on the comprehensive role of the 
cooperatives began to be elaborated in 1949 after the official transfer of sove-
reignty from The Netherlands to Indonesia. Under the new Cooperative Ordi-
inance the Government appointed an 'Adviser of Cooperatives' who was in 
charge of registration and development. The functions of auditing and supervision 
were left to the cooperative movement itself. Support for the cooperative 
movement was widespread and this led in 1953 to the establishment of the 
Dewan Koperasi Indonesia (DEKOPIN, National Cooperative Union). The number 
of cooperatives rose quickly, from 1155 in 1950 to 14 146 in 1958, but the 
performance was below expectations. Damanik (1980) comments about this period: 
'In spite of state welfare and aid, whole sections of the movement never really 
managed to become dynamic'. The first national Law on Cooperatives of 1958 
was aimed at improving the performance by giving wider powers to the gov-
ernment-appointed Adviser of Cooperatives. Supervision and auditing were 
among the tasks transferred from the cooperative movement to the Adviser. 
The new law marked the start of a period of intense political interference in 
the cooperative movement. Cooperatives were established virtually by Presidential 
Decree and the independent DEKOPIN was replaced by a new organization 
dominated by government officials acting on presidential or ministerial instruc-
tion. Politicization, mismanagement in the cooperatives and rampant inflation 
brought the cooperatives to the brink of total collapse. Sukotjo (1978) estimates 
that of the 74 049 cooperatives in 1965 only one-sixth could be regarded as 
viable. This state of affairs lasted until 1965 when an abortive coup resulted 
in the change of government. 
Initially, the new government disfavoured cooperatives: they were de-official-
ized and lost their monopoly positions. As a result, the number of cooperatives 
declined to approximately 12 000 in 1968. A new 'Law on the Basic Regulations 
for Cooperatives', based upon the 1945 Constitution, was enacted in 1967. This 
law made provision for an independent cooperative movement and as a first 
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result DEKOPIN was re-established. The main attention of the government was 
directed at the promotion of agricultural cooperatives. The cooperatives, which 
were often small, were induced to amalgamate into one cooperative per village 
(desa), which means an average operational area of several hundred hectares 
of irrigated rice-field on Java. Education, training and extension programmes 
were formulated and funded by the government budget. Government interference 
in agricultural cooperatives received new impetus with the implementation of 
the BIMAS rice intensification programme. Primary agricultural cooperatives 
within the boundaries of a village unit (a phrase originating from the BRI 
policy to form 'units of villages', usually 3-5, as the working area for the 
provision of credit) were grouped together to deal with input supply and the 
procurement and processing of rice. The first step in this reorganization was 
the establishment of a coordinating body, the Badan Usaha Unit Desa (BUUD, 
Corporation of Village Unit Enterprises) formed by the existing cooperatives, 
local authorities and staff of the technical departments. The second step was 
the formation of one cooperative per village unit, the Koperasi Unit Desa 
(KUD, village cooperative). The Presidential Instruction number 4 of 1973 en-
dorsed the new development towards larger cooperatives and introduced the 
system as a nation-wide programme. Further it was stated that the BUUD 
would be the main rice procurement agent for BULOG. BUUDs were hastily 
established, but were in general unable to meet the unrealistic targets set. 
This led to widespread confusion among the farmers and in July 1973 the gov-
ernment reduced its pressure on the BUUDs. From then on the development 
of BUUDs/KUDs took place at a more realistic pace. The borderline between 
the responsibilities of BUUD and KUD remained unclear until 1978, when a 
new Presidential Instruction stipulated that the BUUD was to be a purely 
advisory body consisting of government officials and local notables. The KUD 
was designated a central role as 'the sole institution for carrying out the 
various economic activities of the rural area'. The sub-district (kecamatan) 
was designated the operational area for the KUD, which meant an enlargement 
to several thousand hectares of irrigated rice-fields and thousands of farm 
families. The central role of the KUD in rural development was further elabo-
rated in the Presidential Instruction of 1984, in which agriculture, transportation, 
electricity, construction, small industries and handicraft were stated as sectors 
of activity. 
The increasing emphasis on KUDs as vehicles for agricultural and rural dev-
elopment went together with increasing government involvement in the operations 
of the KUDs. The Department of Cooperatives, with staff at national, provincial 
and district level, is in charge of supervision and control of KUDs as well as 
the implementation ofvariousgovernment-fundedprogrammes.These programmes, 
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such as training KUD staff, the provision of grants or loans for working capital, 
equipment or storage facilities, are intended to provide the KUDs with the 
skills and faculties required to perform their prescribed role. This combination 
of control and implementation places the staff in an ambiguous position in 
which undue emphasis is put on the spending of funds budgeted for the various 
programmes. Whether programmes fit the local situation is not taken into con-
sideration, and the question of whether or not KUDs are able to handle funds 
and facilities is simply answered by providing training courses. The confusion 
about how the responsibilities for KUDs are divided between staff of the Dep-
artment and KUD committee is confusing for the KUD committee too. Often 
the activities of the committee are restricted to acceptation of funds, training 
courses etc. and following instructions. The formal right of the members to 
control their KUD through the annual members' meeting is not put into practice, 
and in fact members are just clients. 
By government instruction and financial inducement a structure of secondary 
cooperatives at provincial level, Pusat Koperasi Unit Desa (PUSKUD), and a 
national apex organization, Induk Koperasi Unit Desa (INKUD), has been estab-
lished to support the KUDs. PUSKUDs and INKUD are also engaged in imple-
menting government-funded programmes. Although the KUDs are, in theory, 
the controlling members, the secondary cooperatives act as independent enter-
prises aimed at achieving their own targets and objectives which may, or may 
not be, in line with those of the KUDs. 
Despite good intentions and massive government support, the KUDs failed to 
develop into local enterprises supported by, and directed at, the rural population. 
In fact the KUD as sole organization in charge of a range of activities in the 
sub-district may have hampered local initiatives. The most visible result of 
the government policy so far has been the establishment of a huge bureaucracy 
(governmental and semi-governmental). This bureaucracy has large sums available, 
but the lack of clear guidelines and clearly demarcated responsibilities severely 
limit effective operation. The KUDs form the lowest level in this bureaucracy 
and their orientation towards the higher echelons for instructions and funds 
has alienated them from their members. In turn, the members, or the rural 
population in general, have lost sight of the KUDs as cooperatives because 
their participation is not expected. In practice the KUD is often merely regarded 
as an office and a store in the sub-district centre. 
However, the impact of KUDs as government agencies involved in the distri-
bution of inputs and the purchase and processing of rice must not be under-
estimated. The approximately 6400 KUDs (1984) play an important, although 
not dominant, role in the supply of fertilizer and the purchase of rice. In 
specific sub-sectors such as dairy and sugar production the KUDs are dominant 
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but in these activities they operate in a government-created monopoly position. 
Whether the billions of Rupiahs spent on storage facilities, offices, training, 
rice milling equipment and working capital are in balance with the volume of 
business remains dubious. A second point of concern is the state of affairs in 
the KUDs. The inadequate administration and bookkeeping do not allow an 
overall insight in their viability, but it seems likely that the great majority of 
KUDs would cease to operate if the government support were withdrawn. 
In retrospect, two developments in the government policy regarding rural 
cooperatives, the KUDs, are of main importance: the accumulation of responsi-
bilities and the increase in the geographic area of operation. The accumulation 
of responsibilities led to the present situation in which the KUDs are expected 
to execute a range of business activities as well as development programmes 
to serve the varying, and sometimes conflicting, interests of the rural population. 
This is beyond the capabilities of the majority of the KUDs which are still 
struggling with basic administrative and managerial problems. The increase of 
the operational area is the result of the strife towards operational efficiency, 
especially for the major tasks of providing inputs for rice production and the 
purchase and processing of rice. However, the physical distance between the 
KUD office located in the sub-district centre and a large proportion of the 
potential members proved to be too great for the provision of services as well 
as for active participation of the members. The implementation of the govern-
ment policy through massive support in terms of capital and other resources 
led to an extreme orientation of the KUDs and the cooperative superstructure 
towards the central government and its budget, thereby losing sight of the 
basis of cooperatives, the members. 
3.4 Credit services in the vegetable production areas of West Java 
The surveys regarding credit arrangements were concentrated on the two 
largest production areas, Lembang/Cisarua and Pangalengan. In these areas 
village cooperatives, KUDs, and other institutions were visited to collect inform-
ation. The Lembang/Cisarua production area is administratively divided into 
two sub-districts. In Lembang a KUD with the same name was in operation. In 
Cisarua a KUD was in the process of being established but was not yet opera-
ative. The Pangalengan production area lies within the boundaries of the 
sub-district of that name and had a KUD. However this KUD was not active 
because the financial situation was unclear, as a result of the unrecorded, but 
apparently considerable, debts left behind by the previous committee. The 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia had village units in Lembang and Pangalengan, but the 
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latter was not in operation as irregularities had been discovered in the branch 
office under which this village unit operated. 
3.4.1 Institutional credit 
The KUD Lembang implemented three credit schemes. BIMAS credit was 
available to rice farmers and for secondary crops. In 1978 approximately 1000 
members obtained BIMAS loans and part of these were used for vegetable 
production. Information about the total amount outstanding and repayments 
was not available either at the KUD or at the BRI village unit. The second 
scheme was developed and supported with funds by the Directorate General of 
Cooperatives especially for small traders: Kredit Candak Kulak (KCK). A special 
unit was created in the KUD to provide loans with a maximum of Rp 15 000 
to small traders for a maximum period of three months. The interest rate was 
5 percent per month of which 4 percent was retained as compulsory savings 
on behalf of the borrower. Repayments were due in equal installments, usually 
weekly, and because interest and savings were calculated over the total loan 
amount, the actual rate of interest and savings was 10 percent per month. 
The third scheme was an initiative by the KUD itself. Loans were supplied to 
farmers and traders at an interest rate of 2.5 percent per month from the 
capital formed by the entrance fees and compulsory savings of the members. 
The applications for loans were considered by the KUD committee and staff. 
On average, the loans supplied were Rp 200 000, which meant that a limited 
number of people had access to this credit only. In 1978 25 persons obtained 
loans and, according to the annual report, board members, staff and members 
of the board of supervisors were well represented among the happy few. The 
limited number of loans supplied and the selection of borrowers raised doubts 
about the cooperative aspects of these credit services and in fact about the 
operation of the KUD itself. 
In Bandung there is a regional office of the Credit Unions in Indonesia. 
These Credit Unions are independent non-governmental organizations that 
operate with capital formed by the group itself through regular savings. A 
Credit Union can be started by any group of people who apply to the regional 
office. Staff at this office provide general information about the purpose and 
procedures of activities, and if the group decides to go ahead a committee 
receives training in loan evaluation and administration. The group itself decides 
on the amounts which must be saved regularly and the interest rates for savings 
and loans; usually these are 1 to 2 percent and 2 to 4 percent, respectively. 
A loan committee decides about the loan applications at regular meetings, 
possibly after a discussion with the applicant about the purpose and size of 
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the loan. Credit Unions are required to report monthly to the headquarters in 
Jakarta and to the regional office. These reports are used for monitoring and 
support. The 35 Credit Unions existing in the area of Bandung in 1978, were 
formed by employees of larger offices in Bandung town and in district centres; 
none were present in the vegetable production areas. 
3.4.2 Informal credit 
The farm management surveys and discussions with farmers in general provided 
some insight into informal credit relations. However, as the farmers had been 
informed about the proposed credit services of the project, the comments 
were probably biased to a certain extent. The general complaint was that often 
no trader or shopkeeper were willing or able to provide credit. This complaint 
was supported by observations made during the survey period that, in periods 
with low prices, fields remained unplanted for prolonged periods. The credit 
arrangements recorded were in most cases between farmer and vegetable trader. 
The following case is such an arrangement. A farmer decided to plant potatoes 
on a field of 0.16 hectare. He financed the main part of the inputs from own 
resources and obtained from a trader a loan in kind of 100 kg fertilizer and 5 
tins of fungicides with a total market value of Rp 12 000. The condition was 
that the total crop must be sold to the trader, which gave the trader a fan-
guarantee of recovering the loan and which assured him of business in future. 
The farmer was assured of the sale of his produce and this can be important 
in periods of a large supply. After 10 weeks the harvest of 1470 kg potatoes 
was sold to the trader for Rp 130/kg, although the actual market price was 
Rp 135/kg. The trader deducted Rp 13 500 for fertilizer and fungicide and 
paid Rp 177 600 to the farmer. The costs to the farmer for this loan of Rp 
12 000 were: 
extra paid for the inputs Rp 1500 
returns lost because of lower sales price 1470 x Rp 5 Rp 7350 
total Rp 8850 
The cost expressed as interest was 74 percent in total, or 30 percent per 
month, but a proportion of this percentage must be assigned to the guaranteed 
purchase of the crop by the trader. The sum of the total cash inputs for this 
particular crop was Rp 103 250 and thus the loan accounted for 12 percent of 
the cash inputs only. The duration of this type of loan varies from three months 
to several weeks and results in costs that vary from 25 percent to 150 percent 
per month, largely because of the condition to sell the total crop to the trader 
at prices which are usually Rp 5 to Rp 10 below the actual market prices. 
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Shopkeepers selling inputs provided credit as well, but mainly to those farmers 
who could provide collateral; for example the registration documents of a motor 
cycle. The interest rates on these 'secured' loans were usually lower; 5 to 10 
percent per month. 
A form of informal credit without intermediary which was found to be wide-
spread among the farmers' wives is the ROSCA ('arisan' in Indonesian). The 
contributions, mostly paid weekly, varied from Rp 50 to Rp 1000 and the sums 
obtained were Rp 1000 to Rp 20 000. The sums were used predominantly for 
household purposes such as the purchase of plates and clothes. The meetings, 
often after the service in the mosque on Fridays, were important social events 
in the community. 
3.4.3 Conclusions 
The review of institutional and informal credit in and around Bandung resulted 
in the following conclusions: 
1. Institutional credit tailored to the requirements of vegetable farmers is not 
available. The BIMAS loans obtained by farmers in Lembang are small in relation 
to the input requirements, and the seasonal provision of the loans does not 
comply with the continuous nature of vegetable production. 
2. Informal credit for vegetable producers is most probably insufficiently avai-
lable, and this leads to a lower production in terms of volume as well as value. 
3. Informal credit provided by vegetable traders is expensive for the farmers, 
especially because of the condition that the whole crop must be sold to the 
trader. In periods with a large supply this condition can be an advantage for 
the farmer, because he is assured of his crop being purchased. 
4. The institutional credit arrangements present in the area that appear to be 
successful combine the collection of savings from members with the provision 
of credit to the same members. The nominal interest rates for the loans under 
these arrangements range from 2.5 percent to 4 percent per month and these 
rates are not considered excessive by borrowers. In fact, effective interest 
rates were higher, because interest is calculated over the total loan amount 
whereas repayments are made in equal installments. 
35 The vegetable fanners in West Java 
Very little information was available about the financial position of vegetable 
farmers and to obtain this information a farm management survey was conducted 
in two main production areas, Lembang/Cisarua and Pangalengan. Data regarding 
the resource base were collected from 84 vegetable-producing households with 
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a farm size of 2 hectares or less, selected at random. To assess the financial 
position of the households in more detail, resource utilization data were collected 
from the 30 participants in the Pangalengan production area. Project resources 
made it necessary to concentrate on one area: the Pangalengan area was selected 
because the monocropping system practised there facilitated data collection, 
and the two main crops grown were of major importance in West Java. During 
a period of 12 months in 1978 and 1979 all households were visited twice a 
week to record inputs, outputs and inventory changes. The Farm Management 
Data Collection and Analysis System developed by the FAO was used for this 
survey. 
3.5.1 The resource base 
The average age of the farmers was 40 years. Most had received formal 
education for a period of 3 to 6 years, which implies a measure of literacy. 
The average farm family consisted of 5 persons, the farmer and his wife, some-
times adult relatives and children. In seven of the 84 farm households the 
work force was supplemented by a permanent labourer; all farmers employed 
temporary labourers in the peak periods of planting and harvesting. 
The average farm size, defined as average area managed throughout the 
survey period, is around 0.50 hectare in both areas and most of the farms are 
between 0.26 and 0.75 hectare (Table 3.8). Parcels of land are frequently rented 
Table 3.8. Distribution of farm size in Lembang/Cisarua and Pangalengan. 
Farm size Lembang/Cisarua Pangalengan 
(ha) 
farms 
(no) 
average size 
(ha) 
farms 
(no) 
average size 
(ha) 
0.00 -0.25 12 0.15 5 0.15 
0.26 -050 20 036 16 036 
051 -0.75 11 057 5 0.62 
0.76 -1.00 4 0.86 3 0.90 
1.01 -1.25 3 1.12 1 1.03 
1.26 -150 . . 1 1.40 
151 -1.75 1 156 - . 
1.76 -2.00 . - 1 1.92 
2.01 -2.25 1 2.22 
total/average 52 050 32 052 
Source: Moll (1981) 
for one or more cropping seasons and the average proportion of rented land 
is around 30 percent in Pangalengan and 20 percent in Lembang/Cisarua (Table 
3.9). All farms consist of two or more parcels, 5 to 60 minutes' walk from the 
house. These parcels are usually divided into several fields that are planted 
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Table 3.9. Land tenure in Lembang/Cisarua and Pangalengan. 
Lembang/Cisarua Pangalengan 
parcels 
(no) 
total 
area 
(ha) 
average 
per farm 
(ha) 
parcels 
(no) 
total 
area 
(ha) 
average 
per farm 
(ha) 
land owned 106 21.23 0.41 59 11.74 037 
land rented in 23 4.84 0.09 30 5.60 0.17 
land rented out 2 0.24 0.01 3 0.64 0.02 
land managed 127 25.83 050 86 16.70 052 
Source: Moll (1981) 
PARCEL 2 PARCEL 3 
2 1 ' 1 
25 min. 
HOUSE 
PARCEL 1 
parcel 1 
field 1 820 sq.m 
field 2 840 sq. m 
parcel 2 
field 1 570 sq. m 
field 2 210 sq.m 
parcel 3 
field 1 890 sq.m 
total farm 3330 sq. m 
land changes: 
parcel 1, field 1 returned to owner in November 1978. 
parcel 2, fields 1 and 2 combined into field 3 in October 1978. 
cropping pattern 
parcel/field area crop planting date harvesting date 
sq. m (month/week) (month/week) 
VI 820 maize 5/3 9/1 
1/2 840 cabbage 5/3 8/3 
1/2 840 potato 9/2 12/3 
1/2 840 cabbage 12/3 3/1 
1/2 840 potato 3/4 6/3 
2/1 570 maize/sweet potato 5/4 10/1 
2/3 780 potato 10/3 1/1 
3/1 890 potato 4/3 7/3 
3/1 890 cabbage 9/4 VI 
3/1 890 potato 1/3 4/2 
Figure 3.2. Farm map and cropping pattern of typical farm in Pangalengan. 
individually. The farm map and the cropping pattern of a typical small farm in 
Pangalengan are given in Figure 3.2. 
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All farmers own a house on a tiny plot of land in the village and some 
have a small store for fertilizers and equipment. Animal husbandry is a common 
additional activity in both areas and sixty percent of the farmers own sheep 
for meat and manure and an additional twelve percent own dairy cows. Sheep 
and cows are kept in a simple shed, usually close to the house. Farm equipment 
is restricted to a hand sprayer and hand tools, because land preparation, culti-
vation and transport of inputs and produce are all done manually. 
There are basic differences in the vegetable production between the two 
areas. In Lembang/Cisarua vegetables are usually grown on parcels together 
with more or less sparsely spaced fruit trees, whereas in Pangalengan mono-
cropping is practised. The range of vegetables grown on farms in Lembang/ 
Cisarua is wide, but in Pangalengan two crops only, cabbage and potato, account 
for approximately 80 percent of the cultivated area. The farmers in both areas, 
and in fact in all vegetable production areas, make use of modern purchased 
inputs such as hybrid seed, fertilizer and pesticides. The climate in both areas 
is similar, with an average annual rainfall of 2500 mm, mainly in the period 
from September to May. In the remaining months the rainfall is sufficient for 
vegetable production in some years and insufficient in others. Approximately 
30-40 percent of the parcels in both areas are equipped with a gravity irrigation 
system which enables production in dry or drier months. 
3.5.2 Resource utilization and returns 
During the survey period the inputs and outputs were recorded per individual 
crop, plus the data regarding livestock and other activities on the 30 farms in 
Pangalengan. Cabbage and potato are the main crops, accounting for 43 percent 
and 41 percent of the planted area respectively. Chinese cabbage, sweet corn 
and tomato are crops of secondary importance and other crops are grown 
incidentally. The total cultivatable area of the farms is planted with cash 
crops and the total production is sold, usually straight from the field. The 
farmers are thus purely commercial and they buy their staple food, rice mainly, 
in local shops. Vegetable production is a fairly continuous activity; in the 
drier period from June to August sweet corn is often planted,because this is a 
low-input and thus low-risk crop. The cropping intensity ranges from 160 to 
320 percent, with an average of 240 percent. This intensive cultivation and 
the subdivision of parcels into fields lead to 10-20 harvests per year on all 
farms. The parcels are subdivided to spread the risk of adverse weather con-
ditions and low prices and to make optimal use of own financial and labour 
resources. 
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The average variable costs and returns per hectare for the most important 
vegetable crops, except sweet corn, are well above those for irrigated rice 
and this is an important difference between vegetable production and rice 
production (Table 3.10). The comparatively high variable costs for the main 
Table 3.10. Yields, returns and variable costs of vegetable crops in Pangalengan 
1978/79 and rice in Indonesia, 1979 (Rp/ha). 
Cabbage Chinese 
cabbage 
Potato Sweet 
corn 
Tomato Rice 
1) 
Yield and returns 
yield (kg) 32400 10300 11300 3400 26900 3920 
price (Rp per kg) 31 21 111 17 135 73 
value of production 1013800 21400 1255100 58300 3636900 287000 
Variable costs 
seed 93800 52400 325900 5400 106900 4800 
organic fertilizer 121400 77100 77400 96700 500 
mineral fertilizer 139900 58800 105500 107800 10300 
pesticides 61000 33700 242300 555100 1400 
temp, hired labour 105000 36400 89100 2600 172600 36100 
interest 29500 11600 54200 500 43200 
other 101400 11500 
total 550600 270000 894400 8500 1183700 64600 
Economics 
gross margin 463200 -56000 360700 49800 2453200 222400 
gross margin per month 134900 -24000 104000 12900 618500 37100 
costs (Rp per kg) 17 26 79 2 44 16 
number of observations 138 15 132 14 7 
1. Harvested product is dry stalk paddy. 
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics (1983); Moll (1981) 
crops and the average cropping intensity of 240 percent result in an average 
amount of working capital invested in standing crops throughout the year 
estimated at Rp 364 000 per hectare farm land (Table 3.11). The actual require-
ments for working capital vary with the types of crops planted, the farm size 
and the stage of the crops. The availability of working capital is therefore an 
important determinant in production decisions. It was observed that after the 
harvest of a crop which resulted in a sizeable profit, potato was often planted; 
this crop requires a high initial cash outlay. In several cases, exceptional 
profits resulted in the farm being extended by renting of land. In contrasting 
cases crops requiring lower initial expenses, such as Chinese cabbage or sweet 
corn, were planted, or a field was left uncultivated until the harvest of another 
field brought in more cash. 
The data on the average costs and returns stated above must be supplemented 
to give a lealistic picture of the precarious nature of vegetable production. 
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Table 3.11. Average working capital invested in standing vegetable crops per 
hectare farm land. 
crop average area 
planted per 
hectare farm 
land 
(ha^ear) 
(1) 
average working 
capital invested 
during growing 
period 
(RplOOO/ha) 
(2) 
length 
growing 
period 
(days) 
(3) 
average working 
capital invested 
per hectare farm 
land 
(RplOOO) 
(4) 
cabbage 1.04 479 103 141 
Chinese 
cabbage 0.08 238 70 4 
potato 0.99 724 104 204 
sweet 
potato 0.17 7 116 . tomato 0.05 791 120 13 
other 0.07 134 88 2 
total 2.40 364 
(4) = ( l )x(2)x(3) :365. 
Source: Moll (1981) 
Input quantities, and thus the variable costs, are affected in various ways by 
weather conditions. Prolonged wet weather results in high infestation with 
diseases such as Early blight (Altemaria solani) and Late blight (Phytophtora 
infestans) in potato and tomato crops. Intensive spraying, every other day, is 
a common practice in such periods. These efforts are, however, sometimes in 
vain and early harvesting of potatoes can be necessary to save whatever crop 
is formed. The period for harvesting tomatoes can be as short as four weeks. 
Dry or drier weather leads to intensive spraying with insecticides to control 
pests, especially on cabbage. Dry weather further results in low yields for all 
standing crops if no irrigation is available. The variations in input and output 
levels for cabbage and potato, shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, are largely caused 
by the climatic factors stated above and to a lesser extent by factors such as 
quality of land and previous crops grown. Therefore, no relationship could be 
detected between input and output levels in the data on the 400 cabbage and 
potato crop cycles recorded. Average monthly prices fluctuated between Rp 12 
and Rp 120 per kg for cabbage and between Rp 63 and Rp 220 per kg for 
potato in the period of observation (Figure 3.5). The low prices occurred in 
periods with high yields (and thus a high total production) and vice versa. 
The effect of the variation in input and output quantities and the price fluc-
tuations on the results of the cabbage and potato crops was such that 35 
percent and 33 percent respectively of all crop cycles led to a negative gross 
margin. 
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Frequency 
(number of crops) 
20 
ie 
1 0 h 
« 
o 
cabbage 
(128 crops) 
variable costs in Rp 100000/ha 
Frequency 
(Timber of crops) 
•*»r 
40 
35 
30 
28 
potato 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
(123 crops) 
variable costs in Rp 100000/ha 
Figure 3.3. Frequency distribution variable costs for cabbage and potato crops. 
Frequency 
(number of crops) 
40 cabbage 
4 12 2 0 2 8 3 9 4 4 82 60 68 
(123 crops) yield in ton/ha 
Frequency 
(number of crops) 
potato 
2 8 10 14 18 22 26 30 
(123 crops) yield in ton/ha 
Figure 3.4. Frequency distribution yield for cabbage and potato. 
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Price in 
Rp/kg 
1 5 0 
c a b b a g e 
1 2 5 
1O0 
7 5 
5 0 
2 5 
i i i t i i i i p i 
0 
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr Mai Jun Jul AUQ 
Price in 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 
Rp/kg 
2 8 0 
2 4 0 
p o t a t o 
2 0 0 
1 6 0 
1 2 0 
8 0 
4 0 
0 i i i i i i i i — i — i — i — 
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr Mai Jun Jul Aug 
1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 
Figure 3.5. Cabbbage and potato prices during survey period 1978/79. 
The variable and unpredictable results per crop lead to a very irregular 
contribution to the family income despite the fact that lf>20 crops are harvested 
per farm throughout the year. The cash flows of vegetable production on three 
farms, Figure 3.6, show the build-up of the gross margin during the period of 
observation. The graphs clearly show that there are long periods, 6-8 months, 
during which the cumulative gross margin fluctuates around the same level, 
which indicates that returns from crops harvested are just sufficient to cover 
the expenses for new and standing crops. A small number of good harvests 
(the combination of good yields with favourable prices) brings the gross margin 
to the levels stated at the end of the year. 
Vegetable production is the main activity on all farms (this was a selection 
criterion) but animal husbandry is an important secondary activity on 20 of 
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2 0 0 
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1 9 7 8 
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9O0 
6 0 0 
7 0 0 
6 0 0 
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4 0 0 
3 0 0 
2 0 0 
1 0 0 
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1 9 7 9 
Farm 15 
Rp 6 8 0 . 0 0 0 
Apr Mai Jun Jul Aug Sep 
1 9 7 a 
Oct Nov Deo Jan Feb Mar Apr Mai Jun Jul Aug 
1 9 7 9 
Ftp 1 O O 0 
9 0 0 
8 0 0 -
7O0 -
6O0 -
3 0 0 -
4 0 0 
3 0 0 
2 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 
- 1 0 0 
- 2 0 0 I 
Farm 27 
Rp 2 6 0 . 0 0 0 
Apr Mat Jun Jul Aug Sep 
1 9 7 8 
Oct Nov Dec Jan Fob Mar Apr Mai Jun Jul Aug 
1 9 7 9 
Figure 3.6. Cash flows of vegetable production on three farms. 
the 30 farms. The analysis revealed a consistent pattern of differences among 
the farms with and without animal husbandry and therefore three farm types 
were distinguished: farms with vegetable production only, farms with vegetable 
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production and sheep, farms with vegetable production and dairy cows. The 
farms with sheep are the smallest, with an average size of 0.45 hectare, and 
sheep production must be seen as an additional activity for farmers with little 
capital. The farms with dairy cows are 0.84 hectare on average, and only these 
comparatively large farmers can afford one or more dairy cows at a price of 
Rp 300 000 to Rp 500 000 per head. The farms with vegetable production only, 
0.66 hectare on average, obtained better results from vegetable production on 
a per hectare basis than the farms with either sheep or cows. More crops are 
grown per year, average cropping intensity 280 percent against 220 percent, 
and both input-output levels and gross returns per crop planted are higher. 
The gross margins for vegetable production per farm type reflect the differences 
in average farm size and the different intensities with which vegetable produc-
tion is undertaken (Table 3.12). A number of farm families are engaged in other 
Table 3.12. Average gross margin per farm of main activities for each 
farm type (Rp 1000). 
farm type gross margin 
total vegetable 
production 
sheep 
production 
dairy 
production 
vegetable production 
only 896 896 
vegetable production 
and sheep 368 55 423 
vegetable production 
and dairy cows 534 340 874 
all farms 583 26 79 688 
Source: Moll (1981) 
activities on the farm, such as growing tea and rearing fish in ponds. The 
average annual net income per farm obtained from these activities is Rp 21000. 
Several farm families are engaged in off-farm activities such as vegetable 
trade and employment on other farms. The average contribution of these off-
farm activities to the family income is Rp 11 000. 
The fixed costs for the various activities are small compared with the variable 
costs. They refer to the cost of land, costs of repair and maintenance of equip-
ment and farm buildings and interest on capital invested in sheep and cows. 
Deduction of these costs from the respective enterprises results in the net 
returns (Table 3.13). The column 'return to capital' refers to the calculated 
returns from own capital invested in land and livestock. The net returns from 
other farm activities are added, to arrive at the total net farm income, which 
is Rp 665 000 on average. Addition of the Rp 11 000 from off-farm activities 
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Table 3.13. Components of net farm earnings per farm type (Rp 1000). 
farm type average net return per activity return to net farm 
capital earnings 
vegetable sheep dairy other 
prod. prod. prod, farm 
vegetable prod. 
only 792 55 39 886 
vegetable prod. 
and sheep 316 52 4 35 407 
vegetable prod. 
and dairy cows 296 3 107 826 
all farms 498 22 70 21 54 665 
Source: Moll (1981) 
brings the total average family income to Rp 676 000, or Rp 113 000 per person. 
This is slightly below the per capita income in Indonesia at current factor cost, 
which was Rp 133 000 in 1978. Comparison of the average net farm income with 
the estimated annual income of a family without land or livestock in the same 
area (Rp 160 000 per year if husband and wife each work 200 days as farm 
labourer) shows that vegetable production results in incomes well above the 
minimum requirements, at least in the period of observation. The differences 
in net farm earnings within each farm type are great (Table 3.14). In total, 
Table 3.14. Distribution of net farm earnings per farm type. 
net farm earnings frequency per farm type all 
category farms 
vegetable vegetable vegetable 
prod.only prod, and prod, and 
(Rp 1000) sheep dairy 
0 - 333 2 7 3 12 
333 - 666 2 4 1 7 
666 -1000 2 1 3 
1000 -1333 3 1 2 6 
1333 -1666 
1666 -2000 
2000 -2333 
2333 -2666 1 1 
2666 -3000 1 1 
Source: Moll (1981) 
19 farms have earnings below the average amount, but in only three cases the 
income was below the estimated minimum requirements of Rp 160 000 per year. 
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3.5.3 Findings and conclusions 
The following findings and conclusions were of special importance for the 
formulation of the savings and credit scheme; 
1. Vegetable production is a year-round business; it is not affected to a con-
siderable extent by the dry period. 
2. Most vegetable farmers have a farm between 0.26 and 0.75 hectare in size. 
3. Vegetable farmers are 100 percent commercial; they sell the total production 
and buy their food. 
4. Vegetable production is an intensive activity which requires a considerable 
amount of working capital. The average amount of working capital invested in 
standing crops is estimated at Rp 364 000 per hectare farm land. 
5. The returns per individual crop harvested are variable and unpredictable, 
because of weather conditions and price fluctuations. This irregularity, the 
daily and less regular requirements for household expenses and the working 
capital requirements lead to situations in which farmers face serious cash 
shortages, whereas in periods of high prices farmers may have excess funds. 
6. A considerable proportion of the farmers are engaged in other activities 
such as sheep and dairy production, the cultivation of tea and off-farm ac-
tivities. These activities provide a fairly regular contribution to the income 
and thus mitigate to some extent the effects of the vagaries of vegetable 
production. 
7. The average annual income from vegetable production is well above the 
estimated minimum requirements of a farm household, even for the relatively 
small farmers with a farm of 0.25 hectare. 
8. The provision of institutional financial services is possible in principle, 
because there is a considerable margin between the average income and the 
minimum requirements of a farm household. 
9. The provision of institutional financial services to vegetable farmers is 
useful as it enables farmers to grow more, and more valuable crops. 
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4 THE SAVINGS AND CREDIT SCHEME 1979-1985, REVIEW AND 
ANALYSIS 
4.1 Basic rationale of the scheme 
The studies of the financial situation of vegetable farmers and the existing 
financial services resulted in the conclusion that the provision of institutional 
financial services was possible and useful. The original idea about the desirability 
of the provision of credit services was thereby confirmed, and it was decided 
to proceed with the development of credit services. The starting point for the 
formulation of the credit services was formed by the three basic conditions 
that were considered essential for an adequate performance of financial insti-
tutions: 
1. The institution must be financially viable to allow it to function independently 
and continuously. 
2. The institution must be able to reach all farmers who require its services. 
3. The institution must develop and maintain relationships with farmers based 
on confidence. 
Indonesian policy with regard to the role of KUDs in rural areas added a 
fourth condition, namely, that KUDs must be involved in the credit activities. 
The selection of an institution that could possibly comply with the above 
conditions became the central issue in the formulation process. The KUDs 
were considered unsuitable to perform the role of financial institution, for a 
number of reasons: their operational and organizational structure was focused 
on rice production and marketing; the great measure of government influence 
on operational and financial matters had resulted in non-viable loan procedures 
and conditions; their clouded record of overall financial viability offered little 
hope of future improvements; and finally, their inability to develop meaningful 
relations with members. No other formal financial institutions were present in 
the vegetable production areas except in the Lembang and Pangalengan sub-
districts, where BRI village units existed. However, these units were hampered 
by the same government interference as the KUDs, with similar repercussions 
on their performance. Hence, the use of these units was dismissed too. 
A different type of organization was sought which was closer to the farmers 
and which was sufficiently outside the mainstream of government policies to 
allow experiments with loan procedures and conditions. The so-called 'kelompoks', 
groups of 20 to 50 farmers living in the same neighbourhood, which existed in 
the area offered scope in this direction. The groups were originally organized 
by the agricultural extension service but some had expanded their activities to 
include, for example, the collection of savings and the provision of credit. 
60 
The provision of financial services through these small groups would have a 
number of advantages above services provided by KUDs or other types of 
formal institutions operating at sub-district level: 
- Small groups offer individual members insight into the activities and some 
measure of control. Both are important to establish relations based on con-
fidence. 
- The provision of credit in such a small group allows quick procedures and 
results in low transaction costs for the members in terms of time spent and 
travel expenses incurred. 
- The existing groups were all headed by a committee and, if willing and able, 
these committee members could participate in the evaluation of loan applications 
and in administration, thereby bringing in essential knowledge about the back-
ground of members, and reducing administrative costs. 
The utilization of small groups for the provision of financial services also 
resulted in complications. In the first place, the groups were unable to meet 
all financial and managerial requirements on their own. Therefore, intensive 
guidance and support from a specialized institution was necessary. In the second 
place, the groups required an institutional setting that satisfied the government's 
KUD policy. This was found in a construction whereby all group members became 
KUD members and the groups operated within the KUD. With these considera-
tions regarding support to the groups and the necessary involvement of the 
KUDs, an organizational structure was outlined with three tiers: groups perform-
ing financial services for their members with a great measure of independence 
under the legal umbrella of the KUD; the KUD providing assistance to the 
groups through a special credit unit; and the project as the supporting insti-
tution with the overall responsibility for the credit programme. 
Besides the feasibility of the organizational structure there was still a range 
of other questions: are members and committee members of groups and KUDs 
prepared to participate; what is the actual management capacity available in 
groups and KUDs; what terms and conditions for loans and savings are required 
by the farmers; what are the costs and returns of the provision of services; 
what starting capital do the groups require to operate on a viable scale. 
In order to discuss the organizational structure and operational aspects with 
all parties concerned, a draft proposal was prepared for the start of a savings 
and credit scheme with four existing groups of 20 to 50 farmers in the area 
of operations of the Pangalengan KUD. This KUD was selected because detailed 
information was available from the farm management survey and because regular 
contact had been established with farmers, groups of farmers and the KUD 
committee and staff through the survey activities. The operational procedures 
in the proposal deviated considerably from those followed by existing institutions. 
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The starting capital of the groups was to consist of savings collected from 
group members prior to the start of the credit services and a loan from the 
project. The groups were supposed to build up their own capital from members' 
savings and through profit from the credit operations. The interest proposed 
was 5 percent per month for loans and 2 percent per month for voluntary 
savings. 
Over a period of four months the proposal was discussed in detail with 
individual farmers, groups and their representatives, committee and staff of 
the KUD and staff of the Directorate General of Cooperatives (DGC). 
The proposed organizational structure with groups as intermediate organ-
izations proved to be controversial in discussions with the DGC staff. The 
groups were seen as organizations competing with the KUD and thus not in 
line with the government policy. The project staff argued that the groups 
would form links between farmers and the KUD committee and staff located 
in the office-cum-store in Pangalengan village. The discussion revealed the 
two different opinions about the role of the KUD: the KUD as executing agency 
of government programmes for farmers as opposed to the KUD as a farmers' 
organization undertaking activities required and supported by farmers. The 
KUD committee and staff in Pangalengan itself remained rather neutral as 
they were eager to get activities going anyhow. The groups preferred a great 
measure of independence, which was not surprising given the bad financial 
position of the KUD at the time of the discussions. The basic difference of 
opinion about the role of cooperatives between the DGC staff and the project 
staff was not resolved, but eventually all the parties concerned accepted a 
detailed description of the responsibilities and roles of the project, KUD and 
groups in the savings and credit scheme, as a temporary solution. 
The lending policy was the second main topic of the discussion. The project 
staff argued that loans to individual members must be given for a specific 
crop and that the amount should not exceed the minimum expected returns. 
This policy stemmed from the viewpoint that a loan is a supplement to the 
working capital of the farmer and that the risk of the activity for which a 
loan is provided must be covered by this working capital. The proposed lending 
policy meant an important deviation from the 'shopping list method' followed 
by the DGC (and other institutions providing loans for development in Indonesia) 
to determine loan amounts. According to this 'method' all cash inputs for an 
activity are listed and the total amount is provided as loan. The consequence 
of this policy is generally that if the returns are lower than expected, borrower 
and lender both agree sooner or later that the loan cannot be repaid. The 
lender is thus left with the potential losses, whereas if the returns are as 
expected, the profit is for the borrower. The effect of this lending policy, 
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and the connected attitudes about repayment, are of course devastating for 
the lending institution. In the discussions about the lending policy to be followed 
the knowledge obtained by the project about the financial situation of the 
farmers through the farm management study proved to be essential. The DGC 
staff could be convinced with actual data of the necessity to follow the proposed 
lending policy. Farmers and KUD staff agreed too, knowing that the project 
staff had a fairly realistic insight into the financial position of vegetable 
farmers. 
In connection with the accepted lending policy, the proposed contribution 
by the project to the starting capital of the groups of an amount of 
Rp 75 000 per member, to be paid in one lump sum, was agreed upon. This 
amount meant a substantial contribution to the working capital of individual 
members, because the total working capital requirements of an average farmer 
with 0.5 hectare were estimated at Rp 182 000. Further it was expected that 
with a capital of Rp 2 to 4 million per group the turnover would be sufficient 
to cover the costs. 
The third main point of discussion concerned the interest rate. The proposed 
rate of 5 percent per month for loans was unequivocally accepted by the farmers 
and the KUD staff, who were aware of the rates asked by informal interme-
diaries. The DGC staff was initially strongly opposed, because such a rate was 
contradictory to the official doctrine of cheap credit. However, the estimates 
about the costs involved in the provision of short-term credit for periods of 
two to four months showed that such a rate would most likely be necessary 
to cover all costs. This, plus the condition in the proposal that any profit 
would remain in the groups, made this part of the proposal finally acceptable 
to the DGC staff too. 
The procedures for the provision of loans and the collection of savings were 
determined in open discussions with all parties involved. The essential point 
of the proposal, namely that all these activities would take place in the group 
and not in the KUD office, was, after the long discussion about organizational 
structure, accepted. 
Meetings and discussions were essential in finding a consensus among the 
parties involved. However, it was clear that only actual operation would provide 
answers to questions regarding financial viability, the concurrence of terms 
and conditions with farmers' requirements, the farmers' preparedness to save 
and the level of management capacity in groups and KUD. Therefore it was 
agreed to start the scheme as an experiment on the small scale proposed and 
to review the experience after a period of eight months, a period which would 
allow approximately two successive loans to be provided. The draft proposal 
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was amended according to the outcome of the discussions, to serve as a basic 
document in the forthcoming review. The main points are summarized below. 
Organization 
The position of the project and the internal structure of the KUD with 
the positions of the savings and credit unit and groups are outlined in Figure 
4.1. The project staff, one Indonesian and one Dutch staff member, is in charge 
| PROJECT | 
KUD PANGALENGAN 
COMMITTEE 
STAFF 
savings and other 
credit unit sections 
I I I I 
committee committee committee committee 
other 
members 
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other 
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Figure 4.1. Organizational structure of the savings and credit scheme. 
of the overall guidance and supervision. The Savings and Credit unit of KUD 
Pangalengan, staffed with one assistant manager, has the following tasks: 
- to provide assistance to the groups, especially in administration, 
bookkeeping and member education. 
- to take part in the evaluation of loan applications. 
- to maintain a central bookkeeping system from which monthly reports must 
be made available to the groups and to the project. 
The groups elect a chairman and a treasurer who take part in the evaluation 
of loan applications and who maintain the group's bookkeeping with individual 
members' accounts. 
Capital formation 
The project provides the groups through the KUD with an interest-free 
loan of Rp 75 000 per member. This lump sum and the savings made by the 
members prior to the start of the credit services form the group's starting 
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capital. The interest-free loan must be repaid, but terms and conditions are to 
be determined later. The group will build up own capital through: compulsory 
monthly savings, the amount of which is decided by the groups; individual 
voluntary savings; and through profit from the credit services. 
Conditions 
- Loans are given for a proportion of the total costs of the cultivation of a 
specific crop on a specific field and repayment is due directly after the harvest. 
This means a maximum loan duration of four months. 
- An interest of 1.25 percent per week is charged over the outstanding amount; 
repayment in installments is allowed. 
- An interest of 0.5 percent per week is paid on voluntary savings. These 
savings can be withdrawn after giving notice. 
Procedures 
The saving and credit transactions take place in the group, usually the 
chairman's house, on a fixed morning or afternoon in the week, the so-called 
cash day. Project staff and KUD assistant are present on this cash day. The 
farmer completes a loan application form giving details about the crop, tenure 
of the land used, planting and harvest dates and the amount required. The 
requests are considered during the cash day by the group chairman, KUD as-
sistant and project staff. If approved, a loan agreement is drawn up stating 
amount and final repayment date; the loan will be provided on the following 
cash day. 
42 The provision of services in the groups 
4.2.1 The start 
The scheme started early 1979 on a limited scale with two staff members 
of the project, one assistant manager of the Pangalengan KUD and four groups 
of farmers, with 170 members in total. All had been involved in the formulation 
of the scheme. The activities started with a three-day training course conducted 
by the project staff for the chairmen and treasurers of the groups. They were 
introduced to administration, the processing of loans and the principles of 
financial management and they received the books, forms and calculator required. 
Thereafter the project provided the starting capital of Rp 75 000 per member 
to the groups and the provision of loans to the members started. The project 
staff provided intensive guidance during the first months, but thereafter the 
processing of loans and the administration was gradually relinquished to the 
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group comrnittees and the KUD assistant manager. The project staff monitored 
the activities through monthly reports and regular visits, once per month, to 
the groups on cash days and further assistance was provided as and when 
required. At the end of the year the project staff evaluated the activities and 
discussed the results with KUD staff and groups. The provision of short-term 
credit on the terms and conditions determined proved to be appreciated by 
the members; the revenues from interest exceeded the expenses at group and 
KUD level; the savings through monthly contributions by members plus the 
margin between revenues and expenses were sufficient to open prospects for 
the formation of own capital in the groups. The conclusion was that activities 
should be continued and expanded. This conclusion was endorsed by the staff 
of the Directorate General of Cooperatives. 
4.2.2 The proceedings in two groups 
To give insight in the group affairs, the history of two groups will now be 
summarized, from the start of their activities to the end of 1985. Group A 
has been selected as an example of a group which failed; group B is an example 
of a successful group. 
Several groups of farmers in the operation area of Lembang KUD applied 
for admission to the scheme during the first field trial in Pangalengan. After 
the decision was taken to continue and expand the activities of the scheme 
the groups were visited several times to discuss the conditions for participation. 
In consultation with committee and staff of the Lembang KUD 4 groups were 
finally selected for participation. Group A was one of these four groups. Early 
1980 a training course was given, a loan for starting capital was provided to 
each group and the activities started. Group A started with 44 members and a 
committee consisting of a schoolteacher/farmer and two full-time farmers. The 
operations went well during the first two years. Member meetings were held 
regularly, the monthly compulsory savings were collected, the loans were repaid 
correctly, and as a result the number and volume of loans increased. Soon 
after the start the group decided to provide inputs such as fertilizers and 
agrochemicals. In the second year of operation an office-cum-store was rented 
in the village, and an old truck was bought for transport. This took a con-
siderable proportion of the capital used so far for the provision of loans, and 
it resulted in larger overhead costs, because of maintenance and depreciation. 
However, the project raised no objections to the additional activities, because 
the group operated smoothly and the results in the first year were satisfactory. 
After the second year the activities deteriorated; a gradually increasing pro-
portion of the loans was not repaid on time and thus the provision of new 
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loans stagnated. A number of general members meetings were held with KUD 
and project staff, mdividual defaulting farmers were visited, but the declining 
trend could not be reversed (Table 4.1). The problems in the group were aggra-
vated by the declining, and later negative, results of the input supply services 
and the large overhead costs of truck and office-cum-store (Table 4.2). From 
Table 4.1. Group A, the provision of loans to members, 1980-1985. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Loans supplied 
number 143 165 160 113 89 21 
total (Rp 1000) 7275 9412 8628 6690 4540 1320 
Loans outstanding end year 
total (Rp 1000) 2438 3591 3138 3387 2317 2090 
proportion overdue (%) 6 20 33 56 51 89 
Table 4.2. Group A, profit and loss ! accounts, 1980 -1985 (Rp 1000). 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Revenues 
interest on loans to members 822 1575 2066 2545 2102 983 
interest on account with KUD 3 
profit on inputs 2 60 103 18 -78 0 
total 824 1635 2169 2563 2027 983 
Expenses 
308 interest loan starting capital 220 380 
salaries committee 90 370 420 540 465 360 
administration and office 80 226 374 881 1125 148 
management fee KUD/project 107 199 245 300 153 
total 170 703 993 1886 2270 969 
Provision bad debts 565 2132 424 
Profit/Loss 654 932 1176 112 -2375 -410 
1983 onwards, substantial reservations for bad debts were required and the 
group suffered a loss of nearly Rp 3 million over the years 1984 and 1985. 
The effect of the profits during the first years and the losses thereafter is 
shown in Table 4.3. The profits were partly returned to the members and placed 
on individual accounts as 'special savings', and partly used to form group capital. 
Of the liabilities at the end of 1980, 80 percent consisted of the loan from the 
project and 20 percent of the savings and undivided profit. At the end of 
1982 these proportions were 52 percent and 48 percent respectively, which 
means a rapid accumulation of own capital through profits made and through 
the compulsory, monthly, savings. From 1983 onwards the annual profit declined 
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Table 4.3. Group A, the formation of capital, 1980-1985 (RplOOO). 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Loan for starting capital 3300 3300 3300 2963 2616 2576 
Reserves and savings from 
profit 
provision bad debts 2143 2161 
group capital 776 1339 874 874 
special savings 641 656 1474 631 493 
undivided profit 654 932 1176 112 -2375 -2785 
total 654 1573 2608 2925 1273 743 
Savings by members 
compulsory savings 179 305 442 441 495 451 
voluntary savings 147 139 
total 179 305 442 441 642 590 
Total liabilities 4133 5178 6350 6329 4531 3909 
Membership end year 44 44 40 37 35 31 
and became negative; a proportion of the loan for starting capital was repaid 
to the project, and 25 percent of the members left the group, either enforced 
as defaulters or voluntarily after repaying the balance between debts and sa-
vings. The total liabilities declined and the proportion of own capital was 
reduced to 34 percent. At the end of 1985 the capital was largely immobilized 
in loans and interest payments overdue and the savings and credit services 
came to a standstill. The project suffered a loss of Rp 2.5 million and the 
members no longer had access to the services. No specific cause can be given 
for the failure, but in the course of operations it became clear that the addi-
tional input supply services put a heavy demand on the management capacity 
of the committee and resulted in high overhead costs. 
Group B is one of the three groups which started in 1981 in the operation 
area of Cisarua KUD, an area adjacent to Lembang. At that time two groups 
were in operation in the area and five in Lembang. Farmers in Cisarua had 
heard about the savings and credit services of the scheme and several farmers 
had visited groups in Cisarua or Lembang prior to their application for par-
ticipation. The standard selection and start-up procedures were followed and in 
May the group started with Rp 60 000 own capital and a Rp 3 million loan from 
the project. The number and volume of loans increased steadily and the majority 
of the loans were repaid on time. In December of each year the committee 
undertook special efforts to collect all loans overdue, to be able to close the 
books with no overdues at all. These efforts resulted in the somewhat biased 
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picture of the repayment discipline shown in Table 4.4. However, the fact that 
the committee took the initiative for these efforts shows their concern 
Table 4.4. Group B, the provision of loans to members, 1981-1985. 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Loans supplied 
number 
total (Rp 1000) 
115 
6000 
236 
14866 
283 
16739 
276 
20076 
272 
20800 
Loans outstanding end year 
total (Rp 1000) 
proportion overdue (%) 
2906 
1 
4760 
0 
5166 
0 
6479 
0 
7159 
0 
and involvement with the group's affairs. The group did not embark on additional 
activities and resisted the temptation to build a small office as well; the cash 
day and meetings were held in the chairman's house. The result was low 
expenses and this, combined with the correct repayment of loans, led to substan-
tial and increasing profits (Table 45). In 1984 the scheme opened the possibility 
Table 45. Group B, profit and loss ; accounts, 1981 -1985 (Rp 1000). 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Revenues 
interest on loans to members 422 2180 2987 3625 3843 
interest on account with KUD 6 11 
total 422 2180 2987 3631 3854 
Expenses 
interest on loan starting capital 
and on voluntary savings 26 345 242 68 
salaries committee 355 360 420 429 
administration and office 16 119 246 282 220 
management fee 170 200 300 323 
total 16 670 1151 1244 1040 
Provision bad debts 62 15 
Profit/Loss 406 1510 1836 2325 2799 
for groups to deposit excess funds on short-term notice with the project through 
the KUD. The group used this possibility and amounts up to Rp 0.5 million 
were deposited for periods of several months, which resulted in additional 
interest revenues. The profits were kept in the group as special savings for 
which no interest was paid, or as group capital (Table 4.6). Compulsory monthly 
savings and voluntary savings contributed further to the capital formation. In 
the third year of operation the group had built up sufficient own capital to 
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Table 4.6. Group B, the formation of capital, 1981-1985 (RplOOO). 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Loan for starting capital 3000 3375 1200 500 
Reservations and savings from 
profit 
provision bad debts 
group capital 
special savings 
undivided profit 
total 
406 
406 
14 
382 
1510 
1906 
218 
1391 
1836 
3445 
998 
1614 
2325 
4937 
1410 
2324 
2799 ' 
6533 
Savings by members 
compulsory savings 
voluntary savings 
total 
315 
218 
533 
642 
209 
851 
792 
223 
1015 
960 
780 
1740 
1173 
1284 
2457 
Total liabilities 3939 6132 5660 7177 8990 
Membership end year 40 45 44 40 40 
start with the repayment of the loan for starting capital, and at the end of 
the fifth year the total loan of Rp 3.3 million was repaid. At that time the 
group had a capital of Rp 9 million, which means that in a five-year period 
the members saved Rp 225 000 on average. The proceedings in this group show 
the possibility of the scheme to reach farmers with institutional savings and 
credit services. The low operating expenses, the virtual absence of non-repay-
ment and the increasing amount of savings are the visible signs of the serious 
interest members and committee take in the activities of their group. 
43 Development of the scheme and organizational structure 
The development of the savings and credit scheme from the first trial in 
1979 to 1985 can be characterized by the terms expansion, adaptation and 
formalization. The review of these three aspects of development leads to the 
assessment of the organizational structure of the scheme. 
The scheme expanded by incorporating a number of new groups and KUDs 
every year (Table 4.7). From the start of the scheme onwards the project 
received requests for admittance to the scheme from groups in several production 
areas. The requests were discussed with the respective KUDs, after which the 
groups were visiled by the project staff and KUD representatives. In general, 
the groups were seriously interested and some had already started with the 
collection of savings. The first visits were followed by general meetings with 
the groups in the villages, usually in school buildings, where the system was 
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Table 4.7. Expansion 1979-1985, staff and participants. 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Staff project (credit section) 
indonesian staff 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 
expatriate staff 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Staff KUDs 1 3 5 7 9 11 11 
Participants 
KUDs 1 3 4 7 7 9 11 
groups 
admitted during year 4 10 21 26 5 28 19 
wound up during year 1 10 8 
per 31st of December 4 14 34 60 55 75 94 
group members 217 672 1617 2578 2402 3117 3669 
explained to prospective participants and village leaders. Further, the project 
staff stated a number of requirements: the group members must elect a chairman 
and a treasurer who could handle the administration and the processing of 
loans, and a certain amount of savings must be brought together to purchase 
the books, forms and calculator required. Finally, the groups were encouraged 
to visit existing groups, to augment the information provided by the project. 
The formation of groups and the appointment of committee members was thus 
left to the local communities, but the project stipulated that the group size 
should be at least 30 and not more than 50 members. Such a number was ex-
pected to be manageable for a group committee. In consultation with the KUD 
committee involved, 6 to 8 groups were admitted per KUD at the same time 
to enable a full-time KUD assistant manager to be appointed. Besides the ap-
pointment of the assistant manager the KUDs were required to provide some 
office space and in general to provide support. After the final selection of 
groups a plan for including the new groups in the scheme was drawn up. The 
activities were planned to start in the months February and March, to enable 
the project staff to close the books in the existing groups and KUDs first. 
The course of events remained the same: a training course followed by the 
provision of books, forms and calculator; the supply of starting capital by the 
project; the provision of loans; a period of intensive guidance by the project 
and a gradual take-over of administration and loan processing by groups and 
KUD assistant managers. 
The expansion of the scheme through the admittance of new groups was 
thus basically different from the initial start with the four groups. The project 
acted on requests and certain minimum requirements could be asked from groups 
and KUDs, as a condition for participation. For KUDs and groups the decision 
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Table 4.8. Main indicators of activities in all groups, 1979-1985 (million Rp). 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Balance sheet 
assets 19.4 68.9 164.6 276.4 3163 414.4 500.0 
liabilities 
members' savings 0.7 7.0 28.1 57.0 117.1 1055 138.1 
group capital etc 4.7 18.6 335 64.6 63.8 1423 197.6 
loans for starting 
capital 14.0 43.4 103.0 154.7 135.4 166.6 164.3 
Credit acitvities 
loans supplied 25.4 133.9 2635 472.6 595.1 7605 678.4 
loans outstanding 14.8 47.6 104.7 1845 234.6 302.1 330.2 
Profit and loss account 
revenues (interest etc.) 2.4 18.3 37.7 755 1275 166.4 1985 
expenses & reservations 0.6 4.3 12.3 26.7 705 945 1245 
net profit 1.9 14.0 25.4 48.8 57.1 71.9 74.0 
Note: see for details subsequent tables. 
of whether or not to participate was much easier, because they had a fairly 
accurate idea about the scheme through their communication with KUDs and 
groups already involved in the scheme. 
Besides admitting new groups and KUDs it was necessary to exclude a number 
of groups after a few years of operation (Table 4.7). Credit services in these 
groups came to a standstill because loans were not repaid. Late repayment 
and non-repayment proved to be a main problem of the scheme. This will be 
dealt with in Section 4.5, together with the consequences for continued par-
ticipation. 
The pace of expansion was limited by the capacity of the project staff and 
not by the number of requests from groups and KUDs. The project staff had 
to balance the work involved in the admission of new groups against the pro-
vision of guidance and control to existing groups and the efforts required to 
adapt and formalize the scheme. In this situation preference was given to 
extending the savings and credit scheme to all major vegetable production 
areas in West Java rather than to a more complete coverage of one or two 
areas. 
The expansion of the scheme in numbers of participants was accompanied 
by a more than proportional increase in assets, savings, group capital and 
volume of loans provided, and a continuous positive margin between revenues 
and expenses (Table 4.8). These positive developments resulted in the need to 
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adapt regulations with regard to financial management in the groups, and to 
formalize the relations between project, KUDs and groups. Both required the 
demarcation of responsibilities between KUD committee and groups, and this 
proved to be difficult, because there was no official recognition of groups 
within the KUD. In general the groups were allowed to operate with a great 
measure of independence, and regulations for the groups regarding credit limits 
per member, the recovery of loans overdue, the allowances to chairmen and 
treasurers, the solvability and the cash position were adapted in consultation 
with the KUD committee. However, the destination of the profit made by the 
group caused major concern, because KUD committees were inclined to claim 
these profits for general and own purposes. From a legal viewpoint the KUD 
committee had the right to do so, but the diversion of profit from the groups 
would undermine a fundamental aspect of the scheme: the capital formation by 
the groups. The project argued that the profits shown resulted from excess 
interest paid by the members and that this excess should be returned. Generally, 
the reasoning of the project staff was accepted and profits were completely, 
or for the main part, retained by the groups as group capital and as 'special 
savings' on the accounts of individual members. However, the legally undefined 
position of the groups in the KUD remained a weak point and the discussions 
had to be repeated annually to convince KUD committees. 
The financial relations between project, KUD and groups developed from 
the loosely defined agreements reached with Pangalengan KUD prior to the 
start of the first trial, into a set of regulations and formal contracts dealing 
with the following: the provision of starting capital to the groups and its 
repayment; the payment of management fee by the groups to cover the costs 
at KUD and project level; the provision of current account services to the 
groups by KUD and project. The contracts were between project and KUDs, 
the latter acting on behalf of the groups. The formalization process mainly 
took place in meetings with the relatively small number of groups and KUDs 
which participated from the first years of the scheme onwards. Procedures, 
regulations and contracts agreed upon in these meetings were applicable, if 
necessary with modifications, to new KUDs and groups. 
The process of expansion, adaptation and formalization revealed two bottle-
necks in the organizational structure of the scheme: the participation of the 
KUD at the level between project and groups and the temporary status of the 
project. The participation of KUDs resulted in two major complications. The 
first was the impossibility of direct relations between project and groups, 
because KUDs and not groups had the legal status of cooperative. Lengthy 
discussions with KUD committees and groups were required to demarcate respon-
sibilities. In general, agreements that enabled the groups to operate independent-
73 
ly were reached, but a permanent uncertainty about the status of the groups 
remained. The second complication resulted from the ambiguous position of 
the staff of the savings and credit unit in the KUD. The unit was part of 
the KUD and its staff were thus responsible to the KUD committee, but, the 
staff was exclusively engaged in the scheme which was supervised by the project. 
In this situation it proved to be difficult for the project to induce the KUD 
staff to perform their controlling and supporting tasks correctly and conform 
with the procedures agreed upon in meetings with the committee. In several 
cases the KUD staff neglected their tasks or were even involved in malversation 
and considerable additional efforts were required from the project staff to 
minimize the negative effects. In the extreme cases, KUD assistants were re-
placed in consultation with the KUD committee, but this was no guarantee 
for permanent improvement, because the leverage the project exerted on KUD 
assistants remained insufficient. 
The complications resulting from the participation of the KUDs could have 
been resolved by giving the groups an individual legal status and by transferring 
the tasks from the saving and credit unit of the KUD to the project. These 
measures would mean that KUDs were no longer involved in the scheme, and 
result in a simpler structure of the scheme, which would allow a clear-cut 
division of responsibilities between the project as financial institution and the 
groups as clients. However, the government's policy forbad such a solution, 
because the KUDs remained the sole organization at the sub-district level in 
charge of all cooperative activities. 
The status as project under the Directorate General of Cooperatives was 
initially an advantage for the credit section, because this gave a certain freedom 
to experiment, not expected to be present in the Indonesian banking environ-
ment. However, with the expansion' of the scheme and the development of 
financial relations between project and KUDs, the need was felt to obtain a 
permanent legal status for the credit section. As a first step towards achieving 
the desired situation, the activities of the credit section were continued in a 
separate project in 1984. Several options to incorporate the new project per-
manently in the cooperative structure in Indonesia were considered, and in 
1985 it was in principle agreed to incorporate the project as a separate section 
in the Cooperative Bank of Indonesia. The effectuation of this agreement in 
1986 means the transformation from temporary project into financial institution. 
This is the appropriate legal status for an organization of this type and it 
offers prospects for the continuity of the scheme. 
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4.4 Financial viability 
The assessment of the financial viability of the scheme is primarily based 
on the review of the accounts of groups and project, because these two provide 
loans, to members and groups respectively, and control the funds for these 
purposes. The profit and loss accounts and balance sheets since the scheme 
started in 1979 are available for all groups and the summation of these per 
year provides the overall data required for the review. These data are supple-
mented by data for the year 1985 on the 42 groups which were in operation 
from 1982 or before to give insight into the situation of these older groups, 
which have an average operation time of 4.5 years. The review of the accounts 
of the KUD units is restricted to revenues and expenses, because the amount 
of capital involved in the provision of supporting services is minimal. These 
data about the KUD units are available for 1985 only. Loan delinquency is 
considered as cost component in this review, in Section 4.5 the additional 
aspects are reviewed. 
4.4.1 Groups 
The provision of loans by groups to members increased through expansion 
of the scheme and through an increasing number and volume of loans provided 
per member (Table 4.9). The figures for 1985 deviate from the general trend 
Table 4.9. The provision of loans by groups to members, 1979-1985. 
all groups 1) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1985 
Loans supplied 
number 744 3288 5172 8841 9347 10150 8570 4352 
total (million Rp) 25.4 133.9 2635 472.6 595.1 7605 6785 3933 
per member (1000 Rp) 117 199 163 183 248 244 185 252 
Loans outstanding end year 
total (million Rp) 14.8 47.6 104.7 1845 234.6 302.1 330.2 199.0 
per member (1000 Rp) 68 71 65 72 98 97 90 128 
proportion overdue (%) 7 15 15 20 16 19 35 44 
1. The 42 groups in operation from 1982 or before. 
by showing a decline, caused by a sharp increase in loan delinquency which 
immobilized a large proportion of the funds. The data for 1985 of the groups 
in operation from 1982 or before show a higher than average volume of loans 
supplied per member and a higher proportion of loan delinquency. The total 
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volume of loans provided during the period reviewed amounts to Rp 2929 million, 
with an average amount per loan of Rp 63 500. 
Most of the groups sooner or later embarked on additional services such as 
the collection of savings for social purposes, the production of vegetables on 
a communal basis and the supply of inputs. Except for the supply of inputs, 
these activities do not affect the revenues and costs to a major extent. The 
supply of inputs requires a separate bookkeeping system, a store with store-
keeper and working capital, which means additional costs, immobilization of 
part of the capital and additional revenues. This activity resulted in positive 
results in certain groups only, because it proved to be difficult to ensure a 
regular supply of the 10 to 20 different types of inputs required in vegetable 
production. The KUDs were initially in charge of the central purchase of inputs 
for the groups, but they proved incapable of supporting the groups in this 
respect. 
The combined profit and loss account of the groups shows the revenues 
and costs involved in the provision of credit and the other activities (Table 
4.10). Interest on loans was the main revenue throughout the period reviewed. 
Table 4.10. Combined profit and loss accounts all groups, 1979-1985 (million Rp). 
all groups 1) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1985 
Revenues 
interest on loans to 
members 1.8 155 35.7 70.9 122.2 153.3 177.4 115.4 
(interest receivable) (22.1) (8.6) (34.0) (23.1) 
interest on accounts 
with KUDs 0.2 0.1 0.3 05 05 
profit on input supply 2.0 2.0 4.4 4.4 2.6 1.2 1.1 
other 0.6 0.8 0.8 10.2 19.4 16.9 
total 2.4 18.3 37.7 755 1275 166.4 1985 133.9 
Expenses 
interest 0.8 5.6 105 12.3 11.7 
salaries committee 2.7 5.7 12.9 20.7 22.7 24.8 16.8 
administration/office 05 1.6 5.1 7.8 10.4 132 14.1 7.1 
depreciation 62 0.1 0.6 05 
management fee 15 5.2 8.8 16.0 18.8 113 
total 05 4.3 123 26.7 51.7 625 70.6 47.4 
Provision bad debts in groups 18.7 32.0 53.9 38.4 
Profits 1.9 14.0 25.4 48.8 57.1 71.9 74.0 48.1 
Expenses paid by project 
for groups 0.8 2.1 4 5 4.9 
1. The 42 groups in operation from 1982 or before. 
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From 1983 onwards the interest receivable on loans overdue is included in the 
figures. Payment of this interest is guaranteed either by the savings of the 
members with overdue loans, or by provisions made for bad debts in the groups. 
The interest on loans remained 1.25 percent per week, but since 1983 an addi-
tional 0.5 percent per week has been charged on overdue loans. The other 
revenues are from excess funds deposited via the KUD with the project on a 
1.0 percent monthly interest, input supply and various KUD activities. 
The costs made at group level are divided into the categories expenses 
(sub-divided into five items) and provisions for bad debts. Interest expenses, 
the first item, are incurred mainly for the starting capital received as loan 
from the project. Payment of interest started in 1982 when it became clear 
that groups were able to pay and when agreement was reached about terms 
and conditions of the loans already provided. The interest was determined at 
12 percent per year; at the end of 1984 the interest was raised to 18 percent 
for new loans, a rate which is slightly below the rate for commercial loans. 
Repayment of the loans is scheduled in 5 years in annual installments, starting 
in the third year of operation. A small proportion of the interest expenses 
goes to members who deposit voluntary savings with the group, for which 
they receive 2 percent per month. The salaries paid to the group committee 
are the largest item under expenses. The actual amount depends on the assets 
of the group minus the loans overdue and the work involved, varying from 
half a day to two days per week. The average amount paid to the group commit-
tee in 1985 was Rp 22 000 per month. Administration and office expenses cover 
the costs of books and forms, transport, and maintenance of the office (if 
there is one). Depreciation on inventory and buildings was introduced in 1983 
and the amount stated for that year covers arrears. The fifth item is the 
management fee paid to the KUD to cover the costs made at KUD and project 
level. The management fee depends on the assets of the group and the fee 
varies from Rp 12 500 to Rp 42 500 per month for groups with assets varying 
from Rp 1.5 to Rp 30.0 million. Both salary for the group committee and 
management fee are adjusted twice a year. The provision for bad debts is 
calculated annually for the preparation of the annual accounts. For each member 
with loans overdue the balance between loans plus interest receivable and his 
or her savings is calculated. The sum of these balances is stated as 'provision 
bad debts' on the profit and loss account. The proportionally high amount stated 
for the older groups in 1985 is the result of the higher loan delinquency in 
these groups. 
The combined profit and loss account of the groups shows a considerable net 
profit in each year, and even the older groups made a net profit in 1985 despite 
the loan delinquency. During the first years of operation the project paid part 
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of the expenses for the newly admitted groups, but deducting these amounts from 
the net profit in these years does not change the picture. 
The review of the formation of capital in the groups is based on the liabil-
ities, for this purpose classified according to origin under three headings (Table 
4.11); under 'loans for starting capital' the receipts and repayments of loans 
are added, to show the annual movements. The heading 'Other liabilities' is 
added to include 'interest due' and 'other creditors' stated on the balance 
sheets, but the amounts stated are of minor importance. 
Table 4.11. The formation of capital in groups, 1979-1985 (million Rp). 
all groups 1) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1985 
Loans for starting capital 
received 14.0 29.4 625 51.7 19.2 67.4 38.0 
repayed by groups in 
operation 1.0 13.2 18.2 403 
transferred to bad debts 
project 2) 1.9 253 18.0 
balance groups in 
operation 14.0 43.4 103.0 154.7 135.4 166.6 164.3 44.9 
per member (1000 Rp) 65 65 64 60 56 53 45 29 
as proportion total 
liabilities (%) 72 63 63 56 43 40 33 15 
Reserves and savings from profit 
provision bad debts 16.8 28.6 79.0 62.9 
group capital 15 15 7.6 15.3 24.0 325 40.8 39.1 
special savings 103 24.4 79.7 595 81.0 735 
undivided profit 1.9 15.9 25.4 48.8 215 71.9 66.3 39.8 
total 3.4 17.4 433 885 142.0 1925 267.1 2153 
per member (1000 Rp) 16 26 27 34 59 62 73 139 
as proportion total 
liabilities (%) 18 25 26 32 45 46 53 70 
Savings by members 
compulsory savings 0.6 63 153 30.1 35.0 42.3 50.9 35.9 
voluntary savings 0.1 0.7 25 25 25 3.7 6.2 5.0 
social fund 0.2 05 05 0.9 0.8 
total 0.7 7.0 17.8 32.8 38.0 465 58.0 41.7 
per member (1000 Rp) 3 10 11 13 16 15 16 27 
as proportion total 
liabilities (%) 4 10 11 12 12 11 12 14 
Other liabilities 1.3 1.1 05 0.4 0.9 8.8 10.6 5.7 
Total liabilities 19.4 68.9 164.6 276.4 316.3 414.4 500.0 307.6 
per member (1000 Rp) 89 • 103 102 107 132 133 136 199 
1. The 42 groups in operation from 1982 or before. 
2. Outstanding balance of groups wound up during the year stated. 
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The groups admitted to the scheme received a loan from the project as 
starting capital for the credit services. This loan initially formed 80 to 95 
percent of the total capital of the groups, depending on the amount of savings 
collected prior to the start. The amount of the loan per group was determined 
by the membership, because Rp 75 000 was received per member. In the period 
from 1979 to 1985 a total amount of Rp 282.2 million was received by 113 
groups, which means an average of Rp 2.5 million per group. The interest to 
be paid on these loans stimulated early repayment, and at the end of 1985 six 
groups had already fully repaid their loans. The total repayments of the groups 
in operation at the same date amounted to Rp 70.2 million, which is well ahead 
of the repayment schedule. The outstanding balance of the loans of the 19 
groups wound up is removed from the combined accounts of all groups in oper-
ation from the year of winding up. The repayment of these loans is dealt 
with in Section 4.4.3. The importance of the project loans decreased with 
increasing operation time of the groups; this is most clearly demonstrated by 
the 15 percent share of these loans in the liabilities of the groups in operation 
since 1982 or earlier. • 
The starting capital allows the groups to attain a considerable turnover 
direcdy from the start; as the interest rate of 1.25 percent per week results 
in a wide margin between revenues and expenses, considerable profits were 
made in the groups when no reservations for bad debts were required. These 
profits remained in the groups as 'group capital' and as 'special savings'. Group 
capital is intended to cover the fixed assets of the groups such as inventory, 
office, store and land. Special savings refer to the profit which is returned to 
the members on individual accounts. The amounts are a certain proportion of 
the interest paid during the year. In groups without excessive loan delinquency, 
and thus without substantial reservations for bad debts, a proportion of 30 to 
60 percent of the interest paid was returned in this way. The total of reserva-
tions and savings from profit became the main component of the liabilities in 
most of the groups around the third year of operation and the overall data 
for 1985 show a share of 53 percent. 
The third main component of liabilities is formed by the savings made directly 
by group members. The cooperative law distinguishes three types of savings: 
capital savings, compulsory savings and voluntary savings, and the individual 
groups followed this law. Capital savings are made at the time of becoming 
member and they are meant to form the basic capital of cooperatives, in this 
case groups. The actual amounts determined were small, Rp 500 to Rp 1000, 
and these savings were not registered separately but included in 'group capital', 
of which they form a minor proportion. Compulsory savings are collected regu-
larly; frequency and amount are determined by the groups. Usually, an amount 
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of Rp 100 to Rp 500 is collected every month. Although the amounts are small 
their impact is considerable, and in the groups that were in operation from 
1982 or before these savings form 12 percent of the total abilities. The regular 
payment, normally during a members' meeting, further strengthens the bond 
between individual and group and this is positive for the repayment discipline. 
No interest is paid on the above two types of savings and withdrawal is possible 
only when membership is terminated. Voluntary savings are deposited and with-
drawn as and when required by the members and an interest of 0.5 percent 
per week is paid by the groups. The volume of voluntary savings remained 
very small in almost all groups and the expectation at the start of the scheme 
that members would temporarily deposit excess funds did not materialize. In 
Section 4.6 this aspect of saving is reviewed in the context of the total financial 
position of the members. Some of the groups further collect savings for social 
purposes but the amounts remain insignificant. The overall data regarding the 
savings made directly by members and the data for the older groups show a 
gradual increase in proportion of the total Uabihties with increasing operation 
time. The actual amounts saved per member became substantial after several 
years of operation. 
The increase of the total liabilities per member and the increase of capital 
owned by groups points to a considerable ability and propensity to save. Six 
of the 42 groups that started in 1982 or before were completely independent 
of project loans by the end of 1985; for the other 36 groups the project loans 
constituted only 18 percent of the liabihties. For the remaining 52 groups, 
which started in 1983 or thereafter, the project loans formed 62 percent of 
their liabihties. The formation of capital in the groups took place almost com-
pletely through regulated contributions in the forms of interest payments and 
compulsory savings. 
4.4.2 KUD units 
From its outset until 1982 the project paid part of the salaries and admin-
istrative costs of the credit units of the KUDs. In 1981 the management fee 
was introduced, and from 1983 onwards these fees were generally sufficient to 
cover the expenses of the KUD units. The KUD units kept 60 percent of the 
management fees received from the groups and transferred 40 percent to the 
project. The revenues of all KUD units in 1985 (Table 4.12) show two additional 
revenues: interest on funds deposited with the project on behalf of the groups 
(KUD and groups shared the interest paid by the project) and other activities, 
mainly assistance to various KUD activities. The main expenses in the same 
year were for salaries of the assistants. The salary depends on the number of 
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Table 4.12. Combined profit and loss account of KUD units in 1985 (million Rp). 
Revenues 
interest on accounts with project 
management fee 
other 
total 
0.6 
18.8 
2.8 
22.2 
Expenses 
salaries assistant managers 
transport 
administration and office 
depreciation 
management fee 
total 
6.1 
2.4 
AS 
3.3 
8 
24.3 
Profit -2.1 
groups for which services are provided and the total of balance sheets minus 
loans overdue in the groups. The average salary was Rp 46 000 per month, a 
salary which compares well with, for example, that of junior staff of the agri-
cultural extension service. The transport costs refer mainly to the assistants' 
motor-bikes and depreciation refers to motor-bikes and office equipment. The 
administration and office costs stated are for forms, supplies and the office. 
The combined profit and loss account for 1985 shows a loss of Rp 2.1 million, 
which means that some of the KUD units made a loss. In practice, this loss is 
not noticed by KUDs, because most units operate on a cash basis and deprecia-
tion is generally not included in the KUD accounts. 
4.4.3 Project 
The expenses for the savings and credit scheme at project level were in-
separable from the total project expenses during the first years of operation. 
The project budget was insufficient, and an amount of Rp 24.8 million from 
the grant provided by the Dutch government for starting capital was spent on 
training courses and other operating expenses during the years 1979 to 1982. 
The first revenues were received by the project in 1981 when the groups started 
to pay management fees and this reduced the need to use part of the grant 
for operating expenses. The grant was made available in installments during 
the period from 1979 to 1984 in accordance with the planned activities. The 
grant was used to provide loans to the groups for starting capital, to KUDs 
for working capital for input supply and for the purchase of motor-bikes. The 
balance of the grant was placed as fixed-term deposits, with a duration of 1 
to 6 months, with commercial banks at an interest rate of 17 to 18 percent 
annually. The main revenues of the project accrued from the grant, through 
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interest receipts from loans to groups and KUDs, and from fixed-term deposits, 
which together contributed approximately 65 percent of the total revenues in 
1984 and 1985 (Table 4.13). Management fee was the second source of revenues, 
Table 4.13. Profit and loss account project, 1983-1985 (million Rp). 
1983 1) 1984 1985 
Revenues 
interest on loans to KUDs and groups 6.4 9.9 8.7 
interest on accounts with commercial banks 2.4 6.3 12.7 
management fee 1.7 7.4 8.0 
subsidies (The Netherlands and Indonesia) 3.9 2.9 0.7 
other 12 
total 14.4 265 31.3 
Expenses 
interest paid on current accounts KUDs 0.8 1.1 
salaries and allowances staff 4.4 9.2 12.9 
transport 2.0 4.6 4.8 
administration and office 1.2 3.8 2.3 
depreciation 0.1 
other 0.4 15 
total 7.6 18.9 22.6 
Provision bad debts 18.0 17.1 1.4 
Profit -11.2 -05 7.3 
1. June-December 
with a share of approximately 27 percent. The subsidies, in the form of annual 
project budgets, were gradually withdrawn in the period recorded, and the 
amount in 1985 was insignificant. The budget provided by the Netherlands 
Government for the expatriate adviser and his actual costs are not included in 
these calculations. The expenses cover all running costs and the interest pay-
ments to KUDs and groups for the deposits received. The revenues from 1983 
onwards were sufficient to cover the expenses, but the winding up of 18 groups 
in 1983 and 1984 made substantial reservations necessary to cover the expected 
loss of capital, and a total loss of Rp 20.7 million was made in these years. 
In 1985 no groups were terminated, and because only a small additional reserva-
tion was considered necessary, a profit was made. 
The amount of the grant in Indonesian currency is Rp 276.7 million and the 
balance sheet for 1985 shows that this amount was largely intact (Table 4.14). 
Approximately Rp 25 million had been used for operating expenses and Rp 15 
million bad debts had been written off in 1983. The grant was used mainly to 
provide loans to groups for starting capital, 66 percent of the assets at the 
end of 1985. KUDs received short-term loans amounting to 8 percent of the 
assets in 1985. The ample liquid assets at the end of 1985 resulted from the 
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Table 4.14. Balance sheets project, 1979-1985 (million Rp). 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Assets 
cash and bank 7.6 3.1 11.4 14.6 26.3 51.2 695 
debtors/short term loans 
receivable 
loans to KUDs 
doubtful debtors (groups) 
other 
total 
5.0 
5.0 
75 
1.9 
1.0 
10.4 
75 
15 
1.0 
10.0 
4.7 
145 
253 
25 
46.9 
4.6 
19.4 
34.4 
0.9 
593 
4.8 
22.6 
253 
5.8 
58.6 
long term loans 
starting capital groups 1) 14.0 43.4 103.0 154.7 136.6 170.0 1655 
Total assets 21.6 515 124.9 1793 209.8 2805 293.6 
Liabilities 
grant/own capital 2) 21.6 515 124.9 1793 191.6 249.1 249.1 
short term liabilities 
current account KUDs 
reserve bad debts 
total 
13.0 
16.4 
29.4 
24.4 
27.7 
52.1 
28.9 
29.0 
57.9 
from profit and loss account 
balance previous years 
balance this year 
total 
-11.2 
-11.2 
-11.2 
-95 
-20.7 
-20.7 
7.3 
-13.4 
Total liabilities 21.6 515 124.9 1793 209.8 2805 293.6 
Balance grant with Netherlands 
Government (NLG1000) 925 820 500 225 181 
1. The amounts stated for 1983,1984 and 1985 differ from the amounts stated in Table 4.13 
as some repayments were not received by the project on the 31st of December. 
2. From 1979 to 1982 a total amount of Rp 24.8 million of the grant was spent on 
training courses etc. as regular project budgets were insufficient; the annual 
expenses were directly deducted from the grant and the balance is stated. 
repayment of loans by groups (see Table 4.11) and further expansion of the 
scheme is therefore possible. 
At the end of 1985 the actual loss of capital that resulted from loan delin-
quency by groups that had been wound up amounted to the Rp 15 milHon 
written off, but an amount of Rp 253 million was overdue (Table 4.15). Repay-
ments by the groups terminated in 1983 and 1984 were still being received in 
1985, and the final amount to be written off will probably be around Rp 20 
million. This would mean a total loss of 40 percent of the loans originally 
provided to these groups or 20 percent of the loans provided to all groups up 
to the end of 1981. This estimated default rate of 20 percent requires an annual 
provision for bad debts of 20 percent of the loans provided. This would mean 
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Table 4.15. The repayment of loans by groups wound up, 1981-1985 (million Rp). 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 total 
Groups wound up (number) 1 10 8 19 
Loans received by groups wound up 2.8 27.1 235 53.4 
Repaid at time winding up 0.9 1.8 5.4 8.1 
Transferred to doubtful debtors 1.9 25.3 18.0 45.2 
Repaid after wound up 0.4 8.9 9.1 18.4 
Written off 15 15 
Balance doubtful debtors 1.9 15 253 34.4 25.3 
a reservation of 22 percent of the interest receipts of all loans, assuming an 
average duration of 5 years and an interest rate of 18 percent per year. Reser-
vations of this magnitude are a major cost component on the profit and loss 
account, but they do not necessarily result in an overall loss. 
4.4.4 Summary 
The summary of revenues and costs for the scheme in total shows a positive 
balance of Rp 823 million for 1985 (Table 4.16). The management fees and 
interest payments for loans by groups and KUDs and for deposits by these 
with the project are excluded from the revenues and expenses, and stated 
separately as internal transfers. The main costs items are: salaries and allow-
ances, adrninistration and office, and the provisions for bad debts at group 
and at project level, being respectively 33 percent, 15 percent, and 42 percent 
of the total costs. The actual reservation made by the project for bad debts 
was small in 1985, and a more conservative reservation of 20 percent of the 
loans provided to groups in that year would raise the total provision for bad 
debts to Rp 61.5 million and thereby reduce the balance to Rp 76.1 million. 
The interest payments are small, an estimated Rp 0.5 milHon for voluntary 
savings, because the basic capital for the provision of credit is received by 
the scheme as grant. Payment of interest for the grant at a rate of 18 percent 
per year would result in additional costs of Rp 44.8 million. In that case the 
balance between revenues and costs would still remain positive, but more sub-
stantial transfers from groups to project would be required to cover the in-
creased expenses. From the review of revenues and costs it can be concluded 
that the scheme is able to cover all the costs involved in the provision of 
financial services. This is because of the interest rate of 1.25 percent per 
week charged on loans to members, the cost consciousness at all levels, and 
the fact that members are prepared to leave their savings in the group without 
receiving interest. Within the scheme the KUD units and the project more or 
less break even and the substantial margin accrues to the groups. 
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Table 4.16. Profit and loss of the total scheme in 1985 (million Rp). 
Groups KUD Project Total 
units 
Revenues 
interest on loans to members 177.4 177.4 
interest on accounts with commercial banks 12.7 12.7 
margin on inputs 1.2 1.2 
other 19.4 2.8 12 23.4 
subsidies (The Netherlands and Indonesia) 0.7 0.7 
total 198.0 2.8 14.6 215.4 
Expenses 
interest on voluntary savings 1) 05 05 
salaries and allowances 24.8 6.1 12.9 43.8 
transport 2.4 4.8 7.2 
administration and office 14.1 45 2.3 20.9 
depreciation 0.6 3.3 3.9 
other 15 15 
total 40.0 16.3 215 77.8 
Provision bad debts 
for loans to members 53.9 53.9 
for loans to groups 1.4 1.4 
total 53.9 1.4 553 
Balance 104.1 -135 -8.3 82.3 
Internal transfers 2) 
paid 30.6 8.0 1.1 
received 05 19.4 16.7 
1. Estimated. 
2. Totals of "paid' and 'received' differ as not all interest paid by groups and KUDs 
had reached the project on the 31st of December. 
The margin between revenues and costs in the groups, positively affected 
by the fact that interest payments for the loans for starting capital were 
initially not required, has been used to build up own capital. By the end of 
1985 a total of Rp 267 million was stated as 'reserves and savings from profit' 
on the combined balance sheet of all groups. Savings by members amounted to 
Rp 58 million, which brought the proportion of reserves and savings to 65 
percent of the total liabilities. The rate of capital formation enabled the groups 
to repay the loans for starting capital received from the project, and at the 
end of 1985 these repayments were even ahead of schedule. The repayments 
enable the project to expand the scheme without being dependent on external 
financiers, and the initial capital grant provided deserves the appellation 're-
volving fund', which is an exceptional achievement of the scheme. The ability 
to cover all costs involved in the provision of financial services and the ability 
to attract capital through members' savings results in the conclusion that the 
scheme is financially viable. 
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4.5 Access to financial services and loan delinquency 
The requirement to form groups as one of the conditions for incorporation 
in the scheme may in principle limit the access of individual farmers to the 
financial services provided. Individual farmers or small groups unable to meet 
the required minimum membership were, however, not encountered and we must 
assume that the formation of groups forms no obstacle for the access to the 
financial services provided by the scheme, at least in this stage of develop-
ment. The more so, because the project received more requests from groups 
than the number of groups that could be incorporated in the scheme. 
Mamtaining the access of individual members to the financial services proved 
to be a major problem, because loan delinquency endangered the functioning or 
the continued existence of many groups. In practically all groups the proportion 
of overdue loans gradually increased with the number of years in operation 
(Table 4.17). In the first years of operation most of the loans overdue were 
Table 4.17. Groups, years of operation and loans overdue 1). 
Years of operation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Average percentage of loans overdue 
in groups 2) 1 11 18 34 53 63 53 
Classification of groups according 
to proportion of loans overdue 
0 -25% 94 66 35 22 6 1 
26 -50% 3 6 5 4 1 1 
51 -75% 4 7 11 2 1 1 
76 -100% 2 5 8 3 
1. All groups which were active at the end of 1985. 
2. Situation at end of year. 
recovered with only some delay and new loans could be provided as and when 
required. Later, usually around the third year of operation, the overdues became 
a serious problem and the membership of those with overdue loans, or even 
the continued functioning of the group in total, was endangered. This general 
trend of an increasing proportion of overdues is not clearly visible in the 
annual combined accounts of all groups, presented in Section 4.4, because the 
annual inclusion of new groups with their good repayment records 'dilutes' 
the overdues in groups that have been in operation longer. 
The root cause of members' failure to repay is difficult to pinpoint, but 
several external factors that have affected repayment can be identified. The 
first external factor is the risky nature of vegetable production, which has 
affected the ability to repay loans in several ways. In 1982 the Galunggung 
volcano erupted several times, and each time the fields were covered with a 
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layer of ash. The standing crops were destroyed, farmers lost their working 
capital, and were unable to produce and sell crops during a period of four to 
six months. Several groups were unable to recover from the losses, but other 
groups, equally affected, continued activities, because loans were eventually 
repaid. A second hazard is the spread of a new disease, Club root (Plasmodio-
phora brassicae), over all production areas. The disease halves the yields of 
cabbage, Chinese cabbage and cauliflower on fields seriously infected, and no 
cure is available at present. The third risk factor affecting the ability to repay 
were the large price fluctuations, even between the annual average prices 
(Table 4.18). The index of average vegetable prices remained more or 
Table 4.18. Average annual farm-gate prices of major vegetables in West Java and consumer 
price index, 1979-1985. 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Type, main production area(s) Average annual farm-gate prices (Rp. /kg) 
cabbage, Lembang, Pangalengan 51 53 62 88 122 80 87 
carrot, Cipanas 95 64 103 166 138 90 90 
cauliflower, Cisarua, Lembang 51 55 49 91 149 140 150 
onion, Cipanas 64 83 172 75 166 93 97 
potato, Pangalengan 191 206 201 278 265 199 206 
tomato, Lembang 113 149 153 237 198 241 256 
index average prices (1979=100) 100 108 131 165 184 149 157 
Consumer price index (1979 => 100) 100 119 133 146 163 181 189 
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture, Bandung, personal communication; IMF (1987) 
less in line with the consumer price index, but deviations for specific crops 
during longer periods caused problems for specific groups of producers and 
resulted in loan delinquency. The production costs kept pace with the general 
price trend, and vegetable production probably remained profitable throughout 
the period reviewed. 
The second external factor is the gradually increasing competition from 
dairy production in the highlands. In 1978 the government started a programme 
to raise milk production. Thousands of heifers were imported and distributed 
to the farmers on loan through KUDs or dairy cooperatives and the cooperatives 
received equipment for the transport, storage and processing of milk. As a 
result of the imports, the number of dairy cows in Pangalengan increased from 
2500 in 1977 to 12 500 in 1984 and in Lembang from 500 to 4200 in the same 
period. Dairy production is attractive because, contrary to vegetable production, 
it results in a regular income that is of the same magnitude as the income 
from vegetable production. Many group members partly switched to dairy 
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production, joined the dairy cooperative and thereby also got access to credit 
from that cooperative. The effects on the repayment behaviour varied. Some 
of the members lost interest in access to credit for vegetable production and 
simply did not repay their loans. Other members repaid their loans and ter-
minated their membership, and a third category remained member and repaid 
loans, if necessary, from the revenues earned by the milk production. 
Defaults, either due to external factors or wilful defaults, require special 
efforts from the group committee, and if necessary from KUD and project staff. 
In most groups the special efforts such as the collection of overdues at members' 
doorsteps, rescheduling of loans for members unable to repay or, in extreme 
cases, expelling members (sometimes after an arrangement for partial repayment 
had been reached), were successful and activities were continued. In other 
groups the special efforts were either neglected or in vain, and the overdues 
became an internal factor that negatively affected the propensity of other 
members to repay. Overdues in these groups soared to 100 percent and all 
activities came to a standstill. 
A number of groups in which the committee members became engaged in mal-
versation, sometimes in collaboration with the KUD assistant manager, formed 
a special case. Members were in general quickly aware of this situation and 
reacted by stopping repayments. When the project, alarmed by the increasing 
defaults, stepped in, it was generally too late to save the situation. The relations 
in these groups were permanently damaged and there was no longer a basis 
of confidence required for continuation of the activities. 
In the period from 1981 to 1984, 19 groups in total, all in the third or fourth 
year of operation, had to be wound up because of loan delinquency and because 
the prospects for a sound operation with a reduced membership or with a new 
committee were zero. The winding up of these groups resulted in: a) termination 
of access to institutional financial services for the 700 members involved, b) 
reduction of the turnover of the scheme and thus a reduced capacity to pay 
management fees to cover the costs at KUD and project level, and c) the loss 
of starting capital, which amounted to 50 percent of the amount originally 
provided as loan to these groups (Section 4.4.3). 
The effect of loan delinquency on the access to financial services goes beyond 
the collective termination of membership for the groups wound up and the 
individual termination of membership for those with loans overdue. Members 
with good repayment records also withdrew from groups with a growing propor-
tion of loans overdue, because they were not prepared to contribute through 
their interest payments to the reserves for bad debts. These withdrawals meant 
a negative selection and they aggravated the problems caused by non-repayment. 
The extent to which members withdrew for the above reason is not known 
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up and by the additional management fees resulting from the greater volume of 
loans provided in the groups. 
4.6 Farmers, fmanrang and the group 
The preceding Sections (4.4 and 4.5) dealt with the financial relations between 
scheme and members from the viewpoint of the scheme. To complement this 
approach the viewpoint is reversed in this section: the focus is on farmers/ 
members and their financial environment. The first part deals with the financing 
of the farm household through the rural financial market and internal financing, 
the second part deals more specifically with the relation between member and 
group. The information for this section was collected during visits to 19 groups 
in 6 vegetable production areas in 1986. Four of these groups were wound up 
in 1983 or in 1984; the others were still operating. In the area of each group 
3 to 6 farmers, members and non-members, were interviewed; a general discussion 
about financing was held with committee members and others present; and data 
were collected from the records about loans received and repaid by 4 randomly 
chosen group members. The interviews were between farmer and interviewer only, 
neither the name nor the membership number of the interviewee were recorded 
and the interviewee was assured that his answers would not be relayed to group, 
KUD or project; the aim was to encourage the respondent to give unbiased 
answers. The internal structure of a farm household and its external financial 
relations outlined in Section 2.2.3 served as a guideline for the interviews. 
The majority of the 80 farmers interviewed, 54, were member of groups in 
operation; 10 were members of groups that had been wound up; 3 had terminated 
their membership themselves and 13 farmers had never been member of a group. 
Of these respondents, 32 percent produced vegetables only, 51 percent combined 
vegetable production with sheep, dairy or other agricultural enterprises and 17 
percent had a part-time occupation outside agriculture. Further, all respondents 
owned the house in which they were living, except for two who were unmarried 
and lived with their parents. The answers from members and non-members 
regarding financing the farm household showed no systematic differences except 
for the relation between member and group and only where relevant is a dis-
tinction made between members and non-members. 
4.6.1 Financing the farm household 
The first questions regarding financing were about the possibilities of ob-
taining credit for specific purposes. The purposes mentioned by the interviewer 
were: rice (the main staple food purchased); inputs for vegetable production; a 
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large sum of cash, Rp 100 000, for an emergency such as hospitalization. Positive 
answers to these questions were often accompanied by statements that indicated 
limitations, such as: 'for a few days only' (in the case of credit from relatives) 
and 'two weeks before the harvest' (for credit received from a vegetable trader). 
The answers have been compiled in Table 4.19 and give a general picture of 
Table 4.19. Proportion of fanners with access to credit for rice, inputs and for cash 
in case of emergency (%). 
Rice Inputs Cash for 
emergency 
Access per source of credit: 
formal sector 
group (s & c scheme) 68 1) 8 
dairy cooperative 4 6 
other 2 9 
informal sector 
shopkeeper (rice etc. shop) 20 
shopkeeper (fertilizer etc. shop) 28 
vegetable trader 53 5 
other professional operators 1 
relatives, neighbours, friends 35 50 
Farmers with access to credit from: 
formal sector only 2 21 14 
(group only) 20 8 
informal sector onfy 24 46 
formal and informal sectors 48 8 
(group and informal sector) 46 1 
No access to credit 78 7 32 
1. All 54 group members have access to credit for inputs. 
the various sources of credit available. Rice is generally purchased for cash 
and only a few shopkeepers are prepared to give credit for periods from several 
days to one month. Credit for inputs (generally limited in amount and duration) 
can be obtained by most of the farmers (93 percent); in the formal sector the 
groups of the savings and credit scheme are virtually the only suppliers, and 
for 30 percent of the group members the group is the sole source of credit. The 
other 70 percent of the group members may make use of informal sources if 
required. In the informal sector, the supply of credit is dominated by profes-
sional operators who provide credit as part of their business. Shopkeepers 
generally provide credit to the larger farmers with whom they establish more 
or less permanent relations. Initially, collateral (such as the registration papers 
of a motor-cycle) might be required, but if repayment is correct this is not 
longer necessary for new loans. Credit amounts up to Rp 500 000 and periods 
of up to three months were mentioned by eligible farmers. Interest is not 
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calculated, but the prices of inputs received on credit are higher than the 
prices of cash purchases. In a discussion with a group cornmittee, the risk run 
by shopkeepers was specifically brought up and mention was made of considerable 
losses made in times of low vegetable prices. The risk is probably indeed con-
siderable, because competition among shopkeepers gives farmers a certain free-
dom to switch from one to another, and by doing so the farmer leaves the 
shopkeeper with a share of his own misfortune. Vegetable traders provide 
loans for short periods, several days to 4 weeks, and because the standing 
crop serves as collateral, these traders provide credit to small and large farmers 
alike. The costs of this type of credit for the farmer result from the higher 
prices for the inputs and the lower price for the product delivered to the 
vegetable trader; see Section 3.4.2. Credit from relatives, neighbours or friends 
forms the third main source of credit in the informal sector. The answers 
cover a range of potential credit transactions, with durations varying from 
several days to several months and with interest rates from nil to 10 percent 
per month. These potential relations are reciprocal. Relatives, neighbours and 
friends are the main source of credit in the case of emergencies, but the 
often stated restriction with regard to duration may make refinancing necessary. 
Access to credit for emergency purposes from various formal sources is less 
frequently available, but groups, dairy cooperatives and some other sources 
provide credit with a duration of several months and refinancing is either not 
required or less urgent. 
In answering the questions regarding access to credit a considerable pro-
portion of farmers spontaneously mentioned self-financing, either with cash in 
the case of rice purchases, or through the sale of gold, sheep or dairy cows 
if larger amounts were required. The subject of self-financing was brought up 
specifically by asking the farmers what they would do if they received large 
revenues from the next harvest. The majority of the farmers answered that 
they would use the revenues in the first place for farm inputs and secondly 
for consumption (Table 4.20). If any balance remained, most of the farmers 
Table 4.20. Priorities in spending by farm households (frequency). 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Purchase inputs 44 12 3 
Households consumption 19 36 4 
Gold 9 34 6 
Sheep 6 12 3 
Land 1 2 2 1 
Cash and other, see text 
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mentioned that they would invest in gold, sheep or land. None of the members 
mentioned the savings deposit facilities of the groups in this respect and this 
is all the more remarkable because three group members place excess funds 
on a Tabanas' account, a national savings scheme which operates through 
banks and post offices. The topic of spending revenues was concluded by asking 
whether the farmers kept a certain amount of cash. This was obviously a sensi-
tive question to answer, and most of the farmers responded in the manner of 
'just a little' or 'money for tobacco only*. However, 26 farmers stated an 
amount, ranging between Rp 10 000 and Rp 200 000 and with an average of 
Rp 60 000 (USD 47). Amounts in this range are sufficient to cover regular 
household expenses for some time and to purchase regularly required inputs 
such as pesticides. 
The interview was terminated with a check on the existence of all external 
financial relations (Table 4.21). Relations with the formal sector, excluding 
Table 4.21. Relations between farmers and various operators in the rural 
financial market. 
Operator Proportion 
of farmers 
(%) 
Purpose 
Formal sector 
bank (BRL BIMAS) 14 short term credit for rice and secondary crops 
dairy cooperatives medium term credit for dairy cows 
post office 6 transfer of money 
S & C scheme 68 1) short term credit, savings 
Tabanas scheme 12 saving 
Informal sector 
relatives etc. 63 credit for inputs and/or emergencies 
rosea 58 saving and credit for household 
shopkeeper 43 credit for rice and/or inputs 
vegetable trader 55 credit for inputs 
other operators 1 
Other 
goldshop 81 purchase or sale of gold 
radio and TV shop 11 purchase or sale of appliances; credit 
1. All 54 group members. 
the scheme, were much less frequent than relations with the informal sector. 
Relations with banks were restricted to the BIMAS loans received from the 
BRI by 14 percent of the farmers. The BIMAS scheme has since been terminated, 
which means the end of the direct relations with banks, because similar credit 
facilities are not available. Dairy cooperatives were the only suppliers of medi-
um-term loans encountered. The loans for dairy cows are popular with farmers 
and cooperatives alike, which is understandable, because both are heavily sup-
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ported by the government through funds and attractive price-setting. Most of 
the farmers who participated in the Tabanas scheme had started their partici-
pation recently, but the average amount saved was considerable, Rp 31 500 
(USD 25). The interest received is 15 percent per a n n u m for amounts up to 
Rp 200 000 (USD 156), an amount not reached by any participant. Of the 10 
farmers with a Tabanas account, 9 were group members and this again indicates 
that voluntary saving with the group is not attractive; this despite the interest 
of 24 percent per annum. The money transfer facilities of the post office were 
used by a few farmers to transfer money to children at school elsewhere, or 
to receive money from relatives, but the majority of the farmers were not 
aware of these facilities. Participation by women in rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs) was common in most areas and in several households 
husband and wife were members of different associations. The frequency of 
contributions varied from once per week to once per month, and the amounts 
from Rp 100 to Rp 5000 per week (USD 0.08-3.90); in 10 ROSCAs the amount 
was expressed in rice and in one the participating women contributed crockery 
every week. The ROSCAs had between 10 to 60 members, and the amounts 
received weekly ranged from Rp 2500 to Rp 150 000 (USD 2-117). The latter 
amount was received by the 60 participants of a group who specifically saved 
up for a sewing machine. In nearly all cases the amounts received were spent 
on the household; only three mentioned the purchase of inputs. The widespread 
relations with the gold shop are not financial relations in the strict sense, 
because gold is bought and sold by the farmers at prices around Rp 12 000 
and Rp 10 500 per gram (USD 9.35 and USD 8.18), respectively. The transactions, 
however, play an important role in the internal financing of the farm household, 
and this is facilitated by the understanding between shopkeeper and farmer 
that gold bought can be sold back if required. Invoices stating weight, value 
and the shop's name are carefully kept for this purpose. A much smaller 
proportion of farmers used a radio or TV set in the same manner as gold; 
some mentioned the possibility of obtaining a loan from a TV shop with a TV 
set as pawn. 
The picture that emerged from the interviews and discussions shows that 
self-financing plays a central role in the financial management of a farm house-
hold; in the first place by mamtaining the working capital by purchasing inputs 
directly from the proceeds of the crops sold, and in the second place by keeping 
some cash for consumption and production purposes, and thirdly, by saving 
excess funds in the form of assets that can be readily sold (such as gold, 
sheep or durable consumer goods). External financial relations are of importance 
to supplement the own financial resources and most of the farmers have, in 
principle, access to one or more suppliers of credit in the informal sector. 
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Whether loans can actually be obtained if required and whether such loans 
comply in amount and duration with the financial requirements remains an 
open question for the farmers and thus for the interviewer. However, the 
interviews gave a strong impression that credit from informal sources is erratic, 
especially for the poorer farmer. Regularly available short-term credit from 
the formal sector is only available to members of the groups of the savings 
and credit scheme. 
4.6.2 The relation between member and group 
The 54 farmers who were members of a group in operation were asked whether 
they knew the amounts of their loans and savings with the group. All members 
gave correct answers regarding their loans but only 60 percent knew, more or 
less accurately, the amounts of their savings. The remaining 40 percent had 
no idea about their compulsory and special savings. These answers further 
support the conclusion that members consider the credit services provided by 
the group as the most important ones, despite the considerable amounts which 
they save as compulsory and special savings. 
The use of the credit services by members is reflected in the loan pattern 
resulting from the lending policy followed by the group committee and the 
loan requests and repayments by the members. The project plays a minor role 
in this respect, because only general guidelines are provided, such as discour-
aging small loans for several weeks because of the adrninistrative workload 
and discouraging very large loans that could be above the actual requirements 
of the farmers. 
The review of the loan histories of 73 members and ex-members over periods 
ranging from 2 to 4 years showed that the great majority of the farmers had 
one or more loans from the group almost continuously (Figure 4.2). The actual 
amounts outstanding varied, but there is a strong tendency to take loans to 
the maximum amount allowed by the group committee. Three loan patterns can 
be distinguished: 
1. One loan, almost continuously. A member receives a loan for about three 
months, repays and applies immediately for a new loan which he receives the 
next cash day, normally the following week. An example of this loan pattern 
is given in Annex 1. 
2. Two loans with different repayment dates, almost continuously. A member 
receives a loan below the maximum amount allowed and receives a second one 
before the first loan is repaid. Repayment of each of the loans is followed by 
an immediate request for a new loan which is received the next cash day 
(see Annex 2). 
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Figure 4.2. Proportion of time farm households have loans from group. 
3. Irregular loan pattern with periods without loan. 
In all three patterns the loan amounts rise with time, because of the increasing 
amount of capital available in the groups. 
Most of the loan histories reviewed closely resemble patterns 1 and 2 and 
this explains why most of the farm households had loans with the group almost 
continuously (Figure 4.2). The credit provided by the groups thus serves mainly 
as almost permanently available working capital, for which interest is paid 
regularly, when loans are repaid after the harvest of a crop. The irregularities 
in income and expenses are thus only partiy financed through the relation 
with the group. Internal financing through cash, gold, sheep and, to some 
extent, the external relations described in the previous section remain important 
for financing the household of group members. 
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the first section of this chapter the performance of the experimental 
savings and credit scheme will be examined in relation to the three basic 
conditions for an adequate performance as formulated at the start of the scheme, 
i.e. that: 
- The institution must be financially viable to allow it to function indepen-
dendy and continuously. 
- The institution must be able to reach all farmers who require its services. 
- The institution must develop and maintain relationships with farmers based 
on confidence. 
In the second section, the environment in which the scheme operates is 
discussed, to place the experiences in wider perspective. The specific aspects 
of a technical cooperation project as an implementing agency are discussed in 
the third section. The conclusions that may be of a wider relevance for other 
parts of the world, are discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
5.1 The performance of the experimental scheme 
The organizational structure of the scheme with its three tiers (groups, 
KUDs, and the project), is a central issue in the experiment and therefore 
this section starts with some general remarks about the organization. The 
review of the scheme in Sections 43, 4.4 and 45 shows that the performance 
regarding the three basic conditions is interlinked, and that loan delinquency 
is the central element, either as a threat to financial viability, or as a direct 
cause of the termination of access to financial services, or as an expression 
of lack of confidence. Therefore the discussion of the performance with regard 
to each of the basic conditions will be followed by a discussion of loan delin-
quency. At that point it is possible to review the validity of the basic conditions 
as such. The findings in Section 4.6.2 regarding the use of loans by group 
members leads to a discussion of the actual services provided. 
5.1.1 Organizational structure 
The three-tier organizational structure of the scheme requires a clear-cut 
division of tasks and responsibilities among the three levels. The original set-
up with groups providing services to their members, the KUDs as supportive 
intermediate institutions, and the project in charge of overall guidance and 
supervision was largely maintained over the period reviewed. However, the 
definition and formalization of tasks and relations required much effort, mainly 
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from the project. The main complication in this process resulted from the 
incorporation of the KUDs in the organizational structure, the result of the 
Indonesian cooperative policy. It meant that decisions about group activities 
had to be taken in consultation with the KUD committee involved, and this 
committee might, or might not, be interested. Moreover, after decisions had 
been taken, the KUD committees proved to be in general incapable of imple-
menting those aspects of the decisions that referred to their own role. A two-
tier organization, consisting of groups with an independent legal status and the 
project as supporting 'parent' institution, would have allowed direct relations, 
resulting in a substantial gain in effectiveness and efficiency. Such an organiza-
tion would be feasible, because the groups showed that sufficient local manage-
ment capacity is available to operate efficiently. The project could have taken 
over the routine support and control tasks of the KUDs by placing field assis-
tants in the districts. A restructuring of the organization in this direction 
proved to be impossible during the experiment because of the strict application 
of the cooperative policy. This policy thus hindered the development of properly 
functioning cooperative groups. 
The question of group size was extensively discussed at the start of the 
scheme. Small groups offer more possibilities for close relations among members 
and committee, which facilitates management and control; larger groups are 
more efficient in terms of external guidance and control. In discussions with 
farmers an arbitrary maximum group size of 50 persons was determined. Despite 
this decision, several groups developed into a membership of 70 to 100 and 
this gave serious problems because committee members were unable to cope 
with administration and control in peak periods. Committees in groups with 30 
to 50 members could cope with all activities in half to one day per week, a 
workload compatible with the normal activities of farmers. Abilities differ 
from committee to committee and so do the number of transactions per group. 
Therefore, an optimum group size cannot be stipulated, but a membership of 
between 30 and 50 proved to be workable. 
5.1.2 Financial viability 
The review of the annual accounts of the scheme in Section 4.4 shows that 
revenues exceeded expenses and provisions made for bad debts by a considerable 
margin, from the first year of operation onwards. Even if the two elements of 
subsidy, the project budget and the interest subsidy, are excluded, this margin 
remains positive and the scheme was thus able to operate without being sub-
sidized. Further, the scheme proved to be sufficiently attractive for the farmers 
to leave the margin as 'special savings' in the groups and to save considerable 
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operating costs, taking into account the particular environment of the vegetable 
production areas in West Java. 
5.1.3 Ability to reach all farmers who require financial services 
The scheme's organizational structure has three major consequences for the 
ability to reach all farmers who require their services. Firstly, groups can be 
established anywhere, irrespective of the distance from main roads or district 
centres. In the course of the period reviewed, groups were started in all vege-
table production areas in West Java, even in remote areas. Operating through 
groups implies that supporting KUD staff and project staff must have the means 
of transport to reach the groups. For KUDs with a working area with a radius 
of 10-20 km this proved to be no obstacle, because motor bikes were sufficient. 
The project staff required a number of motor bikes and two vehicles to cover 
the vegetable production areas in West Java. The total transport costs of KUD 
and project were a minor proportion of the operational costs. 
Secondly, working with groups gives the organization a great operational 
flexibility. All groups started with the same operational system but in the 
course of time, loan ceilings, the frequency of cash days, loan recovery pro-
cedures and, in some cases, interest rates were amended by most groups in 
consultation with the project. This flexibility is important, because financial 
abilities and requirements proved to differ between groups. 
Thirdly, groups also have a disadvantage, namely that individual farmers are 
dependent on other fanners for their access to financial services. The formation 
of groups was not a constraint because 30 interested farmers could usually be 
found in the densely populated vegetable production areas. The continued func-
tioning of groups, however, is dependent on the committee and all members 
properly understanding their tasks and responsibilities; expressed in a low 
level of loan delinquency. This proved to be a problem in a number of groups, 
and several members with a correct repayment record withdrew because of 
loan delinquency by other members, or because they were faced with the ter-
mination of their group's activities. 
Summarizing, the experimental scheme demonstrated the ability to reach 
farmers throughout the vegetable production areas, and to provide financial 
services adaptable to the requirements and abilities of the individual groups. 
In this respect the scheme performed better than might have been expected 
from a financial institution operating from a local centre. The dependence of 
individual farmers on the performance of the group in total means a potential 
restriction on continued access to these services. 
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5.1.4 Ability to develop relations based on confidence 
One of the reasons for involving small groups with decision-making power 
was the expectation that this would allow individual members insight into the 
activities and some measure of control. Both insight and control were considered 
important for the establishment of relations based on confidence. The insight 
of members into group affairs was pursued through simple procedures, informa-
tion provided during group meetings, and through direct contacts with commit-
tee members. The information provided stimulated discussions during group 
meetings and further explanations from committee and project staff, and some-
times resulted in policies being adjusted, and thus some degree of member 
control. The expectation that the provision of insight was sufficient to lead 
to control and subsequently to relations based on confidence was only partly 
realized. In some of the groups the insight into group affairs supported this 
confidence and thereby contributed to a good performance, but in other groups, 
information and insight proved to be insufficient to develop the required con-
fidence. 
The perception by individual members of the reliability of the group committee, 
and the permanency of the services provided proved to be decisive for the 
development of permanent relations based on confidence between members and 
groups, and thereby for the performance of groups. In this respect the clear 
procedures and the information provided were certainly positive elements. A 
further positive element was the external control of the groups by project 
staff. This formed a guarantee, although not a hundred percent guarantee, 
that the group committee would function correctly. The joint responsibility 
for non-repayment was a negative element, because members were not prepared 
to be held responsible for others. This was clearly demonstrated by members 
with a correct repayment record who withdrew from their groups because of 
loan delinquency by others. 
These experiences with the relations between members and scheme plead for 
individual responsibility to be limited to the individual share of the loan for 
working capital received by the group. In such a situation, loans must be closely 
linked with the individual share of the loan for starting capital, the amount 
of individual savings, and the repayment record; the project assumes the risk 
of losing a proportion of the loan for starting capital if some members default. 
For the groups this would mean that defaulting members can be expelled without 
the rernaining correctly repaying members suffering a loss, thus avoiding the 
danger of rapidly increasing non-repayment. For the project the risk of losing 
some individual proportions of the loan for starting capital would most probably 
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be offset by the reduced risk of losing the main proportion of the total loan 
in those groups where widespread non-repayment terminates all activities. 
5.1.5 Loan delinquency 
Loan delinquency was a recurrent theme in the preceding discussion because 
in various ways it seriously threatens the ability of the scheme to provide 
financial services on a continuous basis. Loan repayment received much attention 
from the project staff and a monitoring system and procedures to recover 
loans overdue were developed. These efforts by the scheme were necessary to 
restrict loan delinquency, but, on the whole they were not sufficient to remove 
the threat of non-repayment. In cases where groups were confronted with 
wilful defaulters it became painfully clear that committee members generally 
cannot exercise sufficient pressure through legal measures or through the 
local government to enforce repayment. If, for whatever reasons, farmers are 
not sufficiently interested in maintaining financial relations, and show this by 
loan delinquency, the institution loses. Several possible reasons for this insuf-
ficient interest were identified: access to other types of institutional or informal 
credit and self financing. The preference for a direct gain through non-repay-
ment at the expense of a possible long-term benefit from access to credit 
from the group, and misgivings about the permanency of the scheme, probably 
supported by earlier experience with the BIMAS credits, are other possibilities, 
and there is probably a variety of reasons why farmers lose interest. 
5.1.6 Basic conditions 
The above discussion about the responsibility of farmers, access to services 
and the relationship between scheme and farmers lead to the conclusion that 
two conditions are too rigidly formulated because they place the total respon-
sibility for the performance of the scheme on the institution itself. These 
conditions are: the institution must be able to reach all farmers who require 
its services; and, the institution must develop and maintain relationships with 
farmers based on confidence. A more appropriate set of basic conditions that 
serve as focal points for the operations and evaluation of a financial institution 
arises if the two conditions are reformulated as: financial institutions must 
aim to offer financial services to all farmers who require these services; and, 
financial institutions must aim to develop and maintain a relationship with 
farmers based on confidence. The reformulated conditions acknowledge the 
fact that an institution cannot press farmers into a financial relationship they 
do not want, for whatever reason. The efforts of an institution to provide 
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financial services must be complemented by the interest of farmers in a financial 
relationship, and the farmers must show this interest by maintaining a correct 
repayment discipline. In the groups where the great majority of the farmers 
have shown this interest, the experimental scheme has shown the possibility 
of reaching farming communities with diverse financial potentials all over the 
vegetable production areas in West Java. 
5.1.7 Services provided 
The terms 'financial services', or 'savings and credit services', have been 
used in the discussion without specification. The annual accounts show a large 
number and volume of short-term loans provided and a much less prominent 
role for the compulsory and voluntary savings. This might, at first sight, result 
in the conclusion that the provision of credit is the main service provided. To 
a certain extent this is true, but the loan histories of individual members 
offer an additional perspective: members have almost continuously one or more 
loans to the maximum amount allowed, and these loans serve as almost perma-
nently available working capital. The amount of the loans increases gradually 
because of the capital accumulation in the groups through savings. The broader 
perspective leads to two conclusions: 
1. The savings and credit services offered are only partly used to stabilize 
the cash flows of the individual households. 
2. Both savings and credit services serve to build up working capital for the 
individual households. 
The combination of savings and credit services was thus essential for the 
effect of the services offered by the scheme over several years: the enforcement 
of the financial capacity of the farm households, and thereby the increase of 
possibilities for production and consumption. 
A third service provided by the scheme is fairly new, and hardly noticiable 
in the annual accounts: the possibility for groups to deposit funds in short-
term accounts with the project, which in turn places these funds in fixed-
term deposits with commercial banks. Despite the small volume of transactions 
involved, the ability of the scheme to provide this linkage with national financial 
markets has been demonstrated, and in future this function may become impor-
tant to make efficient use of the funds accumulated in the groups. 
5.2 The environment 
The findings and conclusions from the studies of vegetable farmers and finan-
cial relations in the project area resulted in the decision to start with the 
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development of institutional financial services and gave direction to the formula-
tion of these services. Now that the scheme has been in operation for seven 
years it is useful to complement the original studies with the experience gained, 
so that the conditions in RFMs that determine the feasibility of institutional 
financial services can be identified. 
5.2.1 The farm household 
The first conclusion that contributed to the decision to start with the pro-
vision of institutional financial services was: "The provision of institutional 
financial services is, in principle, possible, because there is a considerable 
margin between the average income and the m i n i m u m requirements of a farm 
household'. The review of vegetable prices and costs for the period from 1979 
to 1985 further indicated that vegetable production remained a profitable enter-
prise. The existence of this margin between income and minimum requirement 
proved to be of major importance for the financial viability of the scheme, 
because it enabled the farmers to save substantial amounts. This experience 
supports a provisional conclusion in more general terms: the provision of insti-
tutional savings and credit services is possible, if farmers have a capacity to 
save. 
This conclusion needs explanation, because the logical inference is that farmers 
without a capacity to save cannot be served by institutional savings and credit 
services. At first sight this seems strange, as farmers in all circumstances 
have access to informal financial relationships. The answer to this apparent 
contradiction is based on two findings: a) relations with financial institutions 
do not replace informal financial relations but are complementary to them; b) 
relations with financial institutions are largely voluntary, because the legal 
means to enforce repayment are not effective. Farmers with a capacity to 
save have the option of complying with the loan agreement with the institution 
in difficult situations, and of repaying their loans, thereby maintaining the 
relationship and reaping the benefits of continued access. For farmers without 
the capacity to save, the informal financial relationships are a matter of sur-
vival; they cannot afford not to comply with the regulations of informal rela-
tionships. For these farmers the additional relationship with an institution will 
be of secondary importance and the institution will receive the lowest priority 
if repayment is difficult. Of course, this has adverse consequences for this 
relation and for the continued existence of the institution. Thus, informal 
financial relations cannot serve as an indication of the feasibility of providing 
institutional savings and credit services. 
104 
An additional remark about the conclusion refers to the use of 'capacity to 
save' and not of the commonly used 'repayment capacity". This is done to 
emphasize the freedom of the farm household to use this financial surplus for 
a range of purposes. This surplus will be used for repayment to an institution 
only if the relation with the institution ranks high enough in the financing 
priorities of the farm household. 
The second conclusion which led to the decision to start the experimental 
scheme referred to the usefulness of institutional financial services for the 
production of more, and more valuable, crops. The conclusion as such has 
little substance, because it is difficult to envisage farmers for whom these 
services are not useful. In retrospect, it would have been more appropriate to 
relate the usefulness of financial services to the commercial nature of vegetable 
production, thereby going along with the generally accepted opinion that insti-
tutional financial services become increasingly useful for farmers, the more 
commercial their production becomes. The reasoning behind the original con-
clusion is more interesting because it was based in the first place on the find-
ings that farmers are completely commercial and that vegetable production 
leads to frequent and comparatively large movements of cash, and in the second 
place on the expectation that farmers would use the financial services directly 
to stabilize their cash flows. The supposition of large cash movements in com-
mercial farming proved to be correct. The expectation that credit would be 
used to stabilize these cash flows was not fulfilled because farmers' ability, 
and preference, for internal financing was not sufficiently taken into account. 
This internal financing did not make the savings and credit services superfluous, 
but the services were used in a different way than expected; namely, to build 
up the financial capacity of the farm household. This experience draws attention 
to the fungibility of money as well as other assets in relation to the provision 
of financial services. It further leads to the conclusion that the distinction 
between short-term and long-term credit is not as rigid as it seems to be, 
because reliable access to short-term finance enables the accumulation of assets, 
for example in the form of permanent working capital or investments. 
The largely commercialized production also proved to be important for the 
functioning of the savings and credit scheme from another viewpoint. Farmers 
are used to thinking in terms of cash outlays, returns in cash, loans, profit 
and loss. This commercial t h ink ing facilitates the management of the groups 
by the committee, and helps the members to understand the services correctly. 
Commercial production thus opens up possibilities of using and providing insti-
tutional financial services (the latter if a number of conditions are met) and 
it results in the management capacity to deal with these services. 
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To place the savings and credit scheme in a wider perspective it is necessary 
to highlight two specific aspects of the situation of vegetable farmers in West 
Java. Firstly, the farm household's capacity to save was existent prior to the 
start of the scheme and no change in technology was required to reach it. 
This is important, because new technology is inevitably accompanied by additional 
risks, and if credit is supplied to assist the introduction of new technology it 
often turns out that the supplier of credit is burdened with all the risk. Second-
ly, the input supply and marketing services that vegetable farmers require for 
their production were available, and no additional services complementary to 
credit were required. The input supply and marketing services were certainly 
not perfect, but the failure of KUDs and groups to undertake input supply 
and marketing services indicates that the existing services were at a reasonable 
level. 
5.2.2 Institutional and informal financial services 
The initial studies resulted in two main conclusions: a) institutional credit 
tailored to the requirements of vegetable farmers was not available, and b) 
informal credit provided by vegetable traders was expensive and available ir-
regularly. Because the scheme participated in the RFMs of West Java, additional 
insight was obtained into the activities of other intermediaries. 
During the period reviewed (1979 to 1985) competition emerged from two 
institutions: the dairy cooperatives and the Tabanas national savings scheme, 
providing medium-term credit and savings services, respectively. Several groups 
lost some of their members to the dairy cooperatives, but the majority of the 
group members involved in dairy production, and thus members of the dairy 
cooperative, remained in the groups. The Tabanas saving scheme proved to be 
sufficiently attractive to induce a number of group members to bypass the 
savings facilities offered by the scheme, despite the somewhat lower interest 
rate offered by the Tabanas scheme. It is certainly sensible of these members 
to spread their savings over two institutions but it also points to a greater 
confidence in the Tabanas scheme. 
The informal credit services of vegetable traders and suppliers of inputs did 
not interfere with the credit services of the scheme. This is understandable, 
because the main occupation, which is trade, of both types of informal suppliers 
of credit was not affected. Moreover, the credit services of the scheme did 
not completely replace the credit from these informal sources. Individual inter-
views held in 1986 revealed that in addition to the credit obtained from the 
group, 70 percent of the members made use of informal credit, at least some-
times. Although the interviews did not provide precise data, regular contacts 
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with committee members and farmers show that the credit services in the 
groups replaced an important part of the credit relations with informal prof-
essional operators. 
The experience largely confirmed the conclusions of the initial studies and, 
because the savings and credit services offered were greatly appreciated by 
the farmers, the scheme established a strong position in the vegetable production 
areas. The services offered did not completely replace existing informal financial 
relations and methods of internal financing, but largely complemented them. 
This complementariness and the emergence of competition from new institutions 
underline that the scheme is just one of the operators in RFMs, and that it 
must compete to establish and maintain its position. The main points in this 
competition are the provision of services appreciated by the fanners and the 
establishment of an image of trustworthiness. With respect to the first point, 
the scheme was successful; with regard to the second point there remain some 
doubts, in view of the preference of some members for the Tabanas savings 
scheme. 
5.2.3 Summary 
On the basis of the points discussed above it is possible to reformulate the 
earlier conclusions regarding the farm households and financial institutions 
into conclusions which clarify the respective positions of these two elements 
in the provision of institutional financial services. Farm households must have 
a capacity to save to enable them to comply voluntarily with the terms and 
conditions of the relationship with financial institutions. A financial institution 
is just one of the operators in RFMs, and to establish and maintain a firm 
position it must offer services that are sufficiently attractive by comparison 
with the services offered by others. 
These conclusions show that there is a need to approach the provision of 
institutional financial services from various angles. From the foregoing discussion 
it is also clear that the model of the financial structure of the farm household 
with its external financial relations stated in Chapter 2 is valid. This model 
provides the framework in which the results of various studies can be incor-
porated to form a comprehensive picture of the position of farm households 
and of financial institutions. 
53 The project as implementing agency 
When implementing experiments as a project, there is always a risk that the 
staff, budgets and facilities used in the experiment are so different from what 
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is commonly available that the results are not applicable in normal circumstances. 
This problem is addressed below in a review of the specific aspects of the 
project in relation to the experiment. The position of the project can be summa-
rized as follows: the project was designated a 'pilot project' and no physical 
targets were set; the project had operational budgets from Indonesia and The 
Netherlands; a grant for the credit services was provided by The Netherlands; 
the Indonesian and Dutch staff members were contracted specifically for the 
project and had no formal links with either the cooperative movement or with 
financial institutions in Indonesia. 
The pilot status of the project, the own budget, and the independence of 
the staff resulted in a large freedom to experiment and this was used in two 
ways. First, detailed studies were carried out to ascertain the financial position 
of farmers and the financial environment. On the basis of these studies a 
proposal for institutional financial services was prepared and subsequently 
discussed with farmers, local authorities and government officials. This approach 
was highly unusual in the cooperative sector, where schemes and programmes 
are usually formulated and introduced without field research and without lengthy 
discussions with potential participants. Second, an experimental scheme was 
formulated with two elements that strongly deviated from existing policies 
followed by financial institutions and cooperatives: a) the incorporation of 
farmers' groups with executive power in the organizational structure, and b) 
the interest rate of 1.25 percent per week. The approach followed by the project 
and the implementation of an experiment along these lines would have been 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, from a position within a financial insti-
tution or an ongoing cooperative programme. The independent status of the 
project was thus essential for the freedom to experiment. 
Later, when the expanding scheme required a more permanent legal status, 
the pilot status of the project became a disadvantage. The incorporation of 
the experimental scheme into the cooperative structure proved to be a difficult 
process, mainly because the use of groups of farmers with a large measure of 
independence did not comply with the cooperative policy regarding the role of 
the KUD. In this respect the experiment touched the limits of the institutional 
possibilities in Indonesia. 
The operational budgets and the grant facilitated the studies and the estab-
lishment of the scheme in the first years. However, the great emphasis from 
the start on financial viability prevented a continued dependence on external 
funds for operating expenses and capital, as shown in the discussion about 
financial viability in Section 5.1. Therefore, the availability of budgets and 
grant in the project did not disturb the results of the experiment. 
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Although the grant did not disturb the experiment as such, it did steer the 
experiment in a specific direction. The grant enabled loans for starting capital 
to be provided to the groups and this resulted in a large volume of loans 
from the start of the operations in the groups, with positive effects on capital 
formation and on the capability to pay a management fee. Without a grant, 
and thus without loans for starting capital, the financial development would 
have been slower. However, this does not mean that starting capital is essential 
It is reasonable to assume that in a similar scheme, but with groups providing 
loans from their own savings only, the guiding and supervising role of the 
project could have been reduced. Whether lower turnover and lower overhead 
costs would still have resulted in financial viability remains an open question, 
because an additional experiment without loans for starting capital was not 
undertaken. 
The possibility for such an experiment was available, because several groups 
that applied for admittance to the scheme were already engaged in the collection 
of savings and in the provision of credit from these savings. Inspection of 
these groups invariably revealed that neither the procedures for loan application 
and evaluation nor the terms and condition for loans were specified. The result 
was that after an apparently enthusiastic start, the activities in the groups 
first became irregular and later stagnated. The scheme could have provided 
support to the financial management capacity in these groups only. However, 
support without a loan for starting capital proved to be unacceptable, especially 
for the KUDs involved and the staff of the Directorate General of Cooperatives, 
mainly because the grant for the provision of these loans was not yet exhausted. 
The foreign expertise involved in the experimental scheme remained restricted 
to one person, but the status of the project as a form of bilateral cooperation 
facilitated the link between project staff (Indonesian and Dutch) and the 
specialized cooperative banking expertise available in Wageningen Agricultural 
University and in the Dutch Cooperative Bank. The influence of foreign expertise 
was decisive for the approach and for the formulation of the scheme, and 
thereby for the utilization of the available freedom to experiment. In the oper-
ational stage of the experiment the foreign influence gradually dimmished as 
the Indonesian staff grew in expertise and in numbers and took over all exec-
utive responsibilities. 
To sum up: the project introduced two elements into the institutional situation 
in West Java that were essential for the formulation and for the results of 
this experiment: the freedom to experiment and the foreign expertise to utilize 
this freedom. After the experimental phase the necessity of both elements is 
reduced for a wider application of the results in Indonesia. A certain freedom 
to experiment remains necessary for wider application, but this can be provided 
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from within an organization, if the necessity for it is understood. In this respect 
it is important that the scheme operates in West Java, close to Jakarta, so 
that policy makers can visit groups in the field. A link with foreign expertise 
remains useful, but such links can be maintained on the basis of mutual exchange 
of experiences. The great emphasis on financial viability prevented a continuous 
dependence on external funds, and neither project budgets nor grant form a 
disturbing factor for a wider application of the results of the experiment. 
5.4 Applicability of experiences 
The preceding discussion results in conclusions that are specific for the 
situation in West Java; however, some of these conclusions are of wider impor-
tance and seem to be relevant for the provision of financial services to farmers 
in developing countries in general. This section deals with this wider perspective 
of apphcability. First, the influence of the specific aspects of vegetable pro-
duction and existing financial relations in West Java on the experimental scheme 
will be discussed, to ascertain the relevance of the experience of the scheme 
to other circumstances. Thereafter, the experiences of the scheme are discussed 
in relation to financial policies and the operation of financial institutions 
providing services to farmers in other countries. 
The activities of the vegetable farmers can be characterized as follows: 
year-round production of crops with a cycle of approximately three months; 
intensive, totally commercial production requiring a large amount of working 
capital; irregular income pattern over the year, but an average income well 
above minimum requirements, which results in a considerable capacity to save. 
These characteristics had a number of effects on the experimental scheme. 
The short crop cycle of vegetables and the year-round production result in 
frequent transactions between farmer and scheme. The operations of the scheme 
were specifically formulated to deal with these frequent transactions. Weekly 
cash days, short-term loans and an interest rate of 5.4 percent per month are 
the most specific adaptations. For farmers with a slower turnover of working 
capital, because of a longer crop cycle or because of production during one 
season only, the operational aspects and the terms and conditions of services 
need to be different. Fewer transactions per farmer per year require less fre-
quent cash days; monthly cash days with additional cash days in peak periods 
are probably sufficient in most circumstances. Longer crop cycles lead to loans 
for longer periods and this has a direct impact on the lending costs. Figure 
5.1 gives the relationship between lending costs and loan duration, computed 
with the formula stated in Section 2.2, under the following assumptions regarding 
the cost components: cost of capital 1 percent per month; capital use 90 percent; 
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administrative costs 6.5 percent; default rate 5 percent. The figure shows that 
lending costs per month decline drastically if the loan period is extended, 
whereas the lending costs for the total loan duration increase gradually by a 
fixed amount per month. If, for example, the loan duration is extended from 
three to ten months, the lending costs per month decline from 53 to 2.4 per-
cent, and the latter interest rate can hardly be an impediment for loans with 
this duration. The operational aspects, and the type of services provided by 
the scheme, are thus specific for vegetable producers in West Java, and in 
other circumstances both need to be adjusted. 
The size of the loans provided to farmers is related to the financial capacity 
of vegetable farmers. Initially, the starting capital provided by the project to 
the groups determined the size of loans. The starting capital per group member 
was determined at 40 percent of the estimated working capital of the average 
farmer. The loans provided by the scheme thus supplemented the farmers' own 
working capital, and the risk involved in vegetable production was left with 
the farmers. Later, the groups had built up their own capital through savings, 
and the volume of the savings determined the loan size. The relation between 
loan size on the one hand and farmers' financial turnover and capacity to 
save on the other hand receives little attention from financial institutions 
providing services tp f^armers. In extreme cases, such as the settlement of 
landless people on farms planted with perennial crops, the financing of all 
investments and the expected farmers' income and capacity to save is carefully 
studied to arrive at solutions that are attractive and acceptable to both finan-
cing institution and farmers. The settlement of people on oil palm smallholdings 
in Malaysia by the Federal Land Development Authority is an example of this 
comprehensive approach. However, in the most common situation of institutions 
financing new activities that require new investments, the relation between 
loan size and financial capacity of the borrower is often completely neglected; 
the 'shopping list method' - loans are equal to the total cash outlay for the 
investment - is then simply followed. The experience within the scheme indicates 
the need for restraint in the provision of loans that are large in relation to 
the farmers' financial turnover and capacity to save. If loans for new activities 
are large in relation to the financial capacity of the farmers, the farmers will 
be unable to repay if the new activity does not result in the expected returns 
at the expected time. Financial institutions must therefore make an assessment 
of the risk of lower, or later, returns on new activities, and relate this risk 
to the financial capacity of the farmers. If farmers are considered unable to 
bear this risk, the institution must be prepared to take this risk, possibly 
through insurance or through subsidy arrangements with the government, or it 
must reconsider the loan altogether. Measures to deal with risk do not increase 
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the ex-post lending cost of the institution, because experience has shown that 
the risk of new activities financed with comparatively large loans is borne by 
the institution anyway. 
The discussion of the financial performance of the scheme showed that the 
capacity to save is essential for the scheme's financial viability and this results 
in the following conclusion: Farm households must have a capacity to save to 
enable them to comply voluntarily with the terms and conditions of the rela-
tionship with financial institutions. Experiences with the attraction of savings, 
mentioned in Chapter 2, show that farmers in very different circumstances do 
have a capacity to save, and that they are prepared to deposit savings with 
institutions, provided the conditions mentioned by Wai (1972): a) secure and 
dependable opportunities, and b) an attractive interest rate, are met. The capaci-
ty to save of vegetable fanners is thus not an unique characteristic that limits 
the applicability of the experiences of the scheme. 
The above considerations regarding the specific characteristics of vegetable 
farmers in West Java show that the operational aspects of the scheme, the 
type of credit services, and the size of loans provided, are specific for the 
situation. In other circumstances all these aspects need to be determined again, 
and the approach followed by the scheme: assessment of the financial situation 
of farmers through farm management studies and subsequent discussion of 
possible services with prospective participants, provides a method for determining 
these aspects. However, the essential condition for the provision of institutional 
financial services - farm households must have a capacity to save - can be 
met by many farm households in other, very different, situations. The experi-
ences of the scheme are thus relevant for the provision of institutional financial 
services to farmers in situations that differ from the situation in West Java. 
The existing financial relations of the vegetable farmers in West Java form 
a second aspect of the environment which must be considered in relation to 
the relevance of the experiences of the scheme in other circumstances. In 
West Java no major competition was encountered by the scheme, either from 
informal intermediaries or from formal institutions, although farmers do have 
relations with both. The study of the financial relations of farmers who are 
members of a group revealed that the services provided by the scheme formed 
an important and welcome addition to, and not a replacement of, the services 
offered by others. The study clearly showed that there is competition in RFMs 
and that an institution must offer services that are sufficiently attractive in 
comparison with those offered by other operators. Thus, the type and intensity 
of competition determines the freedom of an institution to decide about interest 
rates and further terms and conditions of its services. The type and intensity 
of competition in RFMs will differ from place to place, and we may expect 
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the full range to exist (from absence of competition to full competition - in 
the sense that there is no place for an additional financial institution) with 
the majority of RFMs somewhere in the middle between these two extremes. 
The competition encountered by the scheme suggests that the situation in 
RFMs in West Java is not extreme, and it is reasonable to assume that this 
aspect of competition does not restrict the wider relevance of the experiences 
of the scheme. 
The discussion of the performance of the scheme, Section 5.1, resulted in 
the reformulation of the three basic conditions for an adequate performance 
of financial institutions: 
- The institution must be financially viable to allow it to function independently 
and continuously. 
- The institution must aim to offer financial services to all farmers who require 
these services. 
- The institution must aim to develop and maintain relationships with farmers 
based on confidence. 
The wider applicability of the experience of the scheme will be discussed in 
the context of the attempts made to comply with these conditions. 
To meet the condition of financial viability, the scheme fixed the interest 
rate for short-term loans at 5.4 percent per month, a rate well above the 
usual rates charged by institutions providing credit to farmers. This rate was 
perfectly acceptable to farmers and, because of the experimental character of 
the scheme, to the government too. The review of actual costs involved in 
the provision of savings and credit services, Chapter 4, shows that a rate of 
approximately 5 percent is indeed required to meet all costs, including default. 
Further, it must be mentioned that the average annual inflation of 11 percent 
in the period reviewed was not a disruptive element, because the margin between 
interest receipts and costs was wide enough to allow capital formation in real 
terms. This experience confirms the opinion, voiced in the extensive literature 
on government interference in financial markets and in the operation of financial 
institutions, that a cost-covering interest rate, or a more 'commercial' policy 
towards the provision of credit, is a necessary condition for attaining financial 
viability. The experience gained during the initial phase of the scheme further 
showed that it is extremely difficult to convince the government of the necessity 
to apply cost-covering interest rates. The still expanding literature on govern-
ment interference reveals that the difficulty the scheme encountered in convin-
cing the government is an almost universal phenomenon, and that political 
considerations often result in continued interference. This means that in many 
countries a necessary condition for financial viability cannot be met. 
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The reduction of government interference in interest rates and in operational 
aspects is a necessary condition for a t t a in ing financial viability, but not a 
sufficient condition. A second requirement for financial viability is that financial 
institutions are able to operate at a cost level that is sufficiently low to offer 
credit at an attractive rate to borrowers, and to attract capital at a rate that 
satisfies lenders. The introduction of the operational costs of financial insti-
tutions broadens the scope of the discussion on institutional finance to the 
organizational and operational problems arising from the processing of large 
numbers of small loans. These problems receive much less attention in the 
literature than government interference, despite the fact that these problems 
must be solved for the actual provision of financial services to farmers, or to 
small rural clients in general. Anderson and Khambata (1985) consider the 
implications of cost-covering interest rates for banks and argue that interest 
rates of 40-60 percent annually are required to cover all costs including risk, 
a level which they consider unacceptable for banks. Their conclusion is that 
lending at 'non-concessionary rates' must be complemented by risk-sharing 
schemes, supported by the government, to induce banks to extend their lending 
to the small clients in trade, industry and agriculture who cannot be reached 
with the usual rates demanded by banks, without encountering losses. Nyanin 
(1983) provides comprehensive data on lending costs for the Self-Supporting 
Farmers Development Programme of the Jamaica Development Bank over the 
period from 1974 to 1980. This programme provides short-, medium- and long-
term loans to small and medium-sized farmers. The lending costs per dollar 
lent were 56 percent for loans with an average duration of more than one 
year, despite the fact that capital was obtained at a concessionary rate of 3 
percent. The estimates by Anderson and Khambata and the actual cost data 
presented by Nyanin reveal the great difficulties encountered by banks if they 
want to operate at cost-covering interest rates and, at the same time, wish to 
remain attractive for borrowers and lenders. 
The review of the accounts of the experimental scheme shows that all costs 
can be met by interest receipts, at the interest rate of 5.4 percent per month 
for short-term loans. The lending costs per Rupiah lent were 20 percent in 
1985 (26 percent without subsidies) and this ratio gives a better indication of 
the cost level of the scheme, because the large influence of loan duration on 
costs, see Figure 5.1, is reduced. Such lending costs are low, compared with 
the few data on bank costs available, and this because of the utilization of 
groups of farmers, which reduces overhead costs for administration, and which 
facilitates the attraction of capital from the farmers at low costs. The ex-
perimental scheme thus demonstrated the possibility of providing institutional 
financial services to farmers on a financially viable basis in a situation where 
114 
% per month 
3 0 . 0 
2 0 . 0 
10.0 
0 .0 
Total lending costs for loan duration Q , - - ' 0 
o-"^ 
Lending costs per month 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
months 
Figure S.l. Relationship between lending costs and loan duration. 
the government did not interfere with interest rates and operational aspects 
such as lending policy. 
The second basic condition - the institution must aim to offer financial 
services to all farmers who require their services - does not differ from the 
policy statements that accompany the introduction of many credit programmes 
in developing countries. A close look at these programmes, however, reveals 
that in many cases there is a wide gap between policy statement and imple-
mentation. Elaborate loan procedures and the physical distance between borrow-
ers and lending institution, both resulting in high transaction costs for the 
borrowers, are often barriers that exclude a large proportion of the potential 
beneficiaries of these programmes. The second basic condition is not meant as 
a policy statement, but as a condition that requires specific efforts from the 
financial institution. These efforts are channelled into two directions: a) the 
provision of services which are adjusted to the requirements of the farmers, 
b) the limitation of the physical distance between institution and farmers to 
keep the costs of access at a low level. These aspects are widely recognized 
in existing literature and two recent studies concerning the experiences with 
the provision of institutional financial services of the German Organization 
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for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and of OXFAM, a British NGO (Schmidt and 
Kropp, 1987 and Devereux and Pares, 1987) respectively, stress the importance 
of both aspects. Among the successful attempts by institutions to reach their 
clients quoted in these studies are: the Pigmy savings scheme, whereby savings 
are collected from the client's doorstep by bank agents; the Grameen Bank of 
Bangladesh, which sends officers to groups of five farmers to make an assess-
ment of their financial position; and a savings and credit union operating in a 
rural area of Zambia. All these examples have in common that the services are 
farmer/client oriented and are provided at the location of the farmer/client. 
The approach followed by the experimental scheme: studies of the financial 
position of farmers and discussions with farmers to determine type, terms and 
conditions of services, and the location of the services in the farmers' groups, 
adds to the world-wide experience in reaching farmers with institutional financial 
services. 
The third basic condition places emphasis on the building of relationships 
with farmers. This emphasis is highly warranted because a great number of 
credit programmes are started solely with the aim of financing a specific inno-
vation. In these cases the adoption of an innovation is the main objective, 
and if this objective is achieved, or appears to be impossible to achieve, the 
government's interest in providing credit wanes. The farmers are then left 
without financial services until the next innovation gives birth to a new, again 
short-lived, credit programme. The BIMAS credit programme in Indonesia is 
just one example of this widespread, short-sighted approach to the provision 
of credit. Contrary to this usual combination of credit and innovations, there 
is much to be said for a start with the provision of institutional financial 
services when there is no immediate need for financing innovations. In such a 
situation the relations between institution and farmers can be built on the 
provision of relatively simple services such as savings and, possibly, small, 
short-term credit. If new investment opportunities arise, this institution with 
established relations with farmers, and with links with the national capital 
market, is in a much better position to support the new investments than a 
hastily formed institution which starts with a budget and hardly anything else. 
In other circumstances the existence of financial relations can be of vital 
importance too. Devereux and Pares (1987) mention a revolving crop-loan scheme 
in India which became instrumental in limiting the effects of a serious drought, 
through the ability to provide specific bridging loans to its clients. The emphasis 
on the establishment and maintenance of relationships with fanners thus provides 
a long-term perspective for a financial institution, and such a perspective is 
essential because institutional financial services are useful for farmers, now 
and in the future. 
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The experience of the scheme shows that farmers share this long-term per-
spective, because their perception of the reliability of the group rornmittee 
and the permanency of the services offered, emerged as being essential for 
the establishment of relationships. The efforts by the scheme: clear procedures, 
the provision of information on group affairs to members and external control 
of the functioning of the group committees, contributed to this perception of 
reliability and permanency, and thereby to the establishment of relationships 
based on confidence. In the course of operation it also became clear that 
once established, relationships need to be maintained through continuous efforts 
to confirm the perception of reliability and permanency. 
The discussion of the situation in West Java and of the experiences of the 
experimental scheme in a wider perspective, enables the identification of several 
essential factors regarding the environment of financial institutions and regarding 
the operations of these institutions. 
The environment in which financial institutions operate is determined by 
the government, farm households and the existing financial relations between 
farm households and operators in RFMs. The essential factors can be expressed 
in two conditions and a limitation: 
1. The government must refrain from interfering in interest rates and operational 
aspects such as lending policy. 
2. Farm households must have a capacity to save, to enable them to comply 
voluntarily with the terms and conditions of a relationship with financial insti-
tutions. 
3. The existing formal and informal financial relations in RFMs form elements 
of competition, and the type and intensity of this competition limits the freedom 
of an institution to set interest rates and further terms and conditions of its 
services. 
The above conditions and the limitation imply that the establishment of a 
financial institution in a certain place at a certain time is not just a matter 
of a policy decision followed by implementation. The government must be pre-
pared to refrain from undue interference, and the situation in an REM must 
be studied to determine a) the capacity to save of farm households, and b) 
whether there is room for the provision of institutional financial services in 
addition to the existing financial relations. These studies reveal whether financial 
services can be provided, and if so, of what type. A review of the literature 
shows that in many countries the first condition is not met, whereas the farm 
households' capacity to save and the existing financial relations may limit, but 
only rarely exclude, the provision of institutional financial services. 
A financial institution must realize the provision of services to farmers-
within the conditions and limitation set by the environment. The three basic 
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conditions for an adequate performance of financial institutions have the follow-
ing implications for the operation of these institutions: 
4. Operational costs must be covered by interest receipts, and the operational 
costs must be sufficiently low so that credit can be offered at an attractive 
rate to borrowers, and capital can be attracted at a rate that satisfies lenders. 
5. The services provided must be adjusted to the farmers' requirements. 
6. The physical distance between institution and farmers must be limited, to 
keep the costs of access at a low level. 
7. Services must be provided in the knowledge that permanent relationships 
with farmers are essential, because these services are useful to farmers now 
and in the future. 
These implications form the essential operational conditions for a financial 
institution providing services to farmers. These conditions are to some extent 
conflicting, but the actual provision of services requires decisions about efforts 
regarding all of them, and the degree to which an institution succeeds in 
meeting these conditions determines its role vis-a-vis farmers in RFMs. 
The above conditions and limitation form a comprehensive framework for 
the analysis of the functioning of financial institutions in rural financial markets. 
Commercial banks, operating under government restrictions with regard to 
interest rates, necessarily restrict their services to larger farmers, or larger 
clients in general, because the interest rate does not allow the operational 
costs involved in reaching the small farmers with the type of services they 
require to be recovered. Cost-covering interest rates are essential for continued 
existence, and the profit and loss account forms a major directive for the 
operations of commercial banks. Relaxation of interference in interest rates 
and, possibly, the provision of government subsidies, as Anderson and Khambata 
(ibid.) suggest, will enable the banks to extend their services to smaller clients. 
However, it remains doubtful whether the capacity to save of the majority of 
farmers is large enough to enable a bank to provide attractive services on a 
scale that is sufficient to meet the additional operational. The functioning of 
specialized farm credit institutions largely violates all operational conditions, 
and the survival of these institutions is dependent on continuous financial 
support from outside, to bridge the gap between operational costs and revenues. 
Relaxation of interference with interest rates is a first, and necessary, condition, 
but a complete re-orientation of the operational aspects is required in addition 
to this, to attain a satisfactory performance. The recent literature on farmers 
and finance provides some examples of banks, cooperatives and associations 
that are able to provide the type of services small farmers require in locations 
close to the farmers, but information about the operational costs and the en-
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vironment in which these institutions operate is generally lacking, and this 
seriously limits the insight in the total performance. 
The description and analysis of the experimental savings and credit scheme 
in West Java shows that an organizational structure consisting of independent 
groups of farmers and a financial institution providing services to these groups, 
opens up possibilities of largely complying with the four operational conditions. 
This, in an environment that is favourable, compared with the situation in 
many countries, because the government of Indonesia refrained from interfering 
in the interest rates and operational aspects of the experimental scheme. 
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ANNEX 1 
Loan history of a farmer who had one loan almost continiously. 
Date Loan received Loan repaid Balance outstanding 
(Rp) (Rp) (Rp) 
28-05-1982 50000 50000 
3-09-1982 50000 0 
10-09-1982 50000 50000 
10-12-1982 50000 0 
17-12-1982 60000 60000 
18-03-1983 60000 0 
25-03-1983 65000 65000 
1-07-1983 65000 0 
8-07-1983 75000 75000 
24-10-1983 75000 0 
31-10-1983 95000 95000 
13-02-1984 95000 0 
20-02-1984 100000 100000 
11-06-1984 100000 0 
18-06-1984 125000 125000 
8-10-1984 125000 0 
15-10-1984 150000 150000 
24-01-1985 150000 0 
31-01-1985 160000 160000 
20-05-1985 160000 0 
27-05-1985 170000 170000 
30-09-1985 170000 0 
7-10-1985 170000 170000 
20-01-1986 170000 0 
27-01-1986 170000 
ongoing 
General information: 
Total number of weeks covered: 191 
Number of weeks without loan: 15 (8% of the time) 
Average size of the loan: Rp 107600 
Total interest paid: Rp 244500 
128 
ANNEX2 
Loan history of a farmer who had two loans with different repayment dates 
almost continuously. 
Date Loan received Loan repaid Balance outstanding 
(Rp) (Rp) (Rp) 
18-06-1981 50000 50000 
10-09-1981 50000 0 
17-09-1981 55000 55000 
3-12-1981 20000 75000 
24-12-1981 55000 20000 
31-12-1981 55000 75000 
4-02-1982 20000 55000 
11-02-1982 20000 75000 
22-04-1982 55000 20000 
29-04-1982 60000 80000 
17-06-1982 20000 20000 80000 
2-09-1982 60000 20000 
9-09-1982 70000 90000 
28-10-1982 20000 70000 
4-11-1982 20000 90000 
16-12-1982 70000 20000 
23-12-1982 70000 90000 
10-03-1983 20000 70000 
17-03-1983 20000 90000 
12-05-1983 70000 20000 
19-05-1983 70000 90000 
1-08-1983 20000 70000 
8-08-1983 20000 90000 
19-09-1983 70000 20000 
26-09-1983 85000 105000 
5-12-1983 20000 85000 
12-12-1983 20000 105000 
6-02-1984 85000 20000 
13-02-1984 85000 105000 
7-05-1984 20000 85000 
14-05-1984 25000 110000 
11-06-1984 85000 25000 
18-06-1984 85000 110000 
8-10-1984 85000 25000 
15-10-1984 90000 25000 90000 
22-10-1984 25000 115000 
29-04-1985 115000 0 
farmer left the group 
General information: 
Total number of week covered: 201 
Number of weeks without loan: 0 
Average size of the loan: Rp 87400 
Total interest paid: Rp 222000 
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SAMENVATTING 
In veel ontwikkelingslanden is de verstrekking van leningen tegen lage rente 
door financiële instellingen aan boeren een belangrijk onderdeel van de land-
bouwpolitiek. Het functioneren van deze instellingen en hun kredietprogramma's 
blijft veelal beneden de verwachting en in veel gevallen zijn de programma's 
gestopt en de instellingen gereorganiseerd. Deskundigen van diverse disciplines 
hebben kritiek geleverd op de kredietpohtiek en de krediet programma's. Deze 
kritiek heeft inzicht gegeven in de politieke achtergrond van krediet program-
ma's, het functioneren van de financiële instellingen, de rol van krediet in 
landbouwontwikkeling, en in de grote verscheidenheid van formele en informele 
financiële relaties in de rurale gebieden van ontwikkelingslanden. 
Deze studie betreft een experimenteel spaar- en kredietsysteem dat ontwikkeld 
is voor de groenteproducenten in West Java, Indonesië. De ontwikkeling van 
het experimentele systeem vond plaats door een projekt in het kader van de 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking tussen Indonesië en Nederland. In dit experiment is 
een poging gedaan om de ervaringen met institutioneel krediet en het vermeer-
derde inzicht in financiële relaties in rurale gebieden om te zetten in operatione-
le richtlijnen. Het experimentele systeem wordt in beschouwing genomen en 
geanaliseerd met de bedoeling organisatorische, financiële en operationele fak-
toren te bepalen die beslissend zijn voor het functioneren van het systeem; 
inzicht te krijgen in de rol van institutionele financiële dienstverlening binnen 
het kader van alle financiële relaties van de groenteproducenten; en om te 
bepalen welke interne en externe faktoren essentieel zijn voor het functioneren 
van financiële instellingen in rurale gebieden in ontwikkelingslanden. 
Het experimentele spaar- en kredietsysteem werd geformuleerd in overleg 
met groenteproducenten en met staf van dorpscoöperaties (KUDs) in West 
Java. Hoofdelementen waren: 
a) Een organisatorische struktuur bestaande uit drie niveau's: het projekt, 
belast met de algehele leiding en toezicht; de KUDs, als wettelijke vertegenwoor-
digers van de boeren; en groepen van ongeveer 50 boeren, die werkten binnen 
de legale status van de dorpscoöperatie in hun gebied. 
b) Nadruk op de financiële levensvatbaarheid van het systeem door de vaststel-
ling van een rente van 5,4 procent per maand voor de korte termijn leningen 
en door de kombinatie van lenen en sparen. 
c) De lokatie van de financiële dienstverlening in de groepen. De groepen 
kozen een voorzitter en een penningmeester die belast werden met de uitvoering. 
Wekelijks werd "kas dag" gehouden voor alle transakties, gewoonlijk in het 
huis van de voorzitter. 
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Het project verstrekte een lening aan de groepen als startkapitaal voor de 
verstrekking van leningen aan leden. Het experimentele spaar- en kredietsysteem 
week op een aantal punten sterk af van de gebruikelijke financiële dienstverle-
ning in Indonesië: het overleg met boeren en lokale bestuurders tijdens de 
formulering; het gebruik maken van groepen van boeren die in belangrijke 
mate zelfstandig zijn; de rente van 5,4 procent per maand voor korte termijn 
leningen. 
Het experimentele spaar- en kredietsysteem begon in 1979 met vier groepen 
in het werkgebied van een dorpscoöperatie. De evaluatie na acht maanden gaf 
een positief beeld en men besloot het systeem uit te breiden. Eind 1985 waren 
er 94 groepen binnen 11 KUDs in werking, verspreid over de belangrijkste 
groenteproduktiegebieden van West Java. De uitbreiding ging gepaard met een 
aanpassing van de regels ten aanzien van het financiële beheer in de groepen, 
en met een formele regeling van de relaties tussen groepen, KUDs en projekt. 
Het gevolg was dat het projekt zich ontwikkelde tot een financiële instelling 
met geformaliseerde relaties met groepen en KUDs. De groepen toonden aan 
dat ze in staat waren als zelfstandige rechtspersonen te opereren, maar de 
indonesiche politiek ten aanzien van dorpscoöperaties maakte de overgang 
naar zelfstandige groepen onmogelijk; de KUDs bleven dus deel uit maken van 
het systeeem als wettelijke vertegenwoordigers van de groepen. 
De beschouwing en analyse van het systeem na zeven jaar laat zien dat de 
kosten van het gehele systeem gedekt kunnen worden uit de renteinkomsten 
en dat de besparingen van de groepsleden resulteerde in de accumulatie van 
een aanzienlijk eigen kapitaal in de groepen: het systeeem is dus financieel 
levensvatbaar. De inspanningen van het systeem om alle boeren te bereiken en 
om relaties op te bouwen die gebaseerd zijn op wederzijds vertrouwen was 
voor een deel suksesvol. De ervaring toont aan dat dergelijke inspanningen 
aangevuld moeten worden door de interesse van de boeren in een permanente 
relatie, en dat deze interesse moet resulteren in een correcte terugbetalings-
discipline. In de meeste groepen vertoonde de meerderheid van de boeren een 
dergelijke interesse en het experimentele systeem toonde aan dat het mogelijk 
is gemeenschappen met verschillende financiële mogelijkheden te bereiken met 
institutionele financiële dienstverlening in West Java. Deze prestatie is voor 
een belangrijk deel het gevolg van de inschakeling van groepen, wat resulteert 
in gemakkelijke toegankelijkheid van de dienstverlening, de bereidheid van 
leden om te sparen, en een betrekkelijk laag kostenniveau door het gebruik 
van lokaal management. 
De omstandigheden van de de groenteproducenten in West Java zijn specifiek, 
en de operationele aspecten van het systeem zoals de aard van de diensten, 
het rente percentage, en de wekelijkse kas dagen, zijn op deze omstandigheden 
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afgestemd. In andere omstandigheden moeten deze operationele aspekten aange-
past worden. Voor de vaststelling van deze aspekten in andere omstandigheden 
kan de benadering van het project gevolgd worden. 
De diskussie van de ervaringen met het experimentele systeem in het wijdere 
verband van de verlening van institutionele financiële diensten aan boeren in 
ontwikkelingslanden leidt tot de formulering van zeven essentiële faktoren 
betreffende de omgeving waarin de instellingen werken en betreffende het 
functioneren van de instellingen zelf. De faktoren betreffende de omgeving 
zijn: 
1. De overheid moet zich onthouden van inmenging in de vaststelling van rente-
percentages en operationele aspekten. 
2. Boerenhuishoudingen moeten een vermogen tot sparen hebben om in staat 
te zijn vrijwillig te voldoen aan de verplichtingen die een relatie met een 
financiële instelling met zich mee brengt. 
3. De bestaande formele en informele financiële relaties in rurale financiële 
markten vormen een concurrentie die de vrijheid van een financiële instelling 
beperkt om rente en voorwaarden voor dienstverlening vast te stellen. 
De faktoren betreffende het functioneren van instellingen zijn: 
4. De kosten van dienstverlening moeten gedekt worden door de renteontvangsten 
en de kosten moeten voldoende laag zijn om leningen tegen een aantrekkelijke 
rente aan te kunnen bieden, en om spaarders een acceptabele rente te kunnen 
geven. 
5. De diensten moeten zijn toegesneden op de behoeften van de boeren. 
6. De afstand tussen instelling en boeren moet beperkt zijn om de kosten 
verbonden aan het verkrijgen van diensten laag te houden. 
7. De diensten moeten geleverd worden vanuit de wetenschap dat permanente 
relaties met boeren essentieel zijn, omdat deze diensten nuttig zijn voor de 
boeren nu en later. 
Deze essentiële faktoren vormen tesamen een raamwerk voor de analyse van 
het funktioneren van financiële instellingen in rurale financiële markten in 
ontwikkelingslanden. 
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RINGKASAN 
Di kebanyakan negaraberkembang, pinjaman yang berbunga rendah kepada tani 
oleh instansi pemberi kredit, termasuk bagian penting dari program politik 
pertanian yang berlaku. Peranan daripada instansi2 ini dengan program2 peng-
kriditannya umumnya tidak berjalan sebagai yang diharapkan, bahkan kebanyakan 
dari program2 ini dihentikan guna direorganisasi kembali. Para ahli dari berbagai 
disiplin telah memberi kecaman terhadap politik pengkriditan serta programnya. 
Kecaman2 ini telah memberi gambaran mengenai latar belakang politik program2 
pengkreditan, cara kerjanya badan2 pemberi kredit, peranan kredit di dalam 
pembangunan pertanian dan mengenai adanya aneka jenis relasi finansial yang 
formal maupun yang tidak formal di daerah pedesaan negara2 berkembang. 
Kajian yang bersifat eksperimen mengenai sistem simpan-pinjam ini, disusun 
bagi petani penghasil sayuran di daerah Jawa Barat, Indonesia. Pengolahan dari 
sistem ekperimen ini terjalin dalam rangka proyek kerja-sama antara Indonesia 
dan Negeri Belanda. Dengan ekperimen ini telah dicoba merubah ha!2 yang 
telah dialami di bidang kredit institusional dan pengetahuan yang lebih mendalam 
perihal hubungan relasi finansial di daerah pedesaan, untuk dirubah menjadi 
pedoman2 operasional. Sistem ekperimen dipelajari dan dianalisis dengan tujuan 
untuk menentukan faktor2 organisatoris, keuangan dan operasional yang akan 
menentukan jalannya sistem ini; untuk mendapat gambaran mengenai peranan 
bantuan keuangan institusional dalam rangka segala relasi keuangan-tani 
penghasil sayuran; dan untuk menentukan faktor2 intern dan ekstern mana 
yang penting bagi kelancaran badan2 keuangan ini berfungsi, di daerah pedesaan 
negara2 berkembang. 
Eksperimen sistem simpan-pinjam ini telah disusun bersama-sama dengan petani 
penghasil sayuran dan pengurus koperasi desa (KUD) di Jawa Barat. Unsur2 
terpenting adalah: 
a. Suatu struktur organisatoris yang terdiri dari tiga tingkat, yaitu: proyek 
yang memegang pimpinan umum dan pengawasan, KTJD2 sebagai perwakilan 
yang sah dari para petani, dan kelompok2 petani yang terdiri dari kira2 50 
orang yang bekerja di dalam status yang sah dari lingkungan koperasi desa 
daerahnya sendiri. 
b. Pemberian aksen kepada daya-hidup sistem keuangan ini dengan penetapan 
bunga sebesar 5,4 % sebulan untuk pinjaman jangka pendek dan dengan pemberian 
palayanan kombinasi pinjam-tabung. 
c. Lokasi (tempat) pemberian bantuan keuangan dari kelompok2. Kelompok2 
telah memilih seorang ketua dan seorang bendahara sebagai pelaksana. Seminggu 
sekali diadakan "Hari-Kas" untuk semua transaksi; biasanya diadakan di rumah 
ketua. 
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Proyek telah memberi pinjaman kepada kelompok2 sebagai modal pertama, 
untukdapat dipinjamkannya kepada anggauta2nya. Sistem simpan-pinjam ekspe-
rimen ini dibeberapa bidang menyimpang sekali dari sistem pemberian kredit 
yang berlaku dilndonesia, yaitu: musyawarah dengan para petani dan wakil2 
pemerintah setempat pada waktu perumusan; penggunaan kelompok2 tani yang 
hampir mencapai tingkat mandiri; bunga 5,4% sebulan untuk pinjaman jangka 
pendek. 
Sistem ekperimen simpan-pinjam ini dimulai pada tahun 1979 dengan4 kelompok 
dari satu daerah-kerja koperasi desa. Karena evaluasi yang diadakan setelah 8 
bulan, memberi gambaran yang positip, maka diputuskan untuk memperluas 
sistem ini. Pada akhir 1985, 94 kelompok di dalam 11 KUD, tersebardi seluruh 
daerah penghasil sayuran yang terpenting dari Jawa Barat, telah berjalan. 
Perluasan tersebut berjalan sejajar dengan penyesuaian pedoman2 di bidang 
pengawasan keuangan dalam kelompok2, dan dengan pengaturan formil dari 
relasi2 antar kelompok2, KUD2 dan proyek. Dengan demikian proyek berkembang 
sebagai suatu instansi keuangan dengan hubungan relasi antar kelompok2 dan 
KTJD2, yangformil. Kelompok2telahmembuktikankemampuannyabekerjasebagai 
badan hukum, akan tetapi politik pemerintah Indonesia dibidang koperasi desa, 
tidak memungkinkan terjalinnya peralihan semacam ini; jadi KUD2 tetap ber-
sangkutan dalam sistem ini sebagai wakil kelompok yang sah. 
Pengamatan dan analisis terhadap sistem ini setelah 7 tahun menunjukkan 
bahwa biaya seluruh sistem ini dapat ditutupi dengan pendapatan bunga dan 
bahwapenghematananggauta2kelompokmenghasiËcanpembentukanmodalsendiri 
di dalam kelompok, yang lumayan besarnya; jadi sistem ini memiliki daya hidup 
keuangan yang nyata. Dari sekalian usaha sistem ini untuk menghubungi semua 
petani guna membangun suatu relasi atas dasar saling percaya, hanya sebagian 
saja yang berhasil. Pengalaman telah menunjukkan bahwa usaha semacam ini 
harus dilengkapi dengan tambahan perhatian para petani, terhadap tercapainya 
hubungan yang permanen, yang akhirnya menghasilkan disiplin kepatuhan melunasi 
hutang, yang baik. Umumnya petani2 dari kebanyakan kelompok mempunyai 
perhatian semacam ini; sistem ekperimen ini menunjukkan bahwa di Jawa Barat, 
masyarakat dengan aneka potensi keuangan, dapat dihubungi dengan bantuan 
keuangan institusional. Prestasi ini sebagian besar dicapai berkat diikutsertakan-
nya kelompok2 sehingga, pelayanan lebih lancar jalannya, kesediaan daripada 
anggauta2 untuk bertabung, dan biaya pengeluaran yang relatif tidak tinggi, 
karena adanya kapasitas manajemen berupa tenaga setempat. 
Keadaan petani penghasil sayuran di daerah Jawa Barat adalah khas dan aspek2 
operasional dari sistem ini seperti umpamanya sifat daripada bantuan yang 
diberikan, persentase bunga dan "Hari-Kas"-mingguan, disesuaikan dengan 
keadaan ini. Dalam keadaan yang berbeda, aspek? operasional ini harus dimodi-
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fikasikan. Untuk menentukan aspek2 ini dalam keadaan yang berbeda, cara 
kerja proyek dapat dipergunakan. 
Diskusi mengenai pengalaman dengan sistem eksperimen ini dalam hubungan 
bantuan oleh dinas2 keuangan-institusional kepada petani di negara2 berkembang, 
menghasilkan 7 buah faktor rumusan pokok, mengenai lingkungan pekerjaan 
instansi2 dan cara mereka berfungsi. Faktor2 mengenai lingkungan tersebut 
adalah: 
1. Pemerintah harus lepas tangan di dalam menentukan persentase bunga dan 
aspek2 operasional. 
2. Anggaran rumah tangga petani harus berkemampuan menabung, agar secara 
bebas (tanpa paksa) dapat mentaati kewajiban2 di dalam hubungannya dengan 
instansi2 keuangan. 
3. Hubungankeuangan yang formal maupun yang tidak formal di dalam pasar an 
keuangan-desa, menimbulkan persaingan, yang membatasi kebebasan instansi 
keuangan dalam hal penentuan bunga dan syarat2 bantuan. 
Faktor2 mengenai caranya instansi2 bekerja: 
4. Biaya operasi harus dapat ditutupi dengan hasil penerimaan bunga, dan 
harus cukup rendah sehingga pinjaman dapat ditawarkan dengan bunga yang 
menarik dan kepada sipenabung dapat pula disajikan bunga yang pantas 
nilainya. 
5. Ladenan yang diberikan harus disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan petani. 
6. Jarak kejauhan fisik antara instansi keuangan dan para petani harus dibatasi 
agar biaya-usaha untuk mendapat bantuan mudah terjangkau. 
7. Bantuan harus diberikan atas dasar pemikiran bahwa hubungan permanen 
dengan petani adalah utama, karena bantuan ini berfaedah baginya, baik 
sekarang maupun di kemudian hari. 
Faktor2 utama ini sama2 membentuk suatu rangka, guna menganalisis caranya 
instansi keuangan berfungsi didalam pasar an keuangan-desa dari negara2 berkem-
bang. 
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